[FPSPACE] Understanding what happened to the Iranian launch attempt
Charles Vick
cpvick at globalsecurity.org
Thu Aug 21 10:59:23 EDT 2008
Iran's Second Satellite Booster Launch Attempt
C By Charles P. Vick (All Rights Reserved)
08-19-2008
Disclaimer
The opinions and evaluations stated here in are only the authors and cannot
be construed to reflect those of any Government agency, company, institute
or association. It is based on public information, circumstantial evidence,
informed speculation, declassified U.S. intelligence community documents,
official Iranian and North Korean government documents and histories, oral
histories, interviews and reverse engineering analysis. As with all data
regarding the Iranian and North Korean strategic space and ballistic missile
programs, this analysis is subject to revision--and represents a work in
progress. It reflects the total open source analysis process and previous
studies using the same information analysis process.
Several months behind schedule Iran tried again to launch a booster with a
test payload into earth orbit only to have it fail once again. Its not if
Iran failed in the test satellite launch attempt but how it failed and what
it revealed. The flight ultimately went ballistic into space as the second
stage failed soon after staging and shroud separation. The failure was quite
dramatic in that this time the second stage failed going wildly out of
control ultimately flying ballistic ally into space. The point being is that
the Iranians never gave any orbital data clearly indicating failure to
achieve orbit for a second time in flight testing. Ballistic ally it went
well beyond sixty miles altitude but the failure must have been at a lower
altitude after clearing the atmosphere enough for shroud separation. Sea
level nozzles are only so effective at altitude before you have to be
replaced with the altitude vacuum nozzles to push against.
Yes the second stage did separate with first stage solid motor retro fire
and second stage solid motor pulling it forward to settle the propellants.
Then the second stage started up during staging in this coast translation
period. During the start up the top of the first stage exploded as the
inter-stage disintegrated at second stage ignition soon after separation
under its solid motors power and about ten seconds later the shroud
separated as planned but some how the back wash shock wave fireball from the
start up ignition sent the second stage out of control beyond it orientation
control capability but the second stage did do its burn. Ultimately it
disintegrated on reentry which was probably quite a meteor incoming shower
show in the Arabian Gulf area. The first flight test in February never
started the second stage burn but the turbo machinery did work as it was
spiraling back to earth near the launch site as seen in video. Clearly the
Iranian's have no staging environmental test facility like the US and other
countries do but they have been more successful with their solid motor
staging with the three stage Ashura MRBM replacement for the Shahab-3A/B.
Back in February I was able to identify at least seven or more recognizable
design flaws in the Safir launch vehicle only one or two of which I can
confirm has been addressed by this flight test as the mock-up booster does
not have these features. I assume that several of the other six plus design
flaws noted have also been addressed with this flight. Several design flaws
previously identified can now be discussed. Design flaw one - This booster
did have the translation staging and retrofire rockets for the first and
second stage and third stage separation payload and propellant stabilization
etc but the mock up and engineering test models did not. Design flaw two -
Previously seen where are the anti-vortex baffles for the second stage but
they are probably there but very obscure? Another design flaw now recognized
is the Failure to coast well apart after staging before the primary start up
ignition of the second stage main thrust chambers is apparent. I decline to
give away the rest of those recognized design short comings that would be to
violate the national security technology transfer rules. It is rather
amazing to me that they have missed eight of those design issues in the
engineering models that experience would immediately have recognize as
required.
Literally I was only able to come to this conclusion late last night to what
happened based on the DoD intelligence briefing and White House National
Security briefing and the various press accounts of them which I will
document later on. The SIGINT telemetry analysis and the radar along with
the DSP thermal IR imaging create this understanding as described by several
reporters one of which has repeatedly been much more complete in the
description as given at the off the record backgrounders.
Cpv 08-21-08
Further study of these text and illustrations will explain much more about
the flight path and planning and facilities
http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/world/iran/planning.htm
http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/world/iran/test-ranges.htm
http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/world/iran/satellite-launch-facilities.h
tm
http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/world/iran/first-satellite-launch-attemp
t.htm
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