[FPSPACE] 45th Anniversary of 'Sputnik'

Fri, 4 Oct 2002 08:07:03 -0500

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45th Anniversary of 'Sputnik'

In honor of the date, this chapter from 'Red Star in Orbit' (1981). I =
remember the event vividly, as a 12-year-old 'space nut' who knew the =
Space Age was coming.=20

2

=96=96=96=96=96=98 =96=96=96=96=96

The Birth of SputnikDuring the first week of October 1957, an =
international scientific conference was drawing to a close in =
Washington, D.C. One of the attendees at that conference was an American =
scientist who was born in Russia and had served as an officer in the =
tsarist navy until the Bolshevik Revolution forced him to flee. =
Constantine, as I will call him, was a long-time enthusiast of space =
exploration. He had read all of the works of Konstantin Tsiolkovskiy, =
Nikolay Rynin and other Russian space visionaries, and he chose the =
subject of space flight at the conference to tease the Soviet =
scientists.

The hundredth anniversary of Tsiolkovskiy=92s birth had been marked only =
a few weeks before. "Poor Tsiolkovskiy is turning in his grave," the =
ex-tsarist officer taunted. "His hundredth birthday has passed without =
even one Russian artificial earth satellite in orbit. Under the Tsar we =
would have had several of them long before now and would have celebrated =
the anniversary with a flight to the moon."

Most of the Soviet scientists took no offense at his ribbing, but one =
official, after attempting to restrain himself, finally blurted out, =
"Just you wait and see!" Constantine, sensing that he had touched a =
nerve, pressed his attack: "That's easy for you to say, but you are =
returning to Moscow next Sunday" =96 that would be October 6, just two =
days away. The man retorted, "It will be before then =96 you'll eat your =
words." Constantine, surprised by the man's confidence, realized he had =
uncovered something significant.

Suspicions that the Soviets were about to embark on some spectacular =
space venture had been aroused even before the conference, ever since =
they had claimed that, like the Americans, they, too, were preparing to =
launch scientific satellites as part of the International Geophysical =
Year. Two months before, they had announced the successful flight of an =
intercontinental ballistic missile, an ideal booster rocket for such a =
space probe; only days before, they had quietly released the radio =
frequencies at which their sputnik (Russian for satellite) would soon be =
transmitting.

Other people at the Washington conference also came to the conclusion =
that something would soon break. Walter Sullivan, a New York Times =
science correspondent, had picked up several such rumors and had =
researched all the earlier hints and speculations. Late that Friday =
afternoon he submitted a story to the New York news desk for publication =
in Saturday morning's edition (October 4). The space shot, Sullivan had =
written, could come "at any time." The dateline on his story was Friday, =
October 4, 1957. The story was never printed.

Instead, in Saturday's New York Times, under a three-level full-page =
banner headline saved for particularly earth-shaking events, was the =
news from Moscow: the satellite, Sputnik-1, had been launched late =
Friday, Moscow time. Probably it had happened at about the same time =
that Sullivan was drafting his article and Constantine was teasing his =
Russian colleagues. Sullivan did not learn of the launching until late =
that evening; however, the Russian official's blurted boast had =
intrigued Constantine so much that he passed the story to some friends =
of his at the Naval Research Laboratory outside of Washington. They =
immediately tuned in their radio equipment to the frequencies which had =
been published a few days earlier =96 and within hours were picking up =
the signals from the satellite even before its launching bad been =
announced in Moscow.

The launching of Sputnik-1 is a convenient milestone at which to mark =
the birth of the space age and the subsequent space race between the =
United States and the Soviet Union. But to appreciate all the dimensions =
of that fascinating development, the roots of Sputnik must be traced in =
detail. How it was launched =96 that was a technological question soon =
answered. Who were the men who had launched it =96 that, too, was =
answered, although this question was more difficult. But why was the =
project carried out? Only after a quarter century can we really answer =
that question.

The careers of two exceptional men are intertwined in the development of =
the Sputnik project and the subsequent spaceflight explosion, which took =
men to the moon only twelve years afterward and set up permanent =
outer-space outposts within a quarter of a century. These men were =
Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev, the former miner, party bureaucrat, purge =
master and canny political manipulator, and Sergey Pavlovich Korolev, =
the engineer, pilot, GULag survivor, rocket magician and, finally, =
master of the embryonic Soviet space program. The Sputnik and the space =
age were born from the combination (and often conflict) of these two =
men's needs and capabilities.

The life of Korolev falls into several distinct phases. It has been =
frustratingly difficult to untangle the threads of adulation, cover-up =
and falsehood that have been wrapped around him by official biographers. =
The first phase of his life, which can be styled his "apprenticeship," =
has been described in a fairly straightforward manner even in the =
official chronologies =96 but it stops abruptly in 1938, when Korolev =
(then aged thirty-two) was swallowed up into the monstrosity of the =
GULag Archipelago so vividly documented by Robert Conquest and Aleksandr =
Solzhenitsyn.=20

For the next fifteen years of his life, the most that Moscow has made =
available is a careful selection of isolated impressions and =
half-truths, with many years passed over in silence. Korolev emerges =
again as a real person in the mid-1950s, but with one particular =
drawback: while he was alive (he died in 1966), Khrushchev kept him =
anonymous, referring to him only as the "chief designer" and allowing =
him to publish only under the pseudonym "Sergeyev"; when his existence =
was finally acknowledged after a solemn state funeral, Khrushchev=92s =
turn had come to be deleted from the Soviet loose-leaf history books, =
and he was never thereafter referred to in relation to the development =
of the Soviet space plans in the 1950s. So a complete and honest =
appraisal of this relationship has never been published inside the =
Soviet Union.

Korolev=92s early life in the Ukraine, his studies at an aeronautics =
institute run by the great airplane designer Tupolev in Moscow and his =
amateur enthusiasm for flying homemade gliders have been well documented =
even in Soviet accounts By the mid-1930s, just before his thirtieth =
birthday, he switched his spare-time enthusiasms from glider design to =
rocket propulsion research; he joined a small group led by the Latvian =
engineer Friedrich Zander. Their unofficial organization was named GIRD, =
which nominally stood for Group Studying Rocket Propulsion =96 but in =
recognition of the fact that they received no official support and had =
to acquire all of their materials from their own resources, they often =
jokingly referred to themselves as the Group Working for Nothing which =
worked out to the same letters in Russian.

During this period, Korolev earned his living as a professional engineer =
designing aircraft in the bureau run by Tupolev, Russia=92s greatest =
aeronautical engineers and the creator of the line of aircraft bearing =
the Tu prefix =96 the Tu-20 (Bear), Tu-16 (Badger), Tu-56 (Blinder) and =
the supersonic Tu-144, as examples. But Korolev=92s enthusiasms were =
aimed at higher targets, and he avidly read books on rocketry and space =
travel. In 1934 he visited the home of Russia=92s revered space prophet, =
Konstantin Tsiolkovskiy (or Ziolkowsky =96 his father was a Polish =
lumberjack who had moved to Russia), and met briefly with the great man =
himself. Within a year, Tsiolkovskiy had died =96 but his dreams lived =
on in many Russians, including Korolev.

Rocketry research, meanwhile, took a great leap forward when it received =
the official blessing of Soviet Armaments Minister Mikhail N. =
Tukhachevskiy, who was intrigued by the possibility of rocket weapons. =
He was also apparently a genuine enthusiast about the concept of space =
travel, which, of course, would be accomplished by Soviet pioneers! So =
GIRD suddenly received a substantial budget and several full-time =
employees, first among them being Korolev, who was granted a commission =
of general-engineer (one star) in the Red Army.

Under the patronage of Tukhachevskiy, rocket research flourished. In =
1933 the first free flight of a Russian-made liquid-fuel rocket took =
place at an army base near Nakhabino, outside of Moscow. Development =
continued for several years, spurred on by reports of the work of Robert =
Goddard in the United States (where it was ignored by the government and =
by the academic community) and of a group of German engineers. But this =
embryonic three-way space race ended disastrously for the Russian side =
in 1937.

The Stalin purges had been ravaging the nation=92s intelligentsia, while =
the collectivization drives were wiping out millions of peasants =96 but =
Korolev and his team no doubt felt safe under the wing of the =
highest-ranking Soviet military officer in the Red Army. But they were =
fooling themselves: Tukhachevskiy was suddenly arrested on June 10, =
1937, and his whole staff followed him into prison and to their deaths. =
Stalin evidently suspected him of "Bonapartist" tendencies, believing =
perhaps that forty-three-year-old Tukhachevskiy planned to overthrow the =
Communist party and set up a military dictatorship. Stalin=92s distrust =
was also evidently fueled by falsified documentation implicating =
Tukhachevskiy, documentation prepared and planted by German agents. The =
politics of this episode remain obscure, but the effect on the fledgling =
Soviet rocket program was immediately obvious: annihilation.

All of Tukhachevskiy=92s favorite projects were automatically suspect =
since they no doubt would be staffed by numerous pro-Tukhachevskiy =
people. Stalin=92s secret police took no chances: everyone within reach =
was arrested. Korolev=92s life nearly ended =96 his official biographies =
stutter at this point and leap many years into the future.=20

A former fellow prisoner of Korolev=92s recounted how the future chief =
designer was initially interrogated by the secret police at Butyrskaya =
Prison in Moscow: "Your pyrotechnics and fireworks are not only =
unnecessary to our country but are actually dangerous," he was told. To =
protect the country Korolev was shipped off in a boxcar with a number =
and a life term. There were millions like him in those years, and most =
of them died.

Information about this phase of his life must be gathered from a number =
of independent (and, of course, unofficial) sources. However, defecting =
Soviet science writer Leonid Vladimirov has listed a series of oblique =
references which have made their ways into official books. Other sources =
are the samizdat underground newsletters which circulated in Moscow in =
the late 1960s and early 1970s. Chronicle of Current Events, number 10, =
issued October 31, 1969, criticized Politizdat (Political Publishing =
House) because a new book by A. Romanov about Sergey Pavlovich Korolev =
was deliberately incomplete: "There is no mention of the fact that =
Korolev was arrested and subjugated to repressive measures, nor of what =
became of Korolev=92s immediate teachers and close friends."

Throughout his prison term Korolev was described by former comrades as =
"absolutely firm, never disguising his contempt for the regime" Another =
Russian engineer who knew him in prison described him as "a cynic and a =
pessimist" whose favorite slogan was "We will all vanish without a =
trace." The closest any work has come to an official admission of this =
imprisonment was a fairly honest biography of Korolev by Yaroslav =
Golovanov, who made this suggestive comment when referring to =
Korolev=92s work in the 1930s: "He could not then by any means know that =
there would be many very hard times, sometimes cruelly unjust to him." =
Golovanov=92s ambiguity may have been fueled by Korolev=92s own utter =
refusal to discuss that period with strangers: "Several times I led the =
conversation round to his past," Golovanov wrote in 1967. "But as far as =
I remember, he did not like this theme and always tried to switch our =
talk in another direction."

Well could he have wished to avoid such themes, especially about the =
events of 1937. For months he had been packed in a boxcar heading =
eastward along the Trains-Siberian Railroad, only to be transferred at =
the Pacific coast into the crowded hold of a prison ship. The final =
destination was the east Siberian port of Magadan, staging area for the =
Kolyma gold mines, an infamous charnel house even by GULag standards. =
But back in Moscow a card with his number on it had been flied in a box =
in some police archive =96 and as if by a miracle, he survived a full =
year at Kolyma before receiving a reprieve in the form of an order back =
to a special prison in Moscow.

As it turned out, Tupolov had saved him. The aircraft designer and his =
entire staff had also been arrested but had been locked up in a special =
prison, a =91sharashka=92, as the inmates called it, where they =
continued their engineering work on military projects. Korolev=92s time =
there was mentioned in Solzhenitsyn=92s documentation: "The father of =
space navigation, Korolev, was taken into a sharashka as an aviation =
scientist. The sharashka administration did not allow him to work on =
rockets and he had to do that work at night." Tupolev had been =
instructed to gather together any other of his engineers who had been =
scattered throughout the GULag, and it was his request for Korolev (and =
the officiousness of some secret-police bureaucrat who was actually able =
to trace Korolev=92s sentence) that had snatched him to the relative =
safety of the sharashka.

Korolev spent several years in the prison near Moscow while World War II =
was ignited and Germany invaded Russia. As the Wehrmacht neared Moscow, =
the Tupolev group was evacuated (still under guard =96 there was always =
the chance they might try to escape and join the Nazis!) to Omsk. =
Korolev had been there for only a few months when he was transferred to =
Special Prison Number 4 (location unknown), where a group was working on =
rocket-assisted airplane takeoff systems, on bombardment rockets, on an =
in-flight emergency acceleration rocket for conventional aircraft and on =
pure rocket- and jet-propelled aircraft. The engineer in charge of the =
unit was Valentin Glushko, an old friend and colleague of Korolev=92s =
from the GIRD days who had somehow struck a deal with the secret police =
and was now a free man.

The team worked for four years on these projects, with Korolev serving =
as Glushko=92s deputy for flight testing. After the war ended, =
Korolev=92s position improved, although he was still nominally a =
prisoner serving a life term for treason.

He and Glushko were assigned to a new rocket group under the command of =
an opportunistic and ambitious engineer named Chelomey (or Chalomei =96 =
sources disagree on the spelling).

When Glushko went to Germany in 1946 to study captured V-2 equipment =
(the first trainload of material from Peenemunde had been hijacked by =
Americans and replaced with wrecked farm machinery), he took Korolev =
along =96 under heavy guard. They both attended a British-sponsored test =
launch of an extra V-2 from the Baltic town of Altenwaide ("Operation =
Backfire"), but Korolev=92s name had not been officially submitted to =
the British site commander =96 perhaps because the Soviet secret police =
would not let him out of their direct custody =96 so he was forced to =
watch the test from outside the barbed-wire compound.

When Glushko returned to Russia, Korolev remained in Germany (no doubt =
under appropriate supervision) to direct the repair of the underground =
V-2 factory at Niedersachswerfen and to coordinate the shipment of V-2 =
equipment to the Soviet Union. He escorted the last shipment back to =
Russia in the summer of 1946 and supervised some test firings at a =
Soviet missile range on the lower Volga River, not far from Stalingrad. =
Korolev then returned to the Russian zone of Germany, where he =
interviewed dozens of former V-2 engineers and technicians (he was =
self-taught in German and English). Having prepared a list of useful =
Germans, he turned it over to Soviet security forces =96 and on the =
night of October 22-23, 1946, soldiers rounded up everyone on the list =
for immediate departure for Russia. There they were split into numerous =
design teams and put to work on various research programs; most did not =
return to Germany until 1950-1951.

The Russians, meanwhile, pursued their own rocket research with their =
own surviving experts. The German teams were used for collateral =
research or to cross-check each other and confirm Russian developments, =
and were never integrated into the mainline Russian development program. =
The first all-Russian ballistic missile, code-named the R-1, was created =
under the leadership of Korolev in late 1947; somehow Glushko returned =
to his subservient position and was in charge of the rocket engine while =
Korolev directed the entire project. Eleven test flights in October and =
November 1947 marked the resumption of forward motion of Korolev=92s =
dreams for space flight. He was even called to the Kremlin to personally =
brief Stalin on the military missile program.

Golovanov, the most candid of the official biographers, made a poignant =
commentary on Korolev=92s life during this period, a comment that could =
not be fully appreciated without knowing about the GULag years. "Korolev =
was a most exact reflection of an epoch," wrote Golovanov in 1968. "He =
has become part of it, it would seem, forever and imperishably. He knew =
all its triumphs and drained the cup of its bitterness to the dregs. =
Korolev=92s biography is the concretization of the history of our land =
in one man.

After a few years of near freedom, Korolcv may have been thrown back =
into prison. Some of his former colleagues have reported that he was =
sent back in a sharashka in 1948 (although other reliable sources make =
no mention of this second incarceration). These special prisons have =
been eloquently described by the Russian novelist Solzhenitsyn in his =
First Circle. (According to Dante, the first circle was the highest and =
least uncomfortable circle of Hell.) Many observers reard a peripheral =
character in Chapter 17, a man named Bobynin, to be based on Korolcv =
himself during his second imprisonment. In one bristling retort to a =
Soviet army interrogator, Bobynin/Korolev expressed the thoughts which =
might have gotten him into prison in the first place =96 and certainly =
kept him there:

"We could make you talk."

"You are wrong, Citizen Minister!" Bobynin=92s strong eyes shone with =
hate. "I have nothing, you understand, nothing! You can=92t get your =
hands on my wife and child =96 a bomb got them first. My parents are =
already dead. My entire property on this earth is my handkerchief; my =
coveralls and my underwear are government issue. You took my freedom =
away long ago, and you don=92t have the power to return it because you =
don=92t have it yourself. I am forty-two years old [so was Korolev], and =
you=92ve dished me out a twenty-five-year term. I=92ve already been at =
hard labor, gone around with a number on, in handcuffs, with police =
dogs, and a strict-regime work brigade. What else is there you can =
threaten me with? What can you deprive me of? My work as an engineer? =
You=92ll lose more than I will..."

Only two circumstances need revising to convert the fictional Bobynin =
into the authentic Korolev. First, Korolev=92s mother was still alive =
(and, indeed, was to survive him by more than fifteen years). Also, his =
wife and child were alive =96 but separated from him. In 1946, upon =
regaining his freedom for the first time, Korolev had divorced his first =
wife, Oxana (or Xenia) Vincentini. (Their one daughter had been born =
about 1935.) She had apparently yielded to presure and had denounced him =
while he was at Kolyma, and then had never communicated with him again. =
The next year, 1947, Korolev had remarried, to Nina Kotenkova.

Following Stalin=92s death in 1953, Korolev was rehabilitated, along =
with hundreds of thousands of other purge victims. In Korolev=92s case, =
he was offered membership in the Communist party, and whatever his =
personal feelings, he knew it would increase his political influence =96 =
so he accepted. Korolev was also quickly rewarded for his previous work =
by election to the Soviet Academy of Sciences, first as a corresponding =
member (there are about three hundred) and soon afterward as a full =
member (of which there are about one hundred and fifty).

His rapid rise in the post-Stalin years may not have been based purely =
on merit: it was Khrushchev=92s policy not merely to rehabilitate purge =
victims, but to promote many of them above others who had gone along =
with Stalin=92s regime, thus providing Khrushchev with cadres of =
ready-made loyalists who owed their new positions to him =96 and would =
fall with him.

The new field of military missiles was one which obviously required =
careful watching. Russia=92s need for modern rocket weapons had become =
indisputable, and even before Stalin=92s death, industrial organizations =
had been set up to produce the new equipment. In mid-1953 a new =
organization called the Ministry for Medium Machine Building was =
founded, with the sole purpose of directing the manufacture of missiles. =
Some junior members of the Soviet government were assigned to maintain =
liaison between the engineers and the politicians. One was Dmitriy =
Ustinov, a young but highly competent armaments manager; the other was =
Leonid Brezhnev, an engineer turned politician.

Khrushchev first met Korolev when the "collective leadership" which =
followed Stalin=92s death in 1953 tried to grapple with the issue of the =
new rocket weapons. Stalin had favored such rockets because Tupolev=92s =
airplane bureau had been unable to design bombers with ranges =
sufficiently great to reach the United States =96 powerful missiles =
promised to overcome this restriction. (Korolev had taken charge of the =
project after his rehabilitation.) But as Khrushchev later admitted in =
his memoirs, the new leaders had been kept in the dark by Stalin and =
knew very little about rockets at all: "Korolev came to the Politburo =
meeting to report on his work. I don=92t want to exaggerate, but I=92d =
say we gawked at what he showed us as if we were sheep seeing a new gate =
for the first time. When he showed us one of his rockets, we thought it =
looked like nothing but a huge cigar-shaped tube, and we didn=92t =
believe it would fly. Korolev took us on a tour of the launching pad and =
tried to explain to us how a rocket worked. We were like peasants in a =
marketplace. We walked around the rocket, touching it, tapping it to see =
if it was sturdy enough =96 we did everything but lick it to see how it =
tasted.... We had absolute confidence in Comrade Korolev. When he =
expounded his ideas, you could see passion burning in his eyes, and his =
reports were always models of clarity. He had unlimited energy and =
determination, and he was a brilliant organizer."

This impression of Korolev was a common one. Biographers both inside and =
outside the Soviet Union seem to paint a consistent portrait of =
Korolev=92s character. For example, another official biographer, Pyotr =
Astashenkov, wrote: "Korolev combined an excellent theoretical =
background, scientific foresight and organizing ability with the =
determination to fight hard for his ideas." Romanov=92s 1968 biography =
was even more graphic: "I study the scientist: a high and handsome =
forehead, as though intentionally modeled by a sculptor in order to =
emphasize the unusual qualities of this uncommon man. Black eyebrows, on =
the straight side. Over-wide and deep-set brown eyes. Energy blazes in =
them. At different times I have seen them angry and kind, raging and =
mocking, determined and good-natured. But in many years of knowing the =
man I have never seen them empty or indifferent. The mouth is firmly =
delineated, the corners down-turned, the chin juts forward. Taken all =
together, the appearance of the person sitting before me conveys =
tremendous energy, power, authority."

A former colleague, writing in the freer atmosphere of Yugoslavia, where =
he had taken political refuge, corroborated that image: "Korolev had =
great authority and commanded respect from those with whom he worked," =
wrote Sergey Korda in an obituary in 1966. "A man of inexhaustible =
energy, he combined great talent, excellent engineering intuition and =
surprising creative boldness with outstanding administrative =
capabilities and high spiritual values."

But a few words of caution are in order. Golovanov, most honest of the =
official biographers, pointed out that "there is no need to idealize =
Korolev. He was tough and harsh but cold and daring, sly and cunning but =
not devious. He was blunt, but he knew his business. And the main thing =
about him was his ideal."

That ideal, of course, was space exploration. But to achieve that =
purpose, to send men into space, as he had been planning for years, and =
to send probes to the moon and nearby planets, he needed an immense =
budget =96 and Khrushchev was the one he had to persuade. Getting =
funding for military missiles was one thing, but for space projects =96 =
that was an entirely different matter.

In 1956 his first attempts to get approval for an earth satellite =
project were rebuffed. As he later recounted it, "We closely followed =
reports on the building in the United States of an artificial earth =
satellite with the suggestive name of =91Vanguard.=92 At that time some =
people believed that this satellite would be the first in outer =
space.... We took stock of what we had, and decided that we could send a =
good hundred kilograms into orbit. So we went to the Central Committee =
of the Communist party. There we were told that the idea was attractive =
but needed more thought."

Even without approval for the satellite project, Korolev continued work =
on the R-7 rocket (in Russian, it was affectionately known as "ol=92 =
number seven," or semyorka), the giant missile designed to carry a bulky =
two-ton thermonuclear bomb more than four thousand miles, far enough to =
reach the United States. As it turned out, the semyorka was a very =
inefficient military missile but an excellent space booster, which is =
probably what Korolev had in mind all along.

To test this giant new rocket, with a lift-off thrust of more than one =
million pounds (three times that of its American counterpart, the =
Atlas), an entirely new missile test range was needed. Construction =
began in June 1955 near the Aral Sea, north of the small village of =
Tyuratam in Kazakhstan. The party secretary of Kazakhstan at that time =
was Leonid Brezhnev, and he took great interest in the development of =
the missile project. So did the American CIA: before the concrete on the =
launch pad was dry, U-2 spy planes were flying overhead to keep tabs on =
the project.

The first R-7 exploded on launch in the late spring of 1957. Several =
more attempts also ended catastrophically, and by July 1957 Korolev was =
facing serious criticism from rival rocket experts (particularly the =
engineer Chelomey) and from Moscow bureaucrats; his satellite project =
looked hopeless. According to a thinly disguised but highly sanitized =
semi-biographical movie (The Taming of Fire, Mosfilm, 1972), Korolev =
counterattacked: "You think only Atlas missiles can explode? We are =
building the most powerful machines in the world!" His reference to the =
Atlas explsion during its first launch on June 11 helps date this =
comment (if the comment is authentic) and the R-7 failures which =
preceded it; the statement must also have preceded August 3, when the =
first successful launch was finally accomplished. A second success =
followed a few weeks later, when the missile was sent full range into =
the Paciftc near the Kamchatka peninsula (and not too far from the =
Kolyma gold mines where Korolev had slaved in 1938 =97 1939).

Meanwhile, fireworks had also been going off in the Kremlin. The =
position of Khrushchev as "first among equals" in the collective =
leadership was rapidly deteriorating as his colleagues found unexpected =
unity in a common fear of Khrushchev=92s growing power. While using a =
campaign of anti-Stalinism to combat his rivals, and by flaunting the =
success of his bold (his rivals styled it "reckless") crushing of the =
October 1956 rebellion in Hungary, Khrushchev reached for total and =
undisputed power. The showdown came in June 1957, when several =
Khrushchev allies were absent from Moscow: the anti-Khrushchev forces on =
the Politburo demanded a debate on the ouster of Khrushchev from his =
official posts, and then voted six to one to replace him with Shepilov. =
(Malenkov, Molotov and Kaganovich led the fight against him, and when he =
appeared to have lost, Bulganin joined the opposition; loyalists Suslov, =
Mikoyan and others had been out of town on party business when the =
meeting was convened, as the conspirators had planned.) But Khrushchev =
maneuvered adroitly and delayed certain official actions until a full =
Central Committee meeting could be convened. Meanwhile, he called upon =
Red Army leader Zhukov to organize an airlift of loyalists (and detours =
of unreliables) from all over the Soviet Union to the showdown vote in =
Moscow =96 which he then won.

His victory, while sweet, must have been incomplete. No doubt he =
suspected continued disaffection within the party apparatus, even as he =
drove the leaders of the revolt into retirement or obscurity. No doubt =
he also feared having given Zhukov a taste of power, since Zhukov, the =
victorious general of World War II, was a far more popular figure than =
Khrushchev, not only among the armed forces but also within the party =
hierarchy itself. Lest Zhukov move to grasp full political power (as his =
American counterpart, Eisenhower, already had =96 or so Khrushchev may =
have reasoned by analogy), he was the next target for elimination.

At the same time, Khrushchev was genuinely concerned about perceived =
military threats from the United States. If Russians in general seem to =
be paranoid about foreign invasions, they have also really been the =
victims of countless such invasions and attacks. From the Russian point =
of view, the American bases near their borders, combined with =
belligerent statements from American officials, were cause for genuine =
alarm. A way of reducing Russia=92s susceptibility to attack was the =
development of a credible deterrent system, such as nuclear-tipped =
missiles =96 but such a deterrent is useful only so far as it is =
believable, and any Russian claim to have invented such a device would =
probably be laughed off along with previous claims to the invention of =
airplanes, steam engines, radio, tractors and decimal coinage.

In the light of these domestic and international problems, Korolev=92s =
proposal for a Soviet artificial satellite (to be launched by an R-7 =
missile with a reduced payload) suddenly became much more attractive to =
Khrushchev. First, it would signal to dissident political forces within =
the Soviet Union that Khrushchev was really leading the country to a =
glorious future; second, it would overawe the traditionalist "artillery =
generals" in the Red Army and allow a reorganization of the armed =
forces, including a reduction in obsolete ground forces (saving money =
and pulling the rug out from under possible opposition leaders); last, =
it would demonstrate in an unequivocal manner the existence of the =
long-range missile system, which was intended to discourage a potential =
attack from the United States. Under these circumstances, what had at =
first appeared to be a pointless diversion of technical resources =
suddenly became =96 as far as Khrushchev personally was concerned =96 a =
powerful idea. And so, as Korolev later recounted, "in the summer of =
1957 the Central Committee [a euphemism for Khrushchev, who by that time =
exercised full power] finally endorsed the project." It should be noted =
that neither science nor world opinion seems to have entered into =
consideration.

If approval for the satellite project came after the first successful =
R-7 launches in mid-August, Korolev=92s team had only one month to go =
before the hundredth anniversary of Tsiolkovskiy=92s birth. (That =
anniversary would have meant little to Khrushchev anyway.) It took them, =
instead, about six weeks =96 and Korolev literally lived at the launch =
pad to accomplish this.

The concrete stand from which the satellite would be launched stood at =
the edge of a two-hundred-foot-deep, half-mile-wide pit, a natural bay =
in a high ridge which crossed the missile center. Railway lines ran =
south.from the pad to an assembly building about a mile away; there the =
missile was assembled horizontally (from sections shipped by rail from =
Moscow) on a railroad flatcar before being hauled out to the pad, =
erected and fueled for launch.

Halfway between the assembly building and the pad was a grove of trees =
surrounding a natural spring. In that grove Korolev had built a small =
wood-frame house for his own personal use. He would meet there with his =
deputies, or would walk fifteen minutes to the assembly hail in one =
direction or ten minutes to the launch pad in the other direction. =
Workers knew that Korolev could =96 and did =96 drop in at anytime of =
the day or night; he did not sleep much.

There were other workers at the missile center whom Korolev could not =
visit, even though he knew them well. They were the men who had poured =
the concrete, excavated the bunkers and erected the buildings in which =
the rockets were being assembled. But the color of their drab clothing, =
and the color of the uniforms of their guards, identified these men as =
zeks, political prisoners among whose ranks Korolev had spent many, many =
years. Their work, too, contributed to Korolev=92s dream of the conquest =
of space =96 and no record exists of how he felt about their presence or =
what he could do (if anything) for them. They, too, must have been on =
his mind in those hectic weeks.

A simple test satellite was thrown together in one of the smaller =
machine shops in the assembly building. It consisted of a radio =
transmitter hooked up to a thermometer and powered by a pack of chemical =
batteries. The object was affectionately known as the "PS," the =
preliminary satellite =96 and this caused some confusion among many =
newly arrived engineers, since Korolev himself was known to his men as =
"old SP," for Sergey Pavlovich. The two nicknames "es-peh" and =
=91peh-yess" were often mixed together indiscriminately in those weeks, =
their intimate interrelationship blending in the minds of the workers =
into one entity. It was Korolev, or a significant part of him, who would =
be riding on that rocket.

Finally the payload was attached to the nose of the rocket as it lay on =
its carrier inside the assembly hall. As the nose cone was slid into =
place, a technician flipped a switch on the PS, activating its radio =
system. Someone had brought a shortwave radio into the hall, and the =
beep-beep-beep of the future Sputnik echoed strangely around the =
suddenly silent rocket specialists. The nose cone slid into place and =
the radio receiver was turned off; the men surged back to action.

Korolev took his place inside the command bunker, a steel-walled room =
built right into the concrete launch pad, about three hundred feet from =
the rocket itself. Some men watched the rocket through periscopes, while =
others monitored dials and meters. Korolev sat at a wooden desk, a white =
lab coat over his work clothes and a microphone in his hand.

As the countdown neared zero, a lone figure suddenly appeared on the =
concrete apron and blew a series of long trumpet blasts before vanishing =
back to his duty post. Nobody ever revealed who it was, and it might =
have been Koro1ev himself.=20

The sun had long since set when the count reached zero after many =
exasperating delays. The firing command was given and an automatic =
sequence of pump activation began; moments later, the engines lifted =
off; dazzling the watchers at the periscopes and temporarily deafening =
the occupants of the control blockhouse. Then the PS was on its way; =
within four minutes it was only a tiny spot of light in the northeastern =
sky.

During the ascent, twenty separate engines in five long pods fired in =
unison. The central cylinder held the satellite in its nose, while four =
tapered cylinders were attached to its sides in "parallel staging." The =
tapered units exhausted their fuel first and peeled away like a flower =
unfolding its petals; the thicker central stage continued burning for =
another five minutes until it was soaring at more than 18,000 miles per =
hour, two hundred miles above earth=92s surface. Gravity still pulled =
the now freely falling PS back toward earth on a descending arc =96 but =
so great was its speed (as Korolev had calculated) that the horizon of a =
spherical earth receded from the falling object at the same rate. PS was =
in orbit above the atmosphere. It was 1930 hours Greenwich mean time =
(2:30 in the afternoon in Washington, and 10:30 at night in Moscow); an =
hour and a half later, the PS finished its first circumnavigation of its =
home planet, announcing its success to radio listeners via its =
distinctive radio call sign.

Korolev=92s rocket team assembled at the still-smoking launch pad to =
await the news from the tracking site. The soon-to-be-famous =
beep-beep-beep was played over the pad speakers and the men cheered. =
Korolev stood up on an improvised rostrum and addressed his colleagues =
with a speech that, although impromptu, had probably been part of his =
daydreaming most of his life. "Today the dreams of the best sons of =
mankind have come true," he told the crowd of engineers. "The assault on =
space has begun." It was a vindication of his long-standing insistence =
that space travel was possible; as a later biography put it, it "was the =
culmination of his efforts to persuade skeptics that rocketry and =
astronautics were not merely science fiction."

Khrushchev had just returned to Moscow that night from his vacation home =
in the Crimea A few days later he described his own reactions to =
reporter James Reston, who noted that "Khrushchev=92s attitude on the =
launching of Sputnik... was almost casual." Khrushchev recounted that =
"when the satellite was launched, they phoned me that the rocket had =
taken the right course and that the satellite was already revolving =
around the earth. I congratulated the entire group of engineers and =
technicians on this outstanding achievement and calmly went to bed."=20

In contrast, Moscow spokesmen trumpeted the launching to extract all the =
propaganda they could muster. The original launch announcement had set =
the tone: "Artificial earth satellites will pave the way for space =
travel, and it seems that the present generation will witness how the =
freed and conscious labor of the people of the new socialist society =
turns even the most daring of mankind=92s dreams into reality." That was =
to be the propaganda theme: success in space implied superiority on =
earth.

Khrushchev moved to exploit the impact of the announcement, for the =
purposes of which he had originally approved it =96 but as the days went =
by, he seems to have been surprised by the depth of the feat=92s impact =
on the Western public. That would turn out to be a bonus, but his =
original short-range purposes were also fully met: his reorganization of =
the armed forces proceeded swiftly, and less than five weeks after =
Sputnik-1, he removed Zhukov from his post. Within a year he had =
completed the demobilization of a million soldiers from the Red Army, =
had replaced additional dissident generals (including the army Chief of =
Staff) and had set up an independent missile force coequal with the =
army, navy and air force. "We had to overcome resistance among the =
traditionalist generals," Khrushchev delicately worded it in his =
memoirs. To implement his new programs, he found loyal military officers =
who would obey him completely; one such man was Field Marshal Mitrofan =
Nedelin, a former artillery expert who was put in command of the entire =
Soviet missile forces and who thus became Korolev=92s operational =
commander. Nedelin=92s eagerness to fulfill Khrushchev=92s orders would =
lead to tragedy and to his own death =96 but that story comes later.

As far as the lesson Khrushchev had planned for the West, it also was =
completely successful: "When we announced the successful testing of an =
intercontinental rocket, some U.S. statesmen did not believe us," he =
crowed. "The Soviet Union, you see, was saying it had something it did =
not really have. Now that we have successfully launched an earth =
satellite, only the technically ignorant people can doubt this.... We =
can launch satellites because we have a carrier for them, namely the =
ballistic rocket."

In the long run, however, Khrushchev=92s exploitation of Sputnik (and =
the long string of subsequent Soviet space spectaculars) in an attempt =
to overawe the United States met with, at best, mixed results. It =
created some initial panic, but this was followed by American =
determination to spend whatever was necessary to "catch up" =96 and =
Khrushchev probably had counted more on a stunned paralysis than on the =
vigorous counterthrust that followed. His boasts about producing ICBMs =
by the dozens, "like sausages," led to the fears of the "missile gap," a =
theme with which the Democratic Party ousted the Republicans in a =
squeaker election in November 1960.

Meanwhile, many people in the West sought excuses for their lag. Some =
blamed it all on Army-Navy rivalries, or on bad schools and =
materialistic values, or on politicians, industrialists, intellectuals, =
whomever. Some complained, "We got the wrong Germans," a misconception =
even Eisenhower nourished when he announced it was "German scientists =
captured at the end of the Second World War [who] doubtless played a big =
part in the Soviet achievement." (One self-styled expert even claimed =
that sputnik was really a German word, sputt-nicht, a farewell wish to =
the rocket to "sputter not"!) America=92s cosmic humiliations continued, =
with bigger and better Sputniks circling over the burning wreckage of =
American "flopniks" and "pfftniks."

Amid the near hysteria, some voices called out for calm, claiming that =
the effects of the Soviet, space shots had been exaggerated. Senator =
William Fulbright, for example, wrote: "What about the prestige that =
Sputnik gave the USSR? It does not feed their people. It was a trick, a =
kind of gambit. It does not convert anyone to communism. So far as real =
prestige goes, it is nothing." The world, however, did not seem to =
operate in such intellectual terms: Sputnik made a big impact, at least =
according to surveys made by the U.S. Information Agency; In one report, =
"World Reaction to the United States and Soviet Space Programs" (done in =
mid-1960), the USIA wrote that most of the West believed that Moscow was =
ahead and would still be ahead after ten years.

In countries such as England, France, Germany, Italy and Norway, space =
activities were reported in the context of a race between Russia and =
America. The report continued: "Within this rivalry, space achievements =
are viewed as particularly significant because of the strong tendency =
for the popular mind to view space achievements as an index of the =
scientific and technological aspects of the rival systems, and to link =
space capabilities with military, especially missile, capabilities."

The "missile gap," meanwhile, was a product of Khrushchev=92s boasts and =
American panic. Korolev=92s R-7 was an inefficient ICBM (and he had =
never intended anything different): it was too large to disperse into =
the countryside and had to be installed on rail spurs off the =
Trans-Siberian Railroad; it took hours to fuel and launch and could thus =
be caught on the ground by a sneak air attack; it required ground =
guidance stations, which could easily be bombed or sabotaged; with the =
smallest possible nuclear warhead, the operational version could barely =
reach targets in the northeastern United States.

After the success of the Sputnik, Korolev lined up a whole series of new =
space shots, and Khrushchev =96 satisfied with the results of the first =
launches and delighted with the consternation such accomplishments were =
having in the West =96 promised complete support A series of larger =
satellites with genuine scientific value were prepared: first a dog was =
sent up, to demonstrate that a living creature could survive days of =
weightlessness; then an even heavier geophysical probe was put into =
orbit (after the first of what would be a long series of satellite =
launch failures). Even the moon became a realistic target, theoretically =
brought within range by the addition of an upper stage to the semyorka =
=96 but it took a series of launch failures starting in June 1958 to =
perfect the improved booster, and it was not until January 1959 (after =
the United States had had four launch opportunities of its own and =
missed all four times) that success was achieved. An even bigger upper =
stage was designed, and Korolev set his sights on Mars and Venus; the =
proven moon-rocket version was redirected toward an equally spectacular =
goal, manned flight into orbit =96 and back.

It was at this point, in 1959-1960, that the Khrushchev-Korolev alliance =
began showing the first signs of strain. The problem was that Khrushchev =
had a very precise idea of what he was spending money on space shots =
for: to create the image, both at home and abroad, of a powerful Soviet =
technology and of a progressive and efficient Khrushchev regime.

Space research as such did not interest him. Although one defector =
remarked that "he adored fireworks of all kinds," he never seems to have =
actually attended a space launch. Following the success of each project, =
Khrushchev ordered the cancellation of follow-on launchings of the same =
type, which, while promising to be more scientifically productive, would =
only appear to be "repetitious" and would not result in new gasps of =
shock and fear around the world.

At first Khrushchev timed his own political power plays to follow close =
on the heels of space spcctaculars, but as time passed, he began =
scheduling his diplomatic moves in advance, while demanding that Korolev =
conform his own space-launch schedule to meet Khrushchev=92s =
convenience. In the three years which followed the launching of =
Sputnik-1, these policies led to a greater and greater divergence of =
goals =96 and since Khrushchev controlled the purse strings, it was =
Korolev who accommodated himself to the political demands.

One additional demand of Khrushchev=92s must have infuriated Korolev: =
the space-program chief designer, although no longer a condemned =
prisoner, was enveloped in even more effective chains. His identity was =
kept secret and he was forbidden not just to travel abroad (his =
political reliability was never trusted), but also to even correspond =
with foreign space experts. One case in particular must have frustrated =
Korolev, when Dr. Hermann Oberth of Germany, an old colleague of =
Tsiolkovskiy=92s and a space pioneer in his own right, asked to meet =
with him =96 and Khrushchev forbade it. Wrote Oberth: "I am old, and at =
one time I lost hope that I would live to see the space era. And then a =
Russian Sputnik was orbiting the Earth . . . Unfortunately, I am not =
personally acquainted with another man I respect, the one who =
constructed the powerful rocket. Probably if my colleague Mr. =
Tsiolkovskiy were alive =96 your esteemed fellow countryman with whom I =
corresponded =96 then he and I, on meeting the wonderful designer, would =
exclaim =91Bravo! Bravo! You have realized the dream which nourished our =
minds for many years and for whose accomplishments we did our best.=92 =
Mankind is grateful to this man for his achievement." But neither Oberth =
nor anyone else was ever able to greet Korolev personally.

Khrushchev refused to share the glory with anyone, even Korolev himself. =
"It was important," wrote the defector Vladimirov in 1969, "that =
Khrushchev maintain the impression that the Sputniks were being launched =
by the =91Soviet people=92 under Khrushchev=92s leadership." Khrushchev =
justified the enforced anonymity by using it as an excuse to whip up spy =
mania and xenophobia among the Soviet population: "For those who created =
the rockets and artificial satellites," he promised, "we will raise an =
obelisk and inscribe their names on it in gold so they will be known to =
future generations" =96 but he then blamed the West for their present =
anonymity: "We value and respect these people highly and assure their =
security from enemy agents who might be sent to destroy these =
outstanding people, our valuable cadres." And so Korolev the top space =
engineer was still Korolev the prisoner, although his physical horizons =
had widened slightly; his mental horizons, of course, had never been =
restricted, even in the depths of his Siberian and sharashka exiles.

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45th Anniversary of 'Sputnik'
In honor of the date, this chapter from =
'Red Star in=20
Orbit' (1981). I remember the event vividly, as a 12-year-old 'space =
nut' who=20
knew the Space Age was coming. 
2
=96=96=96=96=96=98 =96=96=96=96=96
The Birth of SputnikDuring the first =
week of=20
October 1957, an international scientific conference was drawing to a =
close in=20
Washington, D.C. One of the attendees at that conference was an American =

scientist who was born in Russia and had served as an officer in the =
tsarist=20
navy until the Bolshevik Revolution forced him to flee. Constantine, as =
I will=20
call him, was a long-time enthusiast of space exploration. He had read =
all of=20
the works of Konstantin Tsiolkovskiy, Nikolay Rynin and other Russian =
space=20
visionaries, and he chose the subject of space flight at the conference =
to tease=20
the Soviet scientists.
The hundredth anniversary of Tsiolkovskiy=92s birth had been marked =
only a few=20
weeks before. "Poor Tsiolkovskiy is turning in his grave," the =
ex-tsarist=20
officer taunted. "His hundredth birthday has passed without even one =
Russian=20
artificial earth satellite in orbit. Under the Tsar we would have had =
several of=20
them long before now and would have celebrated the anniversary with a =
flight to=20
the moon."
Most of the Soviet scientists took no offense at his ribbing, but one =

official, after attempting to restrain himself, finally blurted out, =
"Just you=20
wait and see!" Constantine, sensing that he had touched a nerve, pressed =
his=20
attack: "That's easy for you to say, but you are returning to Moscow =
next=20
Sunday" =96 that would be October 6, just two days away. The man =
retorted, "It=20
will be before then =96 you'll eat your words." Constantine, surprised =
by the=20
man's confidence, realized he had uncovered something significant.
Suspicions that the Soviets were about to embark on some spectacular =
space=20
venture had been aroused even before the conference, ever since they had =
claimed=20
that, like the Americans, they, too, were preparing to launch scientific =

satellites as part of the International Geophysical Year. Two months =
before,=20
they had announced the successful flight of an intercontinental =
ballistic=20
missile, an ideal booster rocket for such a space probe; only days =
before, they=20
had quietly released the radio frequencies at which their sputnik =
(Russian for=20
satellite) would soon be transmitting.
Other people at the Washington conference also came to the conclusion =
that=20
something would soon break. Walter Sullivan, a New York Times science=20
correspondent, had picked up several such rumors and had researched all =
the=20
earlier hints and speculations. Late that Friday afternoon he submitted =
a story=20
to the New York news desk for publication in Saturday morning's edition =
(October=20
4). The space shot, Sullivan had written, could come "at any time." The =
dateline=20
on his story was Friday, October 4, 1957. The story was never =
printed.
Instead, in Saturday's New York Times, under a three-level full-page =
banner=20
headline saved for particularly earth-shaking events, was the news from =
Moscow:=20
the satellite, Sputnik-1, had been launched late Friday, Moscow time. =
Probably=20
it had happened at about the same time that Sullivan was drafting his =
article=20
and Constantine was teasing his Russian colleagues. Sullivan did not =
learn of=20
the launching until late that evening; however, the Russian official's =
blurted=20
boast had intrigued Constantine so much that he passed the story to some =
friends=20
of his at the Naval Research Laboratory outside of Washington. They =
immediately=20
tuned in their radio equipment to the frequencies which had been =
published a few=20
days earlier =96 and within hours were picking up the signals from the =
satellite=20
even before its launching bad been announced in Moscow.
The launching of Sputnik-1 is a convenient milestone at which to mark =
the=20
birth of the space age and the subsequent space race between the United =
States=20
and the Soviet Union. But to appreciate all the dimensions of that =
fascinating=20
development, the roots of Sputnik must be traced in detail. How it was =
launched=20
=96 that was a technological question soon answered. Who were the men =
who had=20
launched it =96 that, too, was answered, although this question was more =

difficult. But why was the project carried out? Only after a quarter =
century can=20
we really answer that question.
The careers of two exceptional men are intertwined in the development =
of the=20
Sputnik project and the subsequent spaceflight explosion, which took men =
to the=20
moon only twelve years afterward and set up permanent outer-space =
outposts=20
within a quarter of a century. These men were Nikita Sergeyevich =
Khrushchev, the=20
former miner, party bureaucrat, purge master and canny political =
manipulator,=20
and Sergey Pavlovich Korolev, the engineer, pilot, GULag survivor, =
rocket=20
magician and, finally, master of the embryonic Soviet space program. The =
Sputnik=20
and the space age were born from the combination (and often conflict) of =
these=20
two men's needs and capabilities.
The life of Korolev falls into several distinct phases. It has been=20
frustratingly difficult to untangle the threads of adulation, cover-up =
and=20
falsehood that have been wrapped around him by official biographers. The =
first=20
phase of his life, which can be styled his "apprenticeship," has been =
described=20
in a fairly straightforward manner even in the official chronologies =96 =
but it=20
stops abruptly in 1938, when Korolev (then aged thirty-two) was =
swallowed up=20
into the monstrosity of the GULag Archipelago so vividly documented by =
Robert=20
Conquest and Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn. 
For the next fifteen years of his life, the most that Moscow has made =

available is a careful selection of isolated impressions and =
half-truths, with=20
many years passed over in silence. Korolev emerges again as a real =
person in the=20
mid-1950s, but with one particular drawback: while he was alive (he died =
in=20
1966), Khrushchev kept him anonymous, referring to him only as the =
"chief=20
designer" and allowing him to publish only under the pseudonym =
"Sergeyev"; when=20
his existence was finally acknowledged after a solemn state funeral,=20
Khrushchev=92s turn had come to be deleted from the Soviet loose-leaf =
history=20
books, and he was never thereafter referred to in relation to the =
development of=20
the Soviet space plans in the 1950s. So a complete and honest appraisal =
of this=20
relationship has never been published inside the Soviet Union.
Korolev=92s early life in the Ukraine, his studies at an aeronautics =
institute=20
run by the great airplane designer Tupolev in Moscow and his amateur =
enthusiasm=20
for flying homemade gliders have been well documented even in Soviet =
accounts By=20
the mid-1930s, just before his thirtieth birthday, he switched his =
spare-time=20
enthusiasms from glider design to rocket propulsion research; he joined =
a small=20
group led by the Latvian engineer Friedrich Zander. Their unofficial=20
organization was named GIRD, which nominally stood for Group Studying =
Rocket=20
Propulsion =96 but in recognition of the fact that they received no =
official=20
support and had to acquire all of their materials from their own =
resources, they=20
often jokingly referred to themselves as the Group Working for Nothing =
which=20
worked out to the same letters in Russian.
During this period, Korolev earned his living as a professional =
engineer=20
designing aircraft in the bureau run by Tupolev, Russia=92s greatest =
aeronautical=20
engineers and the creator of the line of aircraft bearing the Tu prefix =
=96 the=20
Tu-20 (Bear), Tu-16 (Badger), Tu-56 (Blinder) and the supersonic Tu-144, =
as=20
examples. But Korolev=92s enthusiasms were aimed at higher targets, and =
he avidly=20
read books on rocketry and space travel. In 1934 he visited the home of =
Russia=92s=20
revered space prophet, Konstantin Tsiolkovskiy (or Ziolkowsky =96 his =
father was a=20
Polish lumberjack who had moved to Russia), and met briefly with the =
great man=20
himself. Within a year, Tsiolkovskiy had died =96 but his dreams lived =
on in many=20
Russians, including Korolev.
Rocketry research, meanwhile, took a great leap forward when it =
received the=20
official blessing of Soviet Armaments Minister Mikhail N. Tukhachevskiy, =
who was=20
intrigued by the possibility of rocket weapons. He was also apparently a =
genuine=20
enthusiast about the concept of space travel, which, of course, would be =

accomplished by Soviet pioneers! So GIRD suddenly received a substantial =
budget=20
and several full-time employees, first among them being Korolev, who was =
granted=20
a commission of general-engineer (one star) in the Red Army.
Under the patronage of Tukhachevskiy, rocket research flourished. In =
1933 the=20
first free flight of a Russian-made liquid-fuel rocket took place at an =
army=20
base near Nakhabino, outside of Moscow. Development continued for =
several years,=20
spurred on by reports of the work of Robert Goddard in the United States =
(where=20
it was ignored by the government and by the academic community) and of a =
group=20
of German engineers. But this embryonic three-way space race ended =
disastrously=20
for the Russian side in 1937.
The Stalin purges had been ravaging the nation=92s intelligentsia, =
while the=20
collectivization drives were wiping out millions of peasants =96 but =
Korolev and=20
his team no doubt felt safe under the wing of the highest-ranking Soviet =

military officer in the Red Army. But they were fooling themselves:=20
Tukhachevskiy was suddenly arrested on June 10, 1937, and his whole =
staff=20
followed him into prison and to their deaths. Stalin evidently suspected =
him of=20
"Bonapartist" tendencies, believing perhaps that forty-three-year-old=20
Tukhachevskiy planned to overthrow the Communist party and set up a =
military=20
dictatorship. Stalin=92s distrust was also evidently fueled by falsified =

documentation implicating Tukhachevskiy, documentation prepared and =
planted by=20
German agents. The politics of this episode remain obscure, but the =
effect on=20
the fledgling Soviet rocket program was immediately obvious: =
annihilation.
All of Tukhachevskiy=92s favorite projects were automatically suspect =
since=20
they no doubt would be staffed by numerous pro-Tukhachevskiy people. =
Stalin=92s=20
secret police took no chances: everyone within reach was arrested. =
Korolev=92s=20
life nearly ended =96 his official biographies stutter at this point and =
leap many=20
years into the future. 
A former fellow prisoner of Korolev=92s recounted how the future =
chief designer=20
was initially interrogated by the secret police at Butyrskaya Prison in =
Moscow:=20
"Your pyrotechnics and fireworks are not only unnecessary to our country =
but are=20
actually dangerous," he was told. To protect the country Korolev was =
shipped off=20
in a boxcar with a number and a life term. There were millions like him =
in those=20
years, and most of them died.
Information about this phase of his life must be gathered from a =
number of=20
independent (and, of course, unofficial) sources. However, defecting =
Soviet=20
science writer Leonid Vladimirov has listed a series of oblique =
references which=20
have made their ways into official books. Other sources are the samizdat =

underground newsletters which circulated in Moscow in the late 1960s and =
early=20
1970s. Chronicle of Current Events, number 10, issued October 31, 1969,=20
criticized Politizdat (Political Publishing House) because a new book by =
A.=20
Romanov about Sergey Pavlovich Korolev was deliberately incomplete: =
"There is no=20
mention of the fact that Korolev was arrested and subjugated to =
repressive=20
measures, nor of what became of Korolev=92s immediate teachers and close =

friends."
Throughout his prison term Korolev was described by former comrades =
as=20
"absolutely firm, never disguising his contempt for the regime" Another =
Russian=20
engineer who knew him in prison described him as "a cynic and a =
pessimist" whose=20
favorite slogan was "We will all vanish without a trace." The closest =
any work=20
has come to an official admission of this imprisonment was a fairly =
honest=20
biography of Korolev by Yaroslav Golovanov, who made this suggestive =
comment=20
when referring to Korolev=92s work in the 1930s: "He could not then by =
any means=20
know that there would be many very hard times, sometimes cruelly unjust =
to him."=20
Golovanov=92s ambiguity may have been fueled by Korolev=92s own utter =
refusal to=20
discuss that period with strangers: "Several times I led the =
conversation round=20
to his past," Golovanov wrote in 1967. "But as far as I remember, he did =
not=20
like this theme and always tried to switch our talk in another =
direction."
Well could he have wished to avoid such themes, especially about the =
events=20
of 1937. For months he had been packed in a boxcar heading eastward =
along the=20
Trains-Siberian Railroad, only to be transferred at the Pacific coast =
into the=20
crowded hold of a prison ship. The final destination was the east =
Siberian port=20
of Magadan, staging area for the Kolyma gold mines, an infamous charnel =
house=20
even by GULag standards. But back in Moscow a card with his number on it =
had=20
been flied in a box in some police archive =96 and as if by a miracle, =
he survived=20
a full year at Kolyma before receiving a reprieve in the form of an =
order back=20
to a special prison in Moscow.
As it turned out, Tupolov had saved him. The aircraft designer and =
his entire=20
staff had also been arrested but had been locked up in a special prison, =
a=20
=91sharashka=92, as the inmates called it, where they continued their =
engineering=20
work on military projects. Korolev=92s time there was mentioned in =
Solzhenitsyn=92s=20
documentation: "The father of space navigation, Korolev, was taken into =
a=20
sharashka as an aviation scientist. The sharashka administration did not =
allow=20
him to work on rockets and he had to do that work at night." Tupolev had =
been=20
instructed to gather together any other of his engineers who had been =
scattered=20
throughout the GULag, and it was his request for Korolev (and the =
officiousness=20
of some secret-police bureaucrat who was actually able to trace =
Korolev=92s=20
sentence) that had snatched him to the relative safety of the =
sharashka.
Korolev spent several years in the prison near Moscow while World War =
II was=20
ignited and Germany invaded Russia. As the Wehrmacht neared Moscow, the =
Tupolev=20
group was evacuated (still under guard =96 there was always the chance =
they might=20
try to escape and join the Nazis!) to Omsk. Korolev had been there for =
only a=20
few months when he was transferred to Special Prison Number 4 (location=20
unknown), where a group was working on rocket-assisted airplane takeoff =
systems,=20
on bombardment rockets, on an in-flight emergency acceleration rocket =
for=20
conventional aircraft and on pure rocket- and jet-propelled aircraft. =
The=20
engineer in charge of the unit was Valentin Glushko, an old friend and =
colleague=20
of Korolev=92s from the GIRD days who had somehow struck a deal with the =
secret=20
police and was now a free man.
The team worked for four years on these projects, with Korolev =
serving as=20
Glushko=92s deputy for flight testing. After the war ended, Korolev=92s =
position=20
improved, although he was still nominally a prisoner serving a life term =
for=20
treason.
He and Glushko were assigned to a new rocket group under the command =
of an=20
opportunistic and ambitious engineer named Chelomey (or Chalomei =96 =
sources=20
disagree on the spelling).
When Glushko went to Germany in 1946 to study captured V-2 equipment =
(the=20
first trainload of material from Peenemunde had been hijacked by =
Americans and=20
replaced with wrecked farm machinery), he took Korolev along =96 under =
heavy=20
guard. They both attended a British-sponsored test launch of an extra =
V-2 from=20
the Baltic town of Altenwaide ("Operation Backfire"), but Korolev=92s =
name had not=20
been officially submitted to the British site commander =96 perhaps =
because the=20
Soviet secret police would not let him out of their direct custody =96 =
so he was=20
forced to watch the test from outside the barbed-wire compound.
When Glushko returned to Russia, Korolev remained in Germany (no =
doubt under=20
appropriate supervision) to direct the repair of the underground V-2 =
factory at=20
Niedersachswerfen and to coordinate the shipment of V-2 equipment to the =
Soviet=20
Union. He escorted the last shipment back to Russia in the summer of =
1946 and=20
supervised some test firings at a Soviet missile range on the lower =
Volga River,=20
not far from Stalingrad. Korolev then returned to the Russian zone of =
Germany,=20
where he interviewed dozens of former V-2 engineers and technicians (he =
was=20
self-taught in German and English). Having prepared a list of useful =
Germans, he=20
turned it over to Soviet security forces =96 and on the night of October =
22-23,=20
1946, soldiers rounded up everyone on the list for immediate departure =
for=20
Russia. There they were split into numerous design teams and put to work =
on=20
various research programs; most did not return to Germany until =
1950-1951.
The Russians, meanwhile, pursued their own rocket research with their =
own=20
surviving experts. The German teams were used for collateral research or =
to=20
cross-check each other and confirm Russian developments, and were never=20
integrated into the mainline Russian development program. The first =
all-Russian=20
ballistic missile, code-named the R-1, was created under the leadership =
of=20
Korolev in late 1947; somehow Glushko returned to his subservient =
position and=20
was in charge of the rocket engine while Korolev directed the entire =
project.=20
Eleven test flights in October and November 1947 marked the resumption =
of=20
forward motion of Korolev=92s dreams for space flight. He was even =
called to the=20
Kremlin to personally brief Stalin on the military missile program.
Golovanov, the most candid of the official biographers, made a =
poignant=20
commentary on Korolev=92s life during this period, a comment that could =
not be=20
fully appreciated without knowing about the GULag years. "Korolev was a =
most=20
exact reflection of an epoch," wrote Golovanov in 1968. "He has become =
part of=20
it, it would seem, forever and imperishably. He knew all its triumphs =
and=20
drained the cup of its bitterness to the dregs. Korolev=92s biography is =
the=20
concretization of the history of our land in one man.
After a few years of near freedom, Korolcv may have been thrown back =
into=20
prison. Some of his former colleagues have reported that he was sent =
back in a=20
sharashka in 1948 (although other reliable sources make no mention of =
this=20
second incarceration). These special prisons have been eloquently =
described by=20
the Russian novelist Solzhenitsyn in his First Circle. (According =
to=20
Dante, the first circle was the highest and least uncomfortable circle =
of Hell.)=20
Many observers reard a peripheral character in Chapter 17, a man named =
Bobynin,=20
to be based on Korolcv himself during his second imprisonment. In one =
bristling=20
retort to a Soviet army interrogator, Bobynin/Korolev expressed the =
thoughts=20
which might have gotten him into prison in the first place =96 and =
certainly kept=20
him there:
"We could make you talk."
"You are wrong, Citizen Minister!" Bobynin=92s strong eyes shone with =
hate. "I=20
have nothing, you understand, nothing! You can=92t get your hands on my =
wife and=20
child =96 a bomb got them first. My parents are already dead. My entire =
property=20
on this earth is my handkerchief; my coveralls and my underwear are =
government=20
issue. You took my freedom away long ago, and you don=92t have the power =
to return=20
it because you don=92t have it yourself. I am forty-two years old [so =
was=20
Korolev], and you=92ve dished me out a twenty-five-year term. I=92ve =
already been at=20
hard labor, gone around with a number on, in handcuffs, with police =
dogs, and a=20
strict-regime work brigade. What else is there you can threaten me with? =
What=20
can you deprive me of? My work as an engineer? You=92ll lose more than I =

will..."
Only two circumstances need revising to convert the fictional Bobynin =
into=20
the authentic Korolev. First, Korolev=92s mother was still alive (and, =
indeed, was=20
to survive him by more than fifteen years). Also, his wife and child =
were alive=20
=96 but separated from him. In 1946, upon regaining his freedom for the =
first=20
time, Korolev had divorced his first wife, Oxana (or Xenia) Vincentini. =
(Their=20
one daughter had been born about 1935.) She had apparently yielded to =
presure=20
and had denounced him while he was at Kolyma, and then had never =
communicated=20
with him again. The next year, 1947, Korolev had remarried, to Nina=20
Kotenkova.
Following Stalin=92s death in 1953, Korolev was rehabilitated, along =
with=20
hundreds of thousands of other purge victims. In Korolev=92s case, he =
was offered=20
membership in the Communist party, and whatever his personal feelings, =
he knew=20
it would increase his political influence =96 so he accepted. Korolev =
was also=20
quickly rewarded for his previous work by election to the Soviet Academy =
of=20
Sciences, first as a corresponding member (there are about three =
hundred) and=20
soon afterward as a full member (of which there are about one hundred =
and=20
fifty).
His rapid rise in the post-Stalin years may not have been based =
purely on=20
merit: it was Khrushchev=92s policy not merely to rehabilitate purge =
victims, but=20
to promote many of them above others who had gone along with Stalin=92s =
regime,=20
thus providing Khrushchev with cadres of ready-made loyalists who owed =
their new=20
positions to him =96 and would fall with him.
The new field of military missiles was one which obviously required =
careful=20
watching. Russia=92s need for modern rocket weapons had become =
indisputable, and=20
even before Stalin=92s death, industrial organizations had been set up =
to produce=20
the new equipment. In mid-1953 a new organization called the =
Ministry=20
for Medium Machine Building was founded, with the sole purpose of =
directing the=20
manufacture of missiles. Some junior members of the Soviet government =
were=20
assigned to maintain liaison between the engineers and the politicians. =
One was=20
Dmitriy Ustinov, a young but highly competent armaments manager; the =
other was=20
Leonid Brezhnev, an engineer turned politician.
Khrushchev first met Korolev when the "collective leadership" which =
followed=20
Stalin=92s death in 1953 tried to grapple with the issue of the new =
rocket=20
weapons. Stalin had favored such rockets because Tupolev=92s airplane =
bureau had=20
been unable to design bombers with ranges sufficiently great to reach =
the United=20
States =96 powerful missiles promised to overcome this restriction. =
(Korolev had=20
taken charge of the project after his rehabilitation.) But as Khrushchev =
later=20
admitted in his memoirs, the new leaders had been kept in the dark by =
Stalin and=20
knew very little about rockets at all: "Korolev came to the Politburo =
meeting to=20
report on his work. I don=92t want to exaggerate, but I=92d say we =
gawked at what he=20
showed us as if we were sheep seeing a new gate for the first time. When =
he=20
showed us one of his rockets, we thought it looked like nothing but a =
huge=20
cigar-shaped tube, and we didn=92t believe it would fly. Korolev took us =
on a tour=20
of the launching pad and tried to explain to us how a rocket worked. We =
were=20
like peasants in a marketplace. We walked around the rocket, touching =
it,=20
tapping it to see if it was sturdy enough =96 we did everything but lick =
it to see=20
how it tasted.... We had absolute confidence in Comrade Korolev. When he =

expounded his ideas, you could see passion burning in his eyes, and his =
reports=20
were always models of clarity. He had unlimited energy and =
determination, and he=20
was a brilliant organizer."
This impression of Korolev was a common one. Biographers both inside =
and=20
outside the Soviet Union seem to paint a consistent portrait of =
Korolev=92s=20
character. For example, another official biographer, Pyotr Astashenkov, =
wrote:=20
"Korolev combined an excellent theoretical background, scientific =
foresight and=20
organizing ability with the determination to fight hard for his ideas."=20
Romanov=92s 1968 biography was even more graphic: "I study the =
scientist: a high=20
and handsome forehead, as though intentionally modeled by a sculptor in =
order to=20
emphasize the unusual qualities of this uncommon man. Black eyebrows, on =
the=20
straight side. Over-wide and deep-set brown eyes. Energy blazes in them. =
At=20
different times I have seen them angry and kind, raging and mocking, =
determined=20
and good-natured. But in many years of knowing the man I have never seen =
them=20
empty or indifferent. The mouth is firmly delineated, the corners =
down-turned,=20
the chin juts forward. Taken all together, the appearance of the person =
sitting=20
before me conveys tremendous energy, power, authority."
A former colleague, writing in the freer atmosphere of Yugoslavia, =
where he=20
had taken political refuge, corroborated that image: "Korolev had great=20
authority and commanded respect from those with whom he worked," wrote =
Sergey=20
Korda in an obituary in 1966. "A man of inexhaustible energy, he =
combined great=20
talent, excellent engineering intuition and surprising creative boldness =
with=20
outstanding administrative capabilities and high spiritual values."
But a few words of caution are in order. Golovanov, most honest of =
the=20
official biographers, pointed out that "there is no need to idealize =
Korolev. He=20
was tough and harsh but cold and daring, sly and cunning but not =
devious. He was=20
blunt, but he knew his business. And the main thing about him was his=20
ideal."
That ideal, of course, was space exploration. But to achieve that =
purpose, to=20
send men into space, as he had been planning for years, and to send =
probes to=20
the moon and nearby planets, he needed an immense budget =96 and =
Khrushchev was=20
the one he had to persuade. Getting funding for military missiles was =
one thing,=20
but for space projects =96 that was an entirely different matter.
In 1956 his first attempts to get approval for an earth satellite =
project=20
were rebuffed. As he later recounted it, "We closely followed reports on =
the=20
building in the United States of an artificial earth satellite with the=20
suggestive name of =91Vanguard.=92 At that time some people believed =
that this=20
satellite would be the first in outer space.... We took stock of what we =
had,=20
and decided that we could send a good hundred kilograms into orbit. So =
we went=20
to the Central Committee of the Communist party. There we were told that =
the=20
idea was attractive but needed more thought."
Even without approval for the satellite project, Korolev continued =
work on=20
the R-7 rocket (in Russian, it was affectionately known as "ol=92 number =
seven,"=20
or semyorka), the giant missile designed to carry a bulky two-ton =

thermonuclear bomb more than four thousand miles, far enough to reach =
the United=20
States. As it turned out, the semyorka was a very inefficient =
military=20
missile but an excellent space booster, which is probably what Korolev =
had in=20
mind all along.
To test this giant new rocket, with a lift-off thrust of more than =
one=20
million pounds (three times that of its American counterpart, the =
Atlas), an=20
entirely new missile test range was needed. Construction began in June =
1955=20
near the Aral Sea, north of the small village of Tyuratam in =
Kazakhstan. The=20
party secretary of Kazakhstan at that time was Leonid Brezhnev, and he =
took=20
great interest in the development of the missile project. So did the =
American=20
CIA: before the concrete on the launch pad was dry, U-2 spy planes were =
flying=20
overhead to keep tabs on the project.
The first R-7 exploded on launch in the late spring of 1957. Several =
more=20
attempts also ended catastrophically, and by July 1957 Korolev =
was facing=20
serious criticism from rival rocket experts (particularly the engineer =
Chelomey)=20
and from Moscow bureaucrats; his satellite project looked hopeless. =
According to=20
a thinly disguised but highly sanitized semi-biographical movie (The =
Taming=20
of Fire, Mosfilm, 1972), Korolev counterattacked: "You think only =
Atlas=20
missiles can explode? We are building the most powerful machines in the =
world!"=20
His reference to the Atlas explsion during its first launch on June 11 =
helps=20
date this comment (if the comment is authentic) and the R-7 failures =
which=20
preceded it; the statement must also have preceded August 3, when the =
first=20
successful launch was finally accomplished. A second success followed a =
few=20
weeks later, when the missile was sent full range into the Paciftc near =
the=20
Kamchatka peninsula (and not too far from the Kolyma gold mines where =
Korolev=20
had slaved in 1938 =97 1939).
Meanwhile, fireworks had also been going off in the Kremlin. The =
position of=20
Khrushchev as "first among equals" in the collective leadership was =
rapidly=20
deteriorating as his colleagues found unexpected unity in a common fear =
of=20
Khrushchev=92s growing power. While using a campaign of anti-Stalinism =
to combat=20
his rivals, and by flaunting the success of his bold (his rivals styled =
it=20
"reckless") crushing of the October 1956 rebellion in Hungary, =
Khrushchev=20
reached for total and undisputed power. The showdown came in June 1957, =
when=20
several Khrushchev allies were absent from Moscow: the anti-Khrushchev =
forces on=20
the Politburo demanded a debate on the ouster of Khrushchev from his =
official=20
posts, and then voted six to one to replace him with Shepilov. =
(Malenkov,=20
Molotov and Kaganovich led the fight against him, and when he appeared =
to have=20
lost, Bulganin joined the opposition; loyalists Suslov, Mikoyan and =
others had=20
been out of town on party business when the meeting was convened, as the =

conspirators had planned.) But Khrushchev maneuvered adroitly and =
delayed=20
certain official actions until a full Central Committee meeting could be =

convened. Meanwhile, he called upon Red Army leader Zhukov to organize =
an=20
airlift of loyalists (and detours of unreliables) from all over the =
Soviet Union=20
to the showdown vote in Moscow =96 which he then won.
His victory, while sweet, must have been incomplete. No doubt he =
suspected=20
continued disaffection within the party apparatus, even as he drove the =
leaders=20
of the revolt into retirement or obscurity. No doubt he also feared =
having given=20
Zhukov a taste of power, since Zhukov, the victorious general of World =
War II,=20
was a far more popular figure than Khrushchev, not only among the armed =
forces=20
but also within the party hierarchy itself. Lest Zhukov move to grasp =
full=20
political power (as his American counterpart, Eisenhower, already had =
=96 or so=20
Khrushchev may have reasoned by analogy), he was the next target for=20
elimination.
At the same time, Khrushchev was genuinely concerned about perceived =
military=20
threats from the United States. If Russians in general seem to be =
paranoid about=20
foreign invasions, they have also really been the victims of countless =
such=20
invasions and attacks. From the Russian point of view, the American =
bases near=20
their borders, combined with belligerent statements from American =
officials,=20
were cause for genuine alarm. A way of reducing Russia=92s =
susceptibility to=20
attack was the development of a credible deterrent system, such as=20
nuclear-tipped missiles =96 but such a deterrent is useful only so far =
as it is=20
believable, and any Russian claim to have invented such a device would =
probably=20
be laughed off along with previous claims to the invention of airplanes, =
steam=20
engines, radio, tractors and decimal coinage.
In the light of these domestic and international problems, =
Korolev=92s proposal=20
for a Soviet artificial satellite (to be launched by an R-7 missile with =
a=20
reduced payload) suddenly became much more attractive to Khrushchev. =
First, it=20
would signal to dissident political forces within the Soviet Union that=20
Khrushchev was really leading the country to a glorious future; second, =
it would=20
overawe the traditionalist "artillery generals" in the Red Army and =
allow a=20
reorganization of the armed forces, including a reduction in obsolete =
ground=20
forces (saving money and pulling the rug out from under possible =
opposition=20
leaders); last, it would demonstrate in an unequivocal manner the =
existence of=20
the long-range missile system, which was intended to discourage a =
potential=20
attack from the United States. Under these circumstances, what had at =
first=20
appeared to be a pointless diversion of technical resources suddenly =
became =96 as=20
far as Khrushchev personally was concerned =96 a powerful idea. And so, =
as Korolev=20
later recounted, "in the summer of 1957 the Central Committee [a=20
euphemism for Khrushchev, who by that time exercised full power] finally =

endorsed the project." It should be noted that neither science nor world =
opinion=20
seems to have entered into consideration.
If approval for the satellite project came after the first successful =
R-7=20
launches in mid-August, Korolev=92s team had only one month to go before =
the=20
hundredth anniversary of Tsiolkovskiy=92s birth. (That anniversary would =
have=20
meant little to Khrushchev anyway.) It took them, instead, about six =
weeks =96 and=20
Korolev literally lived at the launch pad to accomplish this.
The concrete stand from which the satellite would be launched stood =
at the=20
edge of a two-hundred-foot-deep, half-mile-wide pit, a natural bay in a =
high=20
ridge which crossed the missile center. Railway lines ran south.from the =
pad to=20
an assembly building about a mile away; there the missile was assembled=20
horizontally (from sections shipped by rail from Moscow) on a railroad =
flatcar=20
before being hauled out to the pad, erected and fueled for launch.
Halfway between the assembly building and the pad was a grove of =
trees=20
surrounding a natural spring. In that grove Korolev had built a small =
wood-frame=20
house for his own personal use. He would meet there with his deputies, =
or would=20
walk fifteen minutes to the assembly hail in one direction or ten =
minutes to the=20
launch pad in the other direction. Workers knew that Korolev could =96 =
and did =96=20
drop in at anytime of the day or night; he did not sleep much.
There were other workers at the missile center whom Korolev could not =
visit,=20
even though he knew them well. They were the men who had poured the =
concrete,=20
excavated the bunkers and erected the buildings in which the rockets =
were being=20
assembled. But the color of their drab clothing, and the color of the =
uniforms=20
of their guards, identified these men as zeks, political prisoners among =
whose=20
ranks Korolev had spent many, many years. Their work, too, contributed =
to=20
Korolev=92s dream of the conquest of space =96 and no record exists of =
how he felt=20
about their presence or what he could do (if anything) for them. They, =
too, must=20
have been on his mind in those hectic weeks.
A simple test satellite was thrown together in one of the smaller =
machine=20
shops in the assembly building. It consisted of a radio transmitter =
hooked up to=20
a thermometer and powered by a pack of chemical batteries. The object =
was=20
affectionately known as the "PS," the preliminary satellite =96 and this =
caused=20
some confusion among many newly arrived engineers, since Korolev himself =
was=20
known to his men as "old SP," for Sergey Pavlovich. The two nicknames=20
"es-peh" and =91peh-yess" were often mixed together =
indiscriminately=20
in those weeks, their intimate interrelationship blending in the minds =
of the=20
workers into one entity. It was Korolev, or a significant part of =
him,=20
who would be riding on that rocket.
Finally the payload was attached to the nose of the rocket as it lay =
on its=20
carrier inside the assembly hall. As the nose cone was slid into place, =
a=20
technician flipped a switch on the PS, activating its radio system. =
Someone had=20
brought a shortwave radio into the hall, and the beep-beep-beep =
of the=20
future Sputnik echoed strangely around the suddenly silent rocket =
specialists.=20
The nose cone slid into place and the radio receiver was turned off; the =
men=20
surged back to action.
Korolev took his place inside the command bunker, a steel-walled room =
built=20
right into the concrete launch pad, about three hundred feet from the =
rocket=20
itself. Some men watched the rocket through periscopes, while others =
monitored=20
dials and meters. Korolev sat at a wooden desk, a white lab =
coat=20
over his work clothes and a microphone in his hand.
As the countdown neared zero, a lone figure suddenly appeared on the =
concrete=20
apron and blew a series of long trumpet blasts before vanishing back to =
his duty=20
post. Nobody ever revealed who it was, and it might have been Koro1ev =
himself.=20

The sun had long since set when the count reached zero after many=20
exasperating delays. The firing command was given and an automatic =
sequence of=20
pump activation began; moments later, the engines lifted off; dazzling =
the=20
watchers at the periscopes and temporarily deafening the occupants of =
the=20
control blockhouse. Then the PS was on its way; within four minutes it =
was only=20
a tiny spot of light in the northeastern sky.
During the ascent, twenty separate engines in five long pods fired in =
unison.=20
The central cylinder held the satellite in its nose, while four tapered=20
cylinders were attached to its sides in "parallel staging." The tapered =
units=20
exhausted their fuel first and peeled away like a flower unfolding its =
petals;=20
the thicker central stage continued burning for another five minutes =
until it=20
was soaring at more than 18,000 miles per hour, two hundred miles above =
earth=92s=20
surface. Gravity still pulled the now freely falling PS back toward =
earth on a=20
descending arc =96 but so great was its speed (as Korolev had =
calculated) that the=20
horizon of a spherical earth receded from the falling object at the same =
rate.=20
PS was in orbit above the atmosphere. It was 1930 hours Greenwich mean =
time=20
(2:30 in the afternoon in Washington, and 10:30 at night in Moscow); an =
hour and=20
a half later, the PS finished its first circumnavigation of its home =
planet,=20
announcing its success to radio listeners via its distinctive radio call =

sign.
Korolev=92s rocket team assembled at the still-smoking launch pad to =
await the=20
news from the tracking site. The soon-to-be-famous beep-beep-beep =
was=20
played over the pad speakers and the men cheered. Korolev stood up on an =

improvised rostrum and addressed his colleagues with a speech that, =
although=20
impromptu, had probably been part of his daydreaming most of his life. =
"Today=20
the dreams of the best sons of mankind have come true," he told the =
crowd of=20
engineers. "The assault on space has begun." It was a vindication of his =

long-standing insistence that space travel was possible; as a later =
biography=20
put it, it "was the culmination of his efforts to persuade skeptics that =

rocketry and astronautics were not merely science fiction."
Khrushchev had just returned to Moscow that night from his vacation =
home in=20
the Crimea A few days later he described his own reactions to reporter =
James=20
Reston, who noted that "Khrushchev=92s attitude on the launching of =
Sputnik... was=20
almost casual." Khrushchev recounted that "when the satellite was =
launched, they=20
phoned me that the rocket had taken the right course and that the =
satellite was=20
already revolving around the earth. I congratulated the entire group of=20
engineers and technicians on this outstanding achievement and calmly =
went to=20
bed." 
In contrast, Moscow spokesmen trumpeted the launching to extract all =
the=20
propaganda they could muster. The original launch announcement had set =
the tone:=20
"Artificial earth satellites will pave the way for space travel, and it =
seems=20
that the present generation will witness how the freed and conscious =
labor of=20
the people of the new socialist society turns even the most daring of =
mankind=92s=20
dreams into reality." That was to be the propaganda theme: success in =
space=20
implied superiority on earth.
Khrushchev moved to exploit the impact of the announcement, for the =
purposes=20
of which he had originally approved it =96 but as the days went by, he =
seems to=20
have been surprised by the depth of the feat=92s impact on the Western =
public.=20
That would turn out to be a bonus, but his original short-range purposes =
were=20
also fully met: his reorganization of the armed forces proceeded =
swiftly, and=20
less than five weeks after Sputnik-1, he removed Zhukov from his post. =
Within a=20
year he had completed the demobilization of a million soldiers from the =
Red=20
Army, had replaced additional dissident generals (including the army =
Chief of=20
Staff) and had set up an independent missile force coequal with the =
army, navy=20
and air force. "We had to overcome resistance among the traditionalist=20
generals," Khrushchev delicately worded it in his memoirs. To implement =
his new=20
programs, he found loyal military officers who would obey him =
completely; one=20
such man was Field Marshal Mitrofan Nedelin, a former artillery expert =
who was=20
put in command of the entire Soviet missile forces and who thus became =
Korolev=92s=20
operational commander. Nedelin=92s eagerness to fulfill Khrushchev=92s =
orders would=20
lead to tragedy and to his own death =96 but that story comes later.
As far as the lesson Khrushchev had planned for the West, it also was =

completely successful: "When we announced the successful testing of an=20
intercontinental rocket, some U.S. statesmen did not believe us," he =
crowed.=20
"The Soviet Union, you see, was saying it had something it did not =
really have.=20
Now that we have successfully launched an earth satellite, only the =
technically=20
ignorant people can doubt this.... We can launch satellites because we =
have a=20
carrier for them, namely the ballistic rocket."
In the long run, however, Khrushchev=92s exploitation of Sputnik (and =
the long=20
string of subsequent Soviet space spectaculars) in an attempt to overawe =
the=20
United States met with, at best, mixed results. It created some initial =
panic,=20
but this was followed by American determination to spend whatever was =
necessary=20
to "catch up" =96 and Khrushchev probably had counted more on a stunned =
paralysis=20
than on the vigorous counterthrust that followed. His boasts about =
producing=20
ICBMs by the dozens, "like sausages," led to the fears of the "missile =
gap," a=20
theme with which the Democratic Party ousted the Republicans in a =
squeaker=20
election in November 1960.
Meanwhile, many people in the West sought excuses for their lag. Some =
blamed=20
it all on Army-Navy rivalries, or on bad schools and materialistic =
values, or on=20
politicians, industrialists, intellectuals, whomever. Some complained, =
"We got=20
the wrong Germans," a misconception even Eisenhower nourished when he =
announced=20
it was "German scientists captured at the end of the Second World War =
[who]=20
doubtless played a big part in the Soviet achievement." (One self-styled =
expert=20
even claimed that sputnik was really a German word, =
sputt-nicht, a=20
farewell wish to the rocket to "sputter not"!) America=92s cosmic =
humiliations=20
continued, with bigger and better Sputniks circling over the burning =
wreckage of=20
American "flopniks" and "pfftniks."
Amid the near hysteria, some voices called out for calm, claiming =
that the=20
effects of the Soviet, space shots had been exaggerated. Senator William =

Fulbright, for example, wrote: "What about the prestige that Sputnik =
gave the=20
USSR? It does not feed their people. It was a trick, a kind of gambit. =
It does=20
not convert anyone to communism. So far as real prestige goes, it is =
nothing."=20
The world, however, did not seem to operate in such intellectual terms: =
Sputnik=20
made a big impact, at least according to surveys made by the U.S. =
Information=20
Agency; In one report, "World Reaction to the United States and Soviet =
Space=20
Programs" (done in mid-1960), the USIA wrote that most of the West =
believed that=20
Moscow was ahead and would still be ahead after ten years.
In countries such as England, France, Germany, Italy and Norway, =
space=20
activities were reported in the context of a race between Russia and =
America.=20
The report continued: "Within this rivalry, space achievements are =
viewed as=20
particularly significant because of the strong tendency for the popular =
mind to=20
view space achievements as an index of the scientific and technological =
aspects=20
of the rival systems, and to link space capabilities with military, =
especially=20
missile, capabilities."
The "missile gap," meanwhile, was a product of Khrushchev=92s boasts =
and=20
American panic. Korolev=92s R-7 was an inefficient ICBM (and he had =
never intended=20
anything different): it was too large to disperse into the countryside =
and had=20
to be installed on rail spurs off the Trans-Siberian Railroad; it took =
hours to=20
fuel and launch and could thus be caught on the ground by a sneak air =
attack; it=20
required ground guidance stations, which could easily be bombed or =
sabotaged;=20
with the smallest possible nuclear warhead, the operational version =
could barely=20
reach targets in the northeastern United States.
After the success of the Sputnik, Korolev lined up a whole series of =
new=20
space shots, and Khrushchev =96 satisfied with the results of the first =
launches=20
and delighted with the consternation such accomplishments were having in =
the=20
West =96 promised complete support A series of larger satellites with =
genuine=20
scientific value were prepared: first a dog was sent up, to demonstrate =
that a=20
living creature could survive days of weightlessness; then an even =
heavier=20
geophysical probe was put into orbit (after the first of what would be a =
long=20
series of satellite launch failures). Even the moon became a realistic =
target,=20
theoretically brought within range by the addition of an upper stage to =
the=20
semyorka =96 but it took a series of launch failures =
starting in=20
June 1958 to perfect the improved booster, and it was not until January =
1959=20
(after the United States had had four launch opportunities of its own =
and missed=20
all four times) that success was achieved. An even bigger upper stage =
was=20
designed, and Korolev set his sights on Mars and Venus; the proven =
moon-rocket=20
version was redirected toward an equally spectacular goal, manned flight =
into=20
orbit =96 and back.
It was at this point, in 1959-1960, that the Khrushchev-Korolev =
alliance=20
began showing the first signs of strain. The problem was that Khrushchev =
had a=20
very precise idea of what he was spending money on space shots for: to =
create=20
the image, both at home and abroad, of a powerful Soviet technology and =
of a=20
progressive and efficient Khrushchev regime.
Space research as such did not interest him. Although one defector =
remarked=20
that "he adored fireworks of all kinds," he never seems to have actually =

attended a space launch. Following the success of each project, =
Khrushchev=20
ordered the cancellation of follow-on launchings of the same type, =
which, while=20
promising to be more scientifically productive, would only appear to be=20
"repetitious" and would not result in new gasps of shock and fear around =
the=20
world.
At first Khrushchev timed his own political power plays to follow =
close on=20
the heels of space spcctaculars, but as time passed, he began scheduling =
his=20
diplomatic moves in advance, while demanding that Korolev conform his =
own=20
space-launch schedule to meet Khrushchev=92s convenience. In the three =
years which=20
followed the launching of Sputnik-1, these policies led to a greater and =
greater=20
divergence of goals =96 and since Khrushchev controlled the purse =
strings, it was=20
Korolev who accommodated himself to the political demands.
One additional demand of Khrushchev=92s must have infuriated Korolev: =
the=20
space-program chief designer, although no longer a condemned prisoner, =
was=20
enveloped in even more effective chains. His identity was kept secret =
and he was=20
forbidden not just to travel abroad (his political reliability was never =

trusted), but also to even correspond with foreign space experts. One =
case in=20
particular must have frustrated Korolev, when Dr. Hermann Oberth of =
Germany, an=20
old colleague of Tsiolkovskiy=92s and a space pioneer in his own right, =
asked to=20
meet with him =96 and Khrushchev forbade it. Wrote Oberth: "I am old, =
and at one=20
time I lost hope that I would live to see the space era. And then a =
Russian=20
Sputnik was orbiting the Earth . . . Unfortunately, I am not personally=20
acquainted with another man I respect, the one who constructed the =
powerful=20
rocket. Probably if my colleague Mr. Tsiolkovskiy were alive =96 your =
esteemed=20
fellow countryman with whom I corresponded =96 then he and I, on meeting =
the=20
wonderful designer, would exclaim =91Bravo! Bravo! You have realized the =
dream=20
which nourished our minds for many years and for whose accomplishments =
we did=20
our best.=92 Mankind is grateful to this man for his achievement." But =
neither=20
Oberth nor anyone else was ever able to greet Korolev personally.
Khrushchev refused to share the glory with anyone, even Korolev =
himself. "It=20
was important," wrote the defector Vladimirov in 1969, "that Khrushchev =
maintain=20
the impression that the Sputniks were being launched by the =91Soviet =
people=92=20
under Khrushchev=92s leadership." Khrushchev justified the enforced =
anonymity by=20
using it as an excuse to whip up spy mania and xenophobia among the =
Soviet=20
population: "For those who created the rockets and artificial =
satellites," he=20
promised, "we will raise an obelisk and inscribe their names on it in =
gold so=20
they will be known to future generations" =96 but he then blamed the =
West for=20
their present anonymity: "We value and respect these people highly and =
assure=20
their security from enemy agents who might be sent to destroy these =
outstanding=20
people, our valuable cadres." And so Korolev the top space engineer was =
still=20
Korolev the prisoner, although his physical horizons had widened =
slightly; his=20
mental horizons, of course, had never been restricted, even in the =
depths of his=20
Siberian and sharashka exiles.
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