[FPSPACE] North Korea and space

[wayneday]

>===== Original Message From MattWriter@aol.com =====
>Second, it points out the limits of relying on satellites for monitoring arms
>treaties.  Under the Agreed Framework of 1994, North Korea agreed to end its
>nuclear program in exchange for aid, but there was no provision for on-site
>inspection or aircraft-overflight verification.  I presume the U.S. believed
>that "national technical means" would be adequate.  Being caught by surprise

Are you sure that there was no provision for on-site inspection?  I remember 
reading that part of the agreement included emplacing remote cameras to 
monitor 
the plutonium that the NKs had removed from their reactor.

However, there are certainly different degrees of on-site inspection and even 
if 
it was part of the agreement, it was not intrusive.

Also, wasn't on-site inspection part of the IAEA accords that Iraq signed?  I 
am 
hazy on the details, but Iraq is frequently held up as an example of the 
follies 
of international arms monitoring agreements--they formally signed the 
international accord, yet we learned after the Persian Gulf War of 1991 that 
they had an active nuclear program that the IAEA was unaware of.  (Similarly, 
the Soviet Union signed an agreement concerning biological weapons and then 
violated it in a massive way, although I am not sure that on-site inspections 
was part of that agreement.)

The bottom line seems to be that if a country wants to cheat, they can do so 
whether or not there are inspections, and they can probably get away with it.


>by the 1998 launch should have been a signal that satellites can't do
>everything.  This confirms it - a nuclear program was carried on in
>underground areas without the U.S. apparently having a clue, despite the fact
>that North Korea is undoubtedly one of the top targets for U.S. imaging
>satellites.

First, see the Iraq example above--that provided plenty of proof that US 
imaging 
satellites could not detect a nuclear weapons program.  Second, it is worth 
noting that this recent revelation did not simply happen now--the US suspected 
this as far back as 2000, although the NKs probably initiated their program 
soon 
after they signed the 1994 accord.


>The ramifications of this are serious.  Remember that imaging satellites also
>failed to cath the SS-20s the USSR kept in East Germany in violation of the
>INF  Treaty, and those are pretty large objects.  How far can we go in
>trusting satellites to verify existing treaties on nuclear arms, etc., as
>well as proposed treaties like the ASAT ban?  As long as people don't do
>something stupid, like aboveground nuclear tests, it seems there is a real
>chance of getting away with treaty violations.

This would actually form the good basis of a journal article about the limits 
of 
verification.  Although I am unfamiliar with the literature, I imagine that 
the 
proliferation control community is well aware of these kinds of things.  I 
also 
imagine that the Cold War concept of arms treaty monitoring is no longer in 
use.  
Relying on "national technical means" (NTM) alone is probably no longer 
considered useful by this community except for a very narrow range of issues.

But it is also worth noting that countries that want to build proscribed 
weapons 
are placed at a disadvantage by seeking to avoid national technical means.  
You 
can build a nuclear weapon in secret and not test it so that nobody detects it 
by seismic sensors, but you have much less confidence in the weapon.  The same 
goes for an ASAT weapon--if you do not test it, you do not know if it will 
work, 
but if you do test it, someone will spot it.  Thus, NTM can still serve as a 
deterrent.




DDAY

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