[FPSPACE] MSNBC.com (Oberg): "Human failings serve as NASA wake-upcall"
E.P. Grondine
epgrondine at hotmail.com
Sat Aug 11 14:06:11 EDT 2007
Jim,
I think you are misreading the problem. It isn't people with weaknesses let
through a faulty screening process; it's that the demands of the jobs are so
intense, and the experience of spaceflight so unique, that collectively it
leads to problems for the individuals doing these jobs.
I noted Yuri's morning after, I noted the high divorce rate back so many
years ago. And my observations were generally ignored - they don't fit with
the "heroic" and "fun" paradigm the space cadets promote.
In the end, Novak's behavior might just have been extreme enough to start a
re-examination of the whole behavioural complex. And if that occurs, it
will be for the best.
I note that other data, from Russia, on the early cosmonauts psychological
development is poorly developed at this time.
I think that dealing with this entire complex is going to require a
re-working of the support environment and work loads, not simply refining
the screening process further.
E.P. Grondine
Man and Impact in the Americas
>From: "Jim Oberg" <jeoberg at comcast.net>
>To: <fpspace at friends-partners.org>
>Subject: [FPSPACE] MSNBC.com (Oberg): "Human failings serve as NASA
>wake-upcall"
>Date: Tue, 7 Aug 2007 23:43:52 -0500
>
>MSNBC.com (Oberg): "Human failings serve as NASA wake-up call"
>
>How medical rules were bent - and why remedies are needed
>
>http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/20167011/
>
>Commentary // By James Oberg // NBC News space analyst // Special to MSNBC
>
>August 7, 2007, 9:15 pm EDT
>
> HOUSTON - Over the past few months, space engineers have been forcibly
>reminded that booster seals and wing panels aren't the only things that can
>crack in space: Humans can, too.
>
> To the embarrassment of NASA officials, and to the glee of far too many
>outside cynics, the public has been treated to a ghastly parade of human
>failings from space workers that might have led to disaster if they
>occurred during flight: February's story of a love triangle gone wrong,
>which resulted in the arrest of astronaut Lisa Nowak; a murder-suicide at
>NASA's Johnson Space Center; and last month's tales of heavy alcohol use in
>the astronaut corps.
>
> Still more stories circulate among the astronauts themselves. One
>account focuses on a spaceflier who had a detached retina corrected "on the
>outside" without NASA's knowledge. Another story tells of a veteran shuttle
>commander who should have been disqualified on medical grounds, but was
>allowed one last flight when the medical team acquiesced.
>
> Engineers are accustomed to measuring the reliability of space
>hardware. They have developed tests and measurements that can go a long way
>toward winnowing out the "failure points" in mechanisms, designs or
>operational plans.
>
> Where disaster has occurred, investigation boards have determined them
>to be the result of human failings somewhere along the line - for example,
>skipping procedures that were already known to be necessary.
>
> But how about people? How can they be measured, and how can weaknesses
>be filtered out so that there is not a loss of concentration at a critical
>time, or a loss of the mental or physical ability to react properly?
>
> Medical issue is a complex one -- Applying medical standards to
>astronauts was the main theme of the report issued last month by an
>independent panel of eight physicians - the report that stirred all the
>controversy over alcohol use. Commissioned by NASA Administrator Michael
>Griffin in the wake of Nowak's arrest, the report assessed the space
>agency's ability to monitor the "psychosocial health of astronauts" and
>identify "potential system vulnerabilities" in current practices.
>
> At the same time, I've been conducting a private, informal survey of
>two dozen former astronauts and flight surgeons, and comparing the comments
>with information gleaned during my two decades at Mission Control in
>Houston. The results have convinced me that the issue of maintaining
>medical standards for flight crews is a complex one.
>
> The astronauts say some people have flown even though they shouldn't
>have, and some people have been grounded even though they shouldn't have.
>Some of these cases have had significant impacts on individuals - and yet
>this process, for all its flaws, appears to have functioned sufficiently
>well to forestall any significant impact on U.S. human spaceflight so far.
>
> This is despite the stories of a few men and women who flew sometimes
>with illnesses, sometimes with surgical complications, sometimes with
>physical disqualifications, sometimes with unverified psychological
>balance.
>
> Privacy shrouds process -- As with the anecdotes mentioned in the last
>month's report - such as the stories of pre-flight alcohol abuse, which
>monopolized the public's attention to the disregard of the report's more
>central findings - these stories are unverified. (In fact, NBC News reports
>that investigators have been unable to substantiate the report's claims
>about alcohol.)
>
> Medical anecdotes are difficult to confirm because NASA follows the
>federal government's policy on protecting the medical privacy of employees.
>"All individuals have a right to medical privacy. NASA respects that right
>for all its employees, including astronauts," NASA spokesman James
>Hartsfield told me at Johnson Space Center in Houston.
>
> "The policy we have with regard to astronauts and missions, that are of
>high national interest, is [that] we would respect the medical privacy
>issue unless there is a matter that significantly impacts the mission,"
>Hartsfield said. For example, NASA has in the past disclosed medical
>conditions that affected launch schedules, spacewalks and other mission
>activities - while withholding comment on medical matters extraneous to
>such activities.
>
> Meanwhile, the medical standards process, in public and in private,
>remains hit or miss. It seems based on judgments that are sometimes skewed
>by careerist strategies - for example, not angering people who could help
>dictate the future assignments of those making the decisions.
>
> Getting away with such a strategy "so far" may seem not unlike "getting
>away" with plume leakage from the shuttle's solid rocket boosters, until
>Challenger ... or getting away with debris damage to the shuttle's
>underbelly dozens of times, until Columbia. Is it only a matter of time
>before undetected weaknesses in this component conspire with other failures
>to create conditions for another tragedy in space?
>
> The medical stresses will grow more severe as NASA moves through a
>string of complex missions on the international space station, through the
>twilight years of the space shuttle era, and onward to a new era that will
>take humans beyond low Earth orbit. Human weaknesses that may have been
>tolerable before now may, at some point, reach a breaking point. To
>forestall such disasters, a fuller appreciation of the history of medical
>screening is needed.
>
> A catalog of medical crises -- All of the individuals who responded to
>my inquiries did so under the condition that their names not be used. The
>only guarantee of authenticity that I can give in this analysis is that
>they are all people I have known and worked with, often for decades. I have
>relied on their judgment and candor in the past, and I still do.
>
> Only a handful of astronaut medical disqualifications are in the public
>record. The problems of Mercury astronauts Deke Slayton (heart murmur) and
>Alan Shepard (inner-ear disorder) are well known, and both eventually were
>restored to flight status and flew in orbit. John Bull, selected as an
>astronaut in 1966, was later dismissed after displaying a significant
>intolerance to aspirin. Doctors insist Bull's dismissal was a good call,
>even as they express sympathy.
>
> The famous grounding of would-be Apollo 13 flier Ken Mattingly for
>indirect exposure to German measles was controversial at the time and
>remains so. He later flew a very successful lunar mission. One astronaut
>involved in 1970's Apollo 13 drama noted that Mattingly played a crucial
>role in developing procedures for reviving the imperiled spacecraft. "Ken's
>presence on the ground was of inestimable value in returning the crew
>safely," he said.
>
> One veteran flight surgeon endorsed the view that astronauts were
>usually given the benefit of the doubt on medical calls. "I think overall
>the number of 'breaks' the crew gets far outweigh the hits," he said in an
>e-mail.
>
> He said the final fly/no-fly decision was often out of his hands, and
>over his head: "Most of the time 'management' seems to make the decisions
>(as they probably should, since I would submit every decision is a balanced
>risk). They probably don't weigh the medical opinion as much as I would,
>but that's a biased opinion to be sure." A good example of this might be
>one very successful pilot astronaut who, it was discovered late in his
>career, was color-blind. He seemed to fly OK, so the condition was
>"exempted."
>
> Renal stones and retinal detachment -- The flight surgeon listed other
>cases: "We flew a guy with a positive hepatitis antibody [and] we flew [a
>guy with] known renal stone history." In a more serious case, he added, "We
>found out about a guy who had a retinal detachment lasered on the outside
>but didn't report it. [We] only found out after the fact but still could
>have hit his pension."
>
> Renal stones, better known as kidney stones, can be problematic for
>spaceflight because the dehydration that commonly occurs in zero-gravity
>could lead to rapid precipitation of painful stones during a mission. But
>after several cases of astronauts receiving private treatment for such
>conditions (without telling NASA about it), and then flying without
>incident, NASA seemed to lighten up on that constraint.
>
> One astronaut on a later flight said in an e-mail: "I do know of a case
>of kidney stones for one of our payload specialists, which occurred a few
>months before flight. NASA took him to have them ultrasound zapped, and he
>was able to fly."
>
> Bending the rules seemed acceptable in such cases - except, apparently,
>when the astronaut in question was European, and a history of kidney stones
>had been the reason NASA gave officially in 1980 for keeping him out of
>mission specialist training. He later flew several times as a payload
>specialist, which is a different astronaut classification.
>
> Case of the arthritic astronaut -- Another aging astronaut reportedly
>developed an arthritic shoulder prior to his flight. The astronaut had
>"difficulty raising his right arm above shoulder level," a crewmate
>reported to me.
>
> "This matter was never brought up in any briefings or meetings that I
>recall," the crewmate continued. "[He] flew with distinction, and his
>experience and expertise contributed significantly to the successful
>mission." Back on Earth, the astronaut had the shoulder replaced with a
>mechanical joint, with good results. Whether the shoulder would have proven
>a barrier to successfully evacuating the shuttle in an emergency was
>apparently an issue that NASA never tackled.
>
> A shuttle astronaut (and physician) pointed out that crew surgeons have
>brought about medical "saves," in which disputes were resolved in favor of
>some crew members through successful treatments and other countermeasures
>before flight. One veteran astronaut told me that in the year leading up to
>launch of a science mission for which he had been on the "support crew," he
>was twice notified he might have to step in and fly in the place of a crew
>member who was struggling with a potentially disqualifying medical
>condition.
>
> "In both cases, the problems were actively addressed and resolved," he
>reported. No medical issues arose during flight.
>
> Another pilot astronaut gave a similarly positive review for NASA's
>medical team. "My experiences with flight medicine were all very positive,"
>he said in an e-mail, "and in fact I always felt that they were very
>proactive in doing everything possible to work through any medical issues
>to make certain crew members got fair opportunities."
>
> Bending to the breaking point -- But sometimes, yet another veteran
>astronaut told me, the bending of the rules got to the breaking point.
>
> "There was one instance of a shuttle commander with a
>flight-disqualifying medical episode that the flight surgeons 'nursed
>along' so that he could make one last flight and not cause the agency any
>'embarrassment'" he said in an e-mail. "I have names, etc., but really
>cannot release them."
>
> The independent panel behind last month's report likely heard these
>sorts of stories, and more. The report referred to problems with NASA's
>medical screening process - and concluded, as my own informal survey
>suggested, that such problems had not received adequate attention for a
>very, very long time.
>
> "Many of the cultural and structural issues identified as problematic
>have existed for many years," the report noted. "The current medical and
>operational leadership at NASA inherited most of the cultural and
>structural issues identified in this report, [and] the issues are so
>ingrained and longstanding that it will take senior leadership action to
>remediate them."
>
> Now that the issues have reached the attention of top NASA leadership -
>and the attention of Congress and the public as well - that remediation
>seems assured. This year's painful embarrassments for NASA may prove to be
>a blessing in disguise, balanced against potential future human failures in
>space that now might, just might, be avoided.
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