[FPSPACE] Article: US Journalists Misrepresented Russia in 1990s

[Chuck Donaldson]

[snip]
    James, this was a wonderful, very illuminating article. You have found a
gem. Now, let's watch it disappear into the Liberal Media memory hole. If
not, then let's watch the Clinton Administration and their useful idiots
sidetrack the issue into how Republicans constantly distracted and
obstructed what they really wanted to do for the Russian children.
    A "few" comments below.  (I know, I know, he writes and he writes....)

> The Nation, October 2, 2000
> American Journalism and Russia's Tragedy
> By Stephen F. Cohen
>
> Date: Wed, 13 Sep 2000  From: Peggy Suttle <psuttle@thenation.com>
>
>  This article is adapted from Stephen Cohen's new book, Failed Crusade:
> America and the Tragedy of Post-Communist Russia,  which is being
published
> this month by W.W. Norton.
>
>  With only a few exceptions, America's professional
> Russia-watchers-policy-makers, financial advisers, scholars and, not
least,
> journalists-committed malpractice throughout the nineties. They claimed to
> know the cure for what ailed Russia after the Soviet breakup in 1991, gave
> regular assurances about the ongoing treatment and, while noting
occasional
> relapses, predicted a full recovery.

    [And they claimed to know the cure for West Germany and had to be sent
packing before they wrecked their WWII recovery. American Foreign policy has
been a scandal since Franklin Delano Roosevelt. American foreign policy
Liberal Collectivist have essentially poisoned every country they touched
since Roosevelt. Some day someone will write a thorough book naming names,
policies, and the following disasters from Roosevelt on, each time their
collectivist petty little Liberal fallacies were tried. When countries did
succeed it essential was because they followed our much earlier system of
economics BEFORE Roosevelt and because they basically ignored our experts.]
>
>  Their prescriptions, reports and prognoses have turned out to be
completely
> wrong. Nearly a decade later, Russia is afflicted by the worst economic
> depression in modern history, corruption so extensive that capital flight
far
> exceeds all foreign loans and investment, and a demographic catastrophe
> unprecedented in peacetime. The result has been a massive human tragedy.

>  Journalists had long been forewarned. At the birth of Communist Russia,
> Walter Lippmann and Charles Merz published an analysis of the US press
> coverage of the 1917 Revolution and the ensuing civil war between Reds and
> Whites that became a celebrated textbook case study of journalistic
> malpractice. Lippmann and Merz found that in terms of professional
standards
> the reporting was "nothing short of a disaster" and that the "net effect
was
> almost always misleading." The main reason, they concluded, was that US
> correspondents and editors believed fervently in their government's
anti-Red
> crusade and had thus seen "not what was, but what men wished to see."2

    [Actually through much of the Soviet revolution a host of prominent
journalists were boosters of the revolution if not outright supporting it. I
have two shelves of books naming names, writers, intellectuals, journalists,
government officials, organizations who supported, sent people and money
too, and made excuses for the bloodiest totalitarian dictatorship that ever
existed on earth. Just in the last few years we are finding out what
happened to many Americans who went to "fight for the people" and
disappeared into the Gulag.]
>
>  Seven decades later, it happened again. Most journalists writing for
> influential US newspapers and newsmagazines believed in the Clinton
> Administration's crusade to remake post-Communist Russia. Like a
Washington
> Post columnist, they quickly "converted to Yeltsin's side." Like Business
> Week's Moscow correspondent, they "hoped for the liberal alternative"

    [The "liberal alternative" was  the core of their mistake. We need to
look back at Germany at the end of WWII and the recovery of West Germany
under Ludwig Erhard. I quote, "I had a special interest in this report ever
since I heard Economics Minister of Germany Ludwig Erhard tell a small group
of economists that the recommendations by American Experts in the 1946-48
postware period could have wrecked the feeble German economy. At that time
West Germany was in ruins from the war time bombing. Her people could barely
find the neccessities of life. West Germans had to share their scarce
resources with several million of their former compartriots who escapted
from the tyranny of the communist puppet government in East Germany. .." "In
1948 our experts insisted that the only way out for Germany was to adopt
inflation. But, Erhard threatened to resign if this view was forced upon him
and the Americans backed away. Supporting Erhard, the German government
insisted upon the opposite course-upon the maintenance of a sound currency,
a balanced budget, the elimination of price controls, incentives to business
and individuals to save and invest, and encouragement to private enterprise
rather than government directed economy. The rest is history." From,
"Prosperity Through Freedom," by Lawrence Fertig. Page 46, the chapter, "How
our Experts Almost Ruined Germany."  The Clinton Administration maintains
this same group of tired Liberal Collectivists who can not see the concepts
of lassaire faire capitalism, limited government, and full free enterprise.
Try to remember that one of Clinton's early economic advisors just loved the
East European system of government. And please don't come back and try and
tell me Russia was pressed into a "lassaire faire capitalistic" system and
that's why they failed. Russia is under an Anarchical system driven by brute
force with a cabal of corrupt mixed economy "businessmen who have little to
fear from a weaken govenment and even weaker institutions."

and  believed in the "job that Yeltsin and his liberal reformers had begun."
Like
> the New York Times foreign affairs columnist, they were certain Russia
needed
> the "same basic model" that America had.

    [The basic model for America that the New York Times wanted was a mixed
economy with a massive bureaucracy of insufferable interference in our daily
lives, our economy, the Leninists Progressive taxation system and all of the
Liberal follies of Keynesian Economics.]>

[snip]

>  Yeltsin and his team were, it seemed, the only worthy political figures
in
> all the vastness of Russia. Most Russians saw his economic shock therapy,
> which had cost tens of millions of ordinary citizens their life savings
and
> plunged them into poverty, and related political measures as extremist,
but
> for the US press Yeltsin was the sole bulwark against "extremists of both
> left and right."6 There was little if any room for non-Yeltsin reformers.

[We will find to our regret that it was the extreme "right" that probably
would have been the better course. But, if I miss my guess, in the political
definitions of the world today the extreme right are Nazis. I seriously
doubt there were any Nazi Economists in Russia in 1990.]

[snip]
[snip

  There were even worse malpractices at the expense of professed American
> values. In 1993 US columnists and editorialists followed the Clinton
> Administration almost in unison in loudly encouraging Yeltsin's
> unconstitutional shutdown of Russia's Parliament and then in cheering his
> armed assault on that popularly elected body.

    [This year, it is no longer a "discussion" as to how biased the American
Media is toward Clinton and Liberalism. No longer can the American major
media claim objectivity. So many examples abound as to how the Media is
working to get Al Gore elected that they can no longer hid behind "sound
journalistic practices." They want Gore, they intend to promote Gore openly
and obviously. Thus, US columnists followed the Clinton administration like
the "useful idiots" that they were.]

[snip]
>  Another example highlights the irrelevance, even cold indifference, of
much
> US reporting on post-Communist Russia, where (even according to a
> semiofficial Moscow newspaper) most people were "being exploited" and
> impoverished in unprecedented ways. Discussing the brutal impact of
economic
> shock therapy on ordinary citizens, another pro-Western Russian complained
> that US correspondents had "no desire to look Russia's tragic reality
> straight in the eye." A Reuters journalist later made the same
observation:
> "The pain is edited out."16

    [Oh, this is a real surprise. Just how many Major American newspapers
reported the Gulag in the 30's and 40's. How many of them had front page
news stories on the despicable butchery of the enslaved hundreds of
thousands if not millions who systematically died in slavery. Certainly the
New York Times did just the opposite. Their journalists hide the Gulag from
the American Public.]
>
>  Poverty and health crises were, of course, reported, but usually as
sidebars
> to the main story of Russia's "transition" and as legacies of the
Communist
> past. Virtually all US correspondents and editorial writers were
contemptuous
> of any Russian proposals for a gradual, "somehow less painful reform,"
> whether by Yeltsin's own vice president in 1993 or Prime Minister Yevgeny
> Primakov in 1998 and 1999. Indeed, they seemed to think, following US
> officials and economists whose policies had already failed disastrously,
that
> more shock therapy was needed, such as eliminating the housing and
utilities
> subsidies that sustained millions of impoverished families, perhaps half
the
> nation or more.17

    [First in the 20's and the 30's we were told by the Communists and the
Socialists that capitalism would cause just this kind of impoverishment.
Now, we're told, oh, sorry, we meant Communism and Socialism would cause
this impoverishment. ]
>
>  Like old-time Soviet journalists, their latter-day US counterparts
pardoned
> present deprivations in the name of a bright future that did not come.
There
> was, for example, this astonishing but not unrepresentative assurance
> published by an especially influential US journalist in 1997: "While it is
> undoubtedly true that daily life in Russia today suffers from a painful
> economic, political, and social transition, the Russian prospect over the
> coming years and decades is more promising than ever before in its
> history."18 The following year Moscow's fraudulent financial system
collapsed
> and the "prospect" for tens of millions of Russians became even more
> "painful."

    [Well gee, seems all those omelets we had to break turned out to be
human beings and their savings accounts and not some simple egg in a nest.]
>
>  As Russia sank ever deeper into economic depression and poverty, US
> journalists continued to parrot Kremlin and Washington assertions that
> economic stability and takeoff, which still have not really come, were
just
> around the corner. (Vice President Al Gore is quoted as having said in
March
> 1998, "Optimism prevails universally among those who are familiar with
what
> is going on in Russia.") On the eve of its 1998 financial meltdown (and
even
> after), they still found ways to assure readers that Russia was "a
remarkable
> success story."19 Not even Putin's subsequent admission that "poverty
exists
> on an unusually large scale in the country" would make it a focus of US
> reporting.

    [And it is Al Gore, this visionary with rose tinted collectivist glasses
who has a good chance of continuing this misery and hopeless system of
beliefs after November in the United States. ]
>
>  Many American correspondents clearly did not like "doom-and-gloom"
stories
> about unpaid wages and pensions, malnutrition and abandoned provinces,
where,
> a Russian journalist tells us, "desperation touches everyone." (Newsweek's
> correspondent advised the poor to continue living on bread: "They could do
> worse.")20 Nor did they report more than a very few of the desperate acts
of
> protest taking place around the country, and virtually none of the ways
the
> "reform" government deprived workers of whatever rights and protection
they
> once had in the Soviet system. American journalists preferred other
> "metaphors for Russia's metamorphosis"21-usually in the tiny segment of
> Moscow society that had prospered, from financial oligarchs to yuppies
> spawned by the temporary proliferation of Western enterprises.
>
>  Thus, for a Washington Post columnist who had recently been a
correspondent,
> an especially successful insider beneficiary of state assets was a
> progressive "baby billionaire" and, for the Wall Street Journal, a
"Russian
> Bill Gates."22 For others, including a New York Times editorial writer and
> also former Moscow correspondent, "one of the best seats for observing the
> new Russia is on the terrace outside the cavernous McDonald's [that]
serves
> as a mecca for affluent young Muscovites. They arrive in Jeep Cherokees
and
> Toyota Land Cruisers, cell phones in hand."23 In the new Russia at that
time,
> the average monthly wage, when actually paid, was about $60, and falling.

[I remember a phase in Western newspapers  that went something like, "The
prosperity of the Russian People knows no bounds," stated in the late 30's
when people were having picnics on recent grave yards.]
>
>  No wonder few readers of the US press were prepared for Russia's economic
> collapse and financial scandals of the late nineties. Those who relied on
the
> New York Times, for example, must have been startled to learn-from an
> investigative reporter, not a Russia-watcher-that contrary to its prior
> reporting and editorials, "The whole political struggle in Russia between
> 1992 and 1998 was between different groups trying to take control of state
> assets. It was not about democracy or market reform."24

    [Absolutely correct. The New York Times, and its sycophant reporters had
no intentions of seeing any kind of Clinton "New Democ rat Collectivist
failures. Look at the lengths they went to destroy Ken Star and his
investigations of the Clinton scandals. Remember, there were no scandels, if
there were they were of no importance, if anyone got hurt they deserved it
because they were Clinton "haters."]
>
>  Facts may be stubborn things, but in this case no more so than many US
> journalists. In 1999 the Yeltsin era and Russia's purported "transition"
to
> prosperity, stability and democracy ended not only in economic collapse
and
> human misery but also in the first civil war in a nuclear country and with
a
> career KGB officer in the Kremlin. A few US journalists spoke of "lost
> illusions"-though almost never their own25-but most merely updated the
> media's fictitious narrative of the nineties. Thus, on the occasion of
> Putin's election this past March, top editors of both the New York Times
and
> Washington Post wrote apologias for the entire Yeltsin period and by
> implication their papers' coverage of the Russian nineties.26

   [ The way it works in American journalism is that the New York Times (The
Newspaper of Record)  starts a report, event, an editorial and like sheep at
the edge of a cliff the Washington Post, Boston Globe, Newsweek, Time
Magazine, Dallas News, Chicago Times, Los Angeles Times, San Francisco
Examiner, and Chronicle and 90% of the major AKA: NBC, CBS, ABC and
certainly CNN remainder follow the same events, the same slant, down to the
same words in lock step in their reporting.]
>
>  Certainly there has been no media (or official) reconsideration of the
> arrogant, intrusive and dangerously counterproductive US crusade to
transform
> a different civilization. In late 1999 the Post's chief Moscow
correspondent
> extolled the "great Russian transition," marveling that "Russians have
> accomplished much of what we asked." An editor of the New York Times Book
> Review, presumably in a position to know, reassured readers of "the
> desirability of remaking the former Soviet Union in a Western image." And
> like those of other influential papers, the Post's editors remain
> unrepentantly missionary: "Yes, meddle in Russian affairs."27
>
>  Nor has there been any real acknowledgment of the crusade's calamitous
> impact on the Russian people, whose fate the US government and media so
> lamented when they were the Soviet people. The "Great Transition
Depression,"
> as a UN study properly calls it, is almost never mentioned and the
nation's
> massive poverty only euphemistically, as in "Russians who have benefited
> little."28 By the late nineties, according to a Moscow writer admired in
> America, the "pitiful ruins of the Russian economy stuck out on the bared
> sandbars as if after a shipwreck." But to a visiting high-level Washington
> Post expert, "Russia looks terrific." Similarly, for Business Week's
ranking
> specialist, the insider privatization that most Russians equate with
> plundering and impoverishment remains "one of the most successful reforms
of
> the Yeltsin era."29
>
>  Even the economic happy talk of the pre-1998 meltdown is back. US press
> accounts, parroting as they did in the nineties self-serving assurances by
> Western bankers and investment firms, are again reporting that Russia's
> half-dead economy is actually "booming."30 But Russian authorities from
> economists to President Putin have warned that the modest spurt of
industrial
> output since 1999 is the result of artificial and temporary factors and
has
> done little if anything to benefit capital investment or ordinary
citizens.
> (Capital flight may even have increased during this period.)
>
>  Coverage of Putin himself, the little-known head of the KGB's successor
> agency only a year ago, has been more mixed. He became president thanks to
a
> nearly genocidal war in Chechnya and an electoral process manipulated by
> Kremlin insiders hoping for a post-Yeltsin praetorian to protect their
power
> and ill-gotten wealth. Predictably, the Clinton Administration immediately
> anointed him "one of the leading reformers" and his political rise a
"genuine
> democratic transition." Until it finally acknowledged last month that the
new
> Russian leader is "the un-Boris," the Administration tried to make Putin
its
> Yeltsin of the twenty-first century in order to justify its failed
policies
> of the nineties.

    [Does anyone remember how Western Journalists years ago tried to turn
other ex-KGB operatives who became Russian premiers into "Liberals Like Us?"
and who lived for about 60 hours before being replaced by another "Liberal
Like us" ex-communist who then dies after being in office for 6 days?" Isn't
this sounding a little deja vu ?]

>  Some US journalists did the same. According to the lead New York Times
> correspondent, to take perhaps the most influential example, Putin
occupied
> the Kremlin through "a democratic transfer of executive power" and
"clearly
> has an intellectual grasp of democracy," even a "seemingly emotional
> commitment to building a democracy."31 (A six-month investigation by the
> Moscow Times, an expatriate paper, has just concluded that "falsification"
> was "decisive" in Putin's March electoral victory.)
>
[snip]

[snip]

>  The mainstream US press may be indifferent to the fate of Russia's
> impoverished majority but not to that of its handful of "much maligned"
> oligarchs who were allowed under Yeltsin to "privatize" hundreds of
billions
> of dollars of Soviet state assets for a fraction of their value. The
> country's economic recovery requires some degree of renationalization, as
> even the former chief economist of the World Bank argues. But when Putin
> began to crack down on oligarchical asset-stripping, tax evasion and
illegal
> capital export this summer-steps approved by 75 percent of Russians
> surveyed-the Washington Post sternly warned him against "revisiting the
> privatization deals" and the Wall Street Journal, against even
"antagonizing"
> the tycoons.33

    [The wolf is showing his real colors isn't he?]
>
>  All this suggests that many American journalists, like Western investors,
> the US government and the kleptocrats themselves, would hardly object if
> Putin becomes a Russian Pinochet in order to safeguard Yeltsin's "reforms"
> and impose his own "excellent program." Thus, a Los Angeles Times
> correspondent reports, apparently in full agreement, the growing Western
view
> that "a little authoritarianism might be just what Russia needs."34 If
> influential US journalists and the institutions they represent now share
this
> opinion, we are left with nearly a decade of not only empirical but also
> ethical malpractice.

    [And that is the real irony isn't it, that the democ rat ic Liberals,
their love of mankind, their barrel full of caring, beneath it all is really
a sanctimonious, do as I say, follow my compulsive lead, it is the only one
you should follow or else, now sheds their "caring" skin and  shows them for
the petty little social dictators they always were.]
>
>  The following abbreviations are used: Business Week (BW); Johnson Russia
> List, e-mail (JRL); Los Angeles Times (LAT); The New Republic (NR); New
York
> Times (NYT); Washington Post (WP); and Wall Street Journal (WSJ).
> Considerably more evidence and examples appear in my Failed Crusade:
America
> and the Tragedy of Post-Communist Russia (New York, 2000). 1. Quoted by
> Daniel Williams in WP, March 13, 1993. 2. "A Test of the News," supplement
to
> NR, Aug. 4, 1920. 3. Jim Hoagland in WP, Nov. 6, 1992; Rose Brady,
Kapitalizm
> (New Haven, 1999), pp. 242-43; Thomas Friedman in NYT, Oct. 24, 1999;
Steven
> Erlanger, ibid., July 28, 1993; David Hoffman in WP, Sept. 19, 1999. 4.
Ellen
> Shearer and Frank Starr, "Through a Prism Darkly," American Journalism
> Review, Sept. 1996, p. 37; Anthony Olcott in WP Book World, June 27, 1999,
p.
> 6. For a general indictment of press coverage, see Matt Bivens and Jonas
> Bernstein, "The Russia You Never Met," Demokratizatsiya, Fall 1998, pp.
> 613-47; and Mark Ames and Matt Taibbi, The eXile (New York, 2000). For
> references to factual errors, see my Failed Crusade, p. 252, n. 17 and p.
> 264, n. 92. 5. Leonid Krutakov interviewed by Matt Taibbi and Mark Ames in
> JRL, Oct. 23, 1999. For "giants," see Lee Hockstader in WP, Jan. 1, 1995.
For
> examples of sourcing, see Steven Erlanger in NYT, April 9, Dec. 4, 1993;
Fred
> Hiatt in WP, March 26, 1995, Dec. 10, 1996; and David Hoffman, ibid., Dec.
> 13, 1997. On the other hand, Russia's many opposition politicians and
> economists were rarely quoted or interviewed, except to be dismissed.
Still
> worse, there is little evidence in the coverage that US correspondents in
> Moscow read the Russian press. 6. NYT editorial, Dec. 14, 1993. Similarly,
> see David Hoffman in WP, Oct. 1, 1995. 7. For Yavlinsky, see Michael
Specter
> quoting Michael McFaul approvingly in NYT, May 5, 1996; and similarly the
NYT
> editorial on May 1, 1996, and Specter's dispatch on May 18, 1996. For
"clean
> hands," see Michael Wines on Sergei Stepashin, ibid., May 13, 1999; and,
> similarly, Michael Gordon's promotion of the inexperienced and inept
Sergei
> Kiriyenko, ibid., April 12, 1998. 8. Alessandra Stanley in NYT, June 10,
> 1997; David Hoffman in WP, Jan. 10, 1997; and Carroll Bogert in Newsweek,
> March 21, 1994, p. 51. 9. Vladimir Kvint in NYT, Jan. 24, 1993; James
> Ledbetter in Village Voice, May 28, 1996; Robert V. Daniels, Russia's
> Transformation (Lanham, Md., 1998), p. 193. 10. John Kohan in Time, Dec.
7,
> 1992; Celestine Bohlen and Thomas Friedman in NYT, April 15, 16, 1999, and
> similarly the editorial, June 6, 1999. 11. Bivens and Bernstein, p. 620.
12.
> Michael Gordon and Alessandra Stanley in NYT, Oct. 17, 1996, Nov. 17,
1997.
> Similarly, see David Hoffman in WP, Sept. 9, 1997; Paul Quinn-Judge in
Time,
> Dec. 15, 1997; and Carol Williams in LAT, March 25, 1998. 13. Matt Taibbi
and
> Mark Ames, "The Journal's Russia Scandal," The Nation, Oct. 4, 1999, p.
20.
> 14. Charles Krauthammer and Jim Hoagland in WP, March 19, 1993. For
> omelettes, see also David Remnick on Charlie Rose, PBS, Oct. 4, 1993. For
> voices in unison, see A.M. Rosenthal, the editorial and Leslie Gelb in
NYT,
> March 16, 22, 28, April 29, 1993; George Will in WP, March 25, 1993; and
> editorials in Chicago Tribune, May 9, 1993, and NR, April 12, 1993. 15.
See,
> e.g., Alessandra Stanley in NYT, Jan. 19, 1997; Chicago Tribune editorial,
> May 9, 1998; and Jim Hoagland in WP, Dec. 16, 1999. 16. Oleg Bogomolov in
> Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Feb. 8, 1994; and John Morrison cited in Shearer and
> Starr, p. 39. For exploitation, see Iraida Semenova and Aleksei Podymov in
> Rossisskaia Gazeta, Jan. 24, 2000. 17. See Steven Erlanger in NYT, April
24,
> 1993; for more shock therapy, see WP, editorial, March 12, 1997; Michael
> Gordon in NYT, July 13, 1997; and below, note 32. 18. David Remnick,
> Resurrection: The Struggle for a New Russia (New York, 1997), p. 362. 19.
> See, e.g., Steven Erlanger, the editorials and Richard Stevenson in NYT,
Aug.
> 22, 1994, July 16, Sept. 25, 1995, May 24, 1996; Fred Hiatt, Margaret
> Shapiro, Michael Dobbs and the editorial in WP, April 2, July 30, 1995,
March
> 19, 1997; Carol Williams in LAT, Dec. 2, 1997; Steve Liesman in WSJ, Jan.
28,
> 1998; and Hiatt in WP, July 12, 1998. For Gore, see Mark Egan, Reuters
> dispatch, JRL, Oct. 8, 1999. 20. Carroll Bogert in Newsweek, May 31, 1993,
p.
> 12. For more impatience with "doom and gloom," see Steve Liesman in WSJ,
> Sept. 26, 1996. For the provinces, Leonid Krutakov cited above, note 5.
21.
> Ann Hulbert in NR, Oct. 2, 1995. 22. Fred Hiatt in WP, March 9, 1998; WSJ
> quoted in Bivens and Bernstein, p. 631. Similarly, see Richard Stevenson's
> enthusiasm for the Russian-American investor Boris Jordan in NYT, Sept.
20,
> 1995, in light of the exposé of Jordan's activities by David Filipov and
Matt
> Taibbi in the Boston Globe, Oct. 22, 1997. 23. Philip Taubman in NYT, June
> 21, 1998. Similarly, see Steven Erlanger and Michael Specter, ibid., July
23,
> Oct. 12, 1995; Carol Williams in LAT, Dec. 24, 1997; David Hoffman in WP,
> Sept. 16, 1999. 24. Timothy O'Brien quoting Nodari Simonia in NYT, Sept.
5,
> 1999. 25. Michael Dobbs and Paul Blustein in WP, Sept. 12, 1999.
Similarly,
> see Fred Hiatt, ibid., Aug. 29, 1999; John Lloyd in NYT Magazine, Aug. 15,
> 1999, pp. 34-41, 52, 61, 64. 26. Bill Keller in NYT Book Review, March 19,
> 2000, pp. 1, 6; Fred Hiatt in WP, March 23, 2000. Similarly, see David
> Hoffman's defense of Vice President Gore's role in the crusade, ibid.,
June
> 4, 2000. 27. David Hoffman, ibid., Sept. 19, 1999; Barry Gewen in NYT Book
> Review, Oct. 31, 1999, p. 34; WP editorial, June 1, 2000. 28. Human
> Development Report for Central and Eastern Europe and the CIS 1999 (New
York,
> 1999), p. 15; Paul Quinn-Judge in Time, July 3, 2000, p. 41. 29. Tatyana
> Tolstaya in The New York Review of Books, Nov. 19, 1998, p. 6; Robert
Kaiser,
> Charlie Rose, PBS, Sept. 10, 1999; Rose Brady in BW, March 13, 2000, p.
> 14E12. 30. Michael Sesit in WSJ Europe, July 7-8, 2000. Similarly, see
> Reuters dispatch, JRL, Feb. 19, 1999; Michael Wines in NYT, June 2, 2000;
and
> James Cox in USA Today, July 21, 2000. 31. Michael Wines in NYT, May 8,
Feb.
> 20, July 9, 2000. For other pro-Putin pieces, see John Lloyd in NYT
Magazine,
> March 19, 2000, pp. 62, 64-67; and David Hoffman's minimizing of Putin's
role
> in the Chechen war, in WP, March 20, 2000. 32. Michael Wines in NYT, June
29,
> 2000. For similar enthusiasm, see David Hoffman in WP, July 7, 2000; Paul
> Hofheinz (who calls it an "excellent program") in WSJ Europe, July 5,
2000;
> and the NYT editorial on the flat tax, May 28, 2000. 33. WP editorial,
July
> 22, 2000; Paul Hofheinz in WSJ Europe, July 5, 2000. Similarly, see David
> Ignatius in WP, July 23, 2000. For whitewashing the "much maligned" Boris
> Berezovsky, widely considered the most rapacious oligarch, see Michael
Wines
> in NYT, July 15, 2000; and the way Berezovsky is presented, or allowed to
> present himself, by David Hoffman in WP, July 18 and 20, 2000; and Paul
> Quinn-Judge in Time Europe, July 17, 2000. For the survey, see Vedomosti,
> Aug. 3, 2000. 34. Maura Reynolds in LAT, March 24, 2000. Similarly, see
> Michael Wines in NYT, Feb. 20, 2000; and David Hoffman in WP, March 25,
2000.
>
>
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