[FPSPACE] "Russia's Sorry Infrastructure" article (Dec 2000)

[JamesOberg@aol.com]

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JimO: Thanks to Sven and Phil for making the point -- which I adopted -- tha=
t=20
space activities (particularly Western-funded activities) stand out as a=20
great exception to the overall view of Russia's problems.=20

The entire article is in the attachment. The space-related portion follows:

SPACE PROJECTS IN POOR SHAPE

Meanwhile, for lack of funding, Russia's own fleet of space applications=20
satellites are wearing out and breaking down. This could leave the country=20
half-blind to foreign missile launches,=20
half-deaf to its own domestic communications, half senseless due to the loss=
=20
of weather satellites, and lost without a functioning navigation satellite=20
network.

"The past 10 years have already seen failures of equipment on board=20
spacecraft increase by more than three times," space forces commander Valeri=
y=20
Grin told a reporter in mid-1999. Of the 90 military satellites at his=20
disposal, more than 80 percent had already exceeded their design lifetimes.

The situation with the Glonass space-based navigation constellation=20
graphically illustrates the infrastructure crisis in the domestic space=20
program. Developed as a Soviet response to the U.S. Department of Defense's=20
Global Positioning System (GPS), Glonass planned to deploy 24 satellites in=20
12-hour circular orbits. Beginning in 1982, the satellites (code name Uragan=
,=20
for hurricane) were launched three at a time by Proton rockets.

By 1993, the  orbital alignment of the entire fleet of satellites, was near=20
enough complete for the system to be formally accepted by the Russian Defens=
e=20
ministry. But within two years, replacement launchings ceased as funding=20
levels plummeted. By mid-2000, only 10 of the operational slots were filled;=
=20
the rest had simply died in orbit. All of the surviving payloads have gone=20
far beyond their nominal lifetimes of three years, lasting on average about=20
4.5 years before failing.

After a five-year gap, three new Glonass satellites were launched last 13=20
October. Their launch had been scheduled for 27 September but was postponed=20
after an accident damaged one of the payloads at the Baykonur base. It was=20
being transferred by rail from the launch site to a fueling facility 30 km=20
away, when an improperly operated handcar ran into the carrier.

The payload suffered minor damage, but was airlifted to the factory in Omsk,=
=20
repaired and recertified, and then returned to the launch site. While this=20
urgent repair was being made, two of the remaining 10 satellites in orbit=20
suddenly died. The three new payloads reached orbit successfully, but the=20
network is still non-functional, with more launches planned for next year.

Eventually, Glonass managers hope to limp along on a bare-bones 12-satellite=
=20
network for the next four years, until a new-generation Glonass-M payload ca=
n=20
be built. It will have a life span of seven to eight years. Eventually, a=20
lightweight Glonass-K satellite, to be launched one at a time from a base=20
inside Russia, will replace these designs.

launch warnings collapse

Perhaps more alarmingly, Russia's network of missile launch warning=20
satellites is also collapsing. A full constellation needs 21 satellites, but=
=20
as of mid-1999, there were only three left, the last=20
of which had been launched in 1997. On average, the surviving payloads=20
provide only "single-string" coverage, meaning there is no possibility of a=20
launch warning being confirmed by another satellite.=20

And even that single-string coverage exists for only about half of every day=
.=20
Six new satellite launches are required to resume 24-hour coverage, but=20
neither the payloads nor the boosters have been funded.

Other satellite systems are also suffering. Last August, for example, a=20
Russian Space Agency official, Vladimir Umnikov told a TASS news agency=20
reporter that 34 of the 44 satellites dedicated to economic applications and=
=20
scientific research "have used up their resources." He added that any or all=
=20
of them "could break down at any moment."=20

Earlier this year, Aleksandr Frolov, of the Russian federal weather=20
forecasting service, informed TASS that the situation with the weather=20
satellite network was "critical." The satellites remain in=20
orbit, he admitted, but "their equipment on board is not functioning."

OTHER PROJECTS SHINE

But throughout the year, and in stark contrast to the public perception of=20
overall deterioration,  Russian space engineers have displayed high levels o=
f=20
reliability and innovation and shown impressive competence. But their succes=
s=20
is fueled by money from the West.

Take the return-to-flight of the heavy Proton booster rocket. Its blistering=
=20
pace of flights will set a record for the year. Earlier failures were traced=
=20
to engines improperly assembled during a=20
financial crisis in 1991-2. Recent launches included both commercial payload=
s=20
to geosynchronous orbit and the successful launch of the Service Module for=20
the International Space Station (ISS).=20
An improved Proton-M variation was introduced, and the Proton=E2=80=99s new=20=
Briz=20
upper stage had its first successful flight.=20

The new Fregat upper stage for the mid-sized Soyuz booster was introduced,=20
and there was the world's first demonstration of an inflatable heat shield s=
o=20
that a rocket stage can return from orbit. Four Progress supply ships have=20
been launched (three to the Mir space station, one to the International Spac=
e=20
 Station), bringing the unbroken run of successes to more than a hundred.

There's been a demonstration launch of the new Rokot commercial=20
small-satellite launcher, based on a converted intercontinental ballistic=20
missile, and the first launch from the Plesetsk cosmodrome=20
inside Russia of applications satellites into the sun-synchronous near-polar=
=20
orbit. (All previous launches into this orbital path had been made from the=20
Baykonur space base in Kazakhstan).

Although Russia=E2=80=99s contributions to the International Space Station a=
re mainly=20
funded by the government, they benefit from spillover from commercial profit=
s=20
of the organizations involved. The Service Module, which received its first=20
permanent crew for the space station last month, may have been years late,=20
but when it arrived it was of classic Soviet-era quality.

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SPECTRUM (IEEE), December 2000
Russia's sorry infrastructure

James Oberg
Contributing Editor

A current Moscow joke begins, "Russia is a country of optimists," and ends w=
ith the punch line: "All the pessimists have already left."

Following a decade of political upheaval, economic collapse, international h=
umiliation, and two nasty Caucasian wars, the latest blow to Russian morale=20=
has been a pair of technological disasters.=20
Both occurred in August, one at sea and the other right in the center of Mos=
cow

On 12 August, during naval exercises in the White Sea north of Murmansk, the=
 nuclear attack submarine Kursk sank with all hands lost after two explosion=
s. The 170-meter-long 13 900-ton Oscar-II-class submarine was Russia's newes=
t and most powerful, carried 118 men, including several specialists from a n=
aval weapons bureau among its crew.

Then, on 27 August, fire broke out in Moscow's landmark television tower, Eu=
rope's tallest structure. Three people were killed, and Muscovites were depr=
ived of television broadcasts for several days.=20

Easily visible on the skyline from all over Moscow, the 540-meter-high tower=
 was an expression of Soviet-era pride, built in 1959-67 to commemorate the=20=
50th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution of November 1917. "It wasn't si=
mply a tower," a Moscow TV commentator explained. "It was the symbol of an e=
poch that now, it seems, has passed for good."

"This [last] emergency highlights what condition vital facilities, as well a=
s the entire nation, are in," Russian President Vladimir Putin told governme=
nt officials. "Only economic development will allow us to avoid such calamit=
ies in the future."
  =20
Western observers agreed. "The sinking of the nuclear submarine and the fire=
 at the Moscow television tower have highlighted the crumbling state of Russ=
ia's physical infrastructure," observed=20
Charles Frank, first deputy president of the London-based European Bank for=20=
Reconstruction and Development. Speaking at Harvard University's Russian-Ame=
rican Investment Forum in Cambridge, Mass., early in October, he continued:=20=
"A decade of improperly addressed=20
investments, of disdain for maintenance and repair, and of the foolish waste=
 of enormous natural and human resources has led to an aging ... infrastruct=
ure ... with diminished effectiveness."
 =20
In Russia the two disasters evoked the same consensus among a variety of off=
-the-cuff commentators. Many of the assertions came from officials who wante=
d more funding=20
for their own departments, while in other cases, dubious and undocumented hy=
potheses were bandied about like authoritative conclusions.

Infrastructure decay from malign neglect, as it could be referred to, can be=
 seen everywhere in Russia. There are some exceptions, most conspicuously co=
mmercial segments of the space industry fueled by Western payments. But Gove=
rnment-funded programs, starved of funds, are collapsing--witness the skimpe=
d satellite programs and the laggardly telephone system, of which more later=
. But whether malign neglect was the direct cause of the two August disaster=
s was less clear. Still, if they focused Russian attention--and resolve--on=20=
the larger problem, they might yet yield some benefit.

INFRASTRUCTURE AND KURSK

The most likely explanation of the submarine disaster seems to have been a m=
ishap in the forward torpedo tube during a launch, possibly a test, of an im=
proved high-speed Shkval rocket torpedo. Seismic stations in Norway monitore=
d a small blast, followed two minutes later by an explosion with the force o=
f one to two tons of TNT. The Richter 3.47 shock wave was detected as far aw=
ay as Canada and Alaska.

The subsequent rescue attempt was much more related to infrastructure decay.=
 Only then did most of the world discover that the Russian Navy's undersea r=
escue teams had been disbanded several years earlier. Anatoliy Vyrelkin, for=
mer head of one deep-diving rescue unit, told a Russian newspaper it would h=
ave taken his men less than a day to get to the Kursk hatches, but "there is=
 not a single specialized ship in the Northern fleet nowadays."

Later, the Russian Navy evidently concluded that Russia no longer possessed=20=
the technical know-how to recover bodies from the wreck itself. In October,=20=
it completed negotiations with the Norwegian subsidiary of Halliburton AS to=
 do the job. Halliburton is the largest U.S. company designing and deliverin=
g oil and gas equipment.

To fill in some more details, Kursk, powered by two 190-MW pressurized-water=
 OK-650-b nuclear reactors, was taking part in a Northern Fleet exercise. Th=
is was in preparation for the deployment of ships from the Northern Fleet, B=
altic, and Black Sea fleets into the Mediterranean, to show the flag after a=
 long absence.=20

The naval maneuvers coincided with a crucial Kremlin meeting on military spe=
nding. Fiercely competitive, the country's nuclear and conventional force co=
mmanders were heading for a showdown and the Navy was determined not be left=
 out.

On Saturday, 12 August, at about noon, Kursk requested and received permissi=
on to fire one torpedo in the first of a series of torpedo runs. That was th=
e last signal ever received from it.

What happened next was monitored from Norway and from North Atlantic Treaty=20=
Organization (NATO) ships at sea. The first blast was followed by sounds tha=
t could be interpreted as a life-and-death struggle. These included the soun=
d of cavitation, as bubbles of water vapor were created by the twin seven-bl=
aded propellers spinning at top speed. Sounds of machinery working and balla=
st tanks being blown were also heard.

"You can hear them desperately trying to reach the surface," a senior U.S. n=
aval officer who had studied the event told the Washington Post. But whateve=
r crisis overwhelmed the crew, it left them no time for even the most basic=20=
responses, such as releasing a rescue beacon.

The second explosion terminated any mechanical sounds from the submarine. Al=
l that could be heard was the creaking of the hull, perhaps signifying slow=20=
collapse of weakened structures under the relatively mild pressures of the s=
hallow depth. Some 105 seconds later came the thud of the Kursk gouging into=
 the seabed (many Russians still insist the second explosion occurred at the=
 moment of impact with the bottom).

So how was all this to be interpreted? John Pike, a technology analyst for t=
he Federation of American Scientists, in Washington, D.C., told ABC News tha=
t the first, smaller blast "certainly would be consistent with what you migh=
t expect from either a torpedo or cruise missile warhead exploding." But he=20=
added: "It would not exclude bumping into an old World War II sea mine."

The later blast, said Pike, was consistent with one or more near-simultaneou=
s explosions of torpedoes or cruise missiles, or perhaps the violent collaps=
e of some internal pressurized bulkheads. Based on the two-minute delay, he=20=
said, "one could speculate that the initial explosion caused a fire in the t=
orpedo room, [setting] off another weapon, or weapons or ... breached part o=
f the hull, which damaged another pressure bulkhead, subsequently causing it=
 to collapse."

Images on Moscow TV showing damage to the Kursk agreed with the idea that a=20=
torpedo explosion set off the disaster.

  Deep-sea inputs

Evidence for collision with another ship would exculpate the Kursk's state o=
f fitness, to a degree--the theory favored by the Russian Navy. So in Septem=
ber the wreck was examined by the oceanographic research ship Mstislav Keldy=
sh, famous for its exploration of the sunken Titanic. In the course of five=20=
days, it deployed its two deep-sea diving vessels to photograph the submarin=
e and to search for wreckage from another ship.

No evidence of such a ship was found. Yet public sentiment blaming the disas=
ter on a foreign submarine ("probably NATO, perhaps British," goes the most=20=
popular rumor) remains strong. Meanwhile, Russian newspapers report that the=
 consensus among naval officers in Murmansk is that a missile from the cruis=
er Peter the Great, also in the area, accidentally hit Kursk, setting off th=
e explosions.

What the Keldysh did find was grim enough. The submarine was upright, its no=
se plowed about 2 meters into the clay bottom at a depth of 108 meters. The=20=
periscope was raised. Besides the damage forward, there was damage to the br=
idge, and two Granit missile tube lids were torn=20
off. Metal fragments were recovered that were traced to both the outer and i=
nner hulls of the submarine. The fragments, twisted and melted, were evidenc=
e of a massive explosion within the forward torpedo room. Based on these fin=
dings, officials concluded that all crewmembers had died during the first fe=
w moments after the second explosion.=20

But Russian divers, supported by Norwegian specialists, made a grim discover=
y when they entered the aft compartment of Kursk late in October. In a pocke=
t of one of the bodies there was a note describing how about two dozen men h=
ad survived the initial explosions and had taken refuge in the last compartm=
ent, where they knew they were doomed. Russian press reports even suggested=20=
that additional notes showed the men had lived at least two days, but under=20=
the known conditions on the sub experts consider that idea preposterous.

New television inspections of the outer hull of Kursk showed what looked lik=
e long gouges on its surface. Whether these were from a collision with anoth=
er vessel, or had been caused by impact with the bottom, or had been there e=
ven before the disaster, still was unknown.


The danger of cutting corners

As the investigation widened, evidence uncovered suggested that infrastructu=
re decay might well have elevated hazards aboard the submarine, as well as o=
n other Russian warships. Apparently when the submarine went out on the exer=
cise its full weapons complement from its last combat patrol was still insta=
lled and could have led to or reinforced the second explosion.
 =20
Normally, cranes are used to offload the weapons while the vessel is in port=
, but according to documents obtained by Moscow newspapers, "the Russian Tec=
hnical Register put a ban on operating the cranes in the Northern Fleet, say=
ing they are too worn out for use." In fact,=20
in a budget deposition to the Russian parliament last year, the commander-in=
-chief of the Russian Navy, Vladimir Kuroyedov, had complained that of fourt=
een 100-ton cranes and sixty-three 40-ton=20
cranes at naval bases, only three of the big ones and seventeen of the small=
er ones were operable. A request for about $20 million for crane repair was=20=
ignored.

One other credible report blames the initial explosion on budget-cutting pre=
ssures. A few days after the sinking, the Russian military daily newspaper R=
ed Star embellished its Web site with an=20
article about faulty torpedoes. Three days later the piece was deleted witho=
ut ever appearing in print, perhaps because of military security concerns.

The Red Star article described how expensive, battery-powered torpedoes of R=
ussia's submarines were being replaced with liquid-fueled designs, to elimin=
ate costly battery components such as metallic silver.=20

According to the article, Navy officials argued against the new design becau=
se the liquid-fueled torpedoes were difficult to handle and were considered=20=
"too explosive." But the new design promised cost savings and was adopted.

The case for a torpedo explosion is not altogether proven, even so. In Octob=
er, deputy prime minister Ilya Klebanov, in charge of the investigation, tol=
d reporters that investigators had so far been unable to get a torpedo to ex=
plode as hypothesized for Kursk. "So far, no matter what harsh conditions we=
 put a torpedo into, we cannot reach the variant of anything happening to it=
," he said. "But obviously something happened to it--either to a torpedo its=
elf or as a consequence of other processes occurring."

Other Russian newspapers provided details of cost-savings measures on the su=
bmarine. One wrote that no emergency batteries were installed. Another descr=
ibed how emergency systems, such as the locator beacon and a crew bailout po=
d, may have been welded to the outer deck because mechanical equipment to ho=
ld them in place had worn out. These measures prove the fraying of the infra=
structure, but were unlikely to have contributed to the loss of Kursk. (Stil=
l, they could=20
cause future disasters unless remedied.)

Even if the nuclear Kursk was "safe," the entire Russian submarine fleet rem=
ains an environmental threat. It is assumed that Kursk's two reactors shut d=
own safely, and monitoring ships have not detected any radiation leaks. But=20=
a hundred other Russian submarines, decommissioned but not dismantled, float=
 in Russian harbors with their reactors still installed. For decades, expend=
ed reactor hardware was simply sunk off the Russian coast. As detailed by pr=
ivate groups, such as the Bellona Foundation in Norway, the collapse of the=20=
old Soviet nuclear navy is a slow-motion catastrophe requiring urgent and ex=
pensive countermeasures.

The toll on the navy of budget cutbacks is seen in other figures. In the pas=
t nine years more than 85 percent of Russia=92s naval vessels have been scra=
pped. Today, Russia has only 12 nuclear and 10 conventional submarines and 3=
7 surface warships considered combat ready. This is less than half the sea p=
ower of its neighbor, Turkey, and only half of these can be manned and suppl=
ied to go to sea together. In 1989, Russia built 78 military ships, and in 1=
998 it built 4.=20

Too little, too much

In the case of Moscow's television tower, originally inadequate construction=
 plus recent overdevelopment, not simply neglect, appears to have fanned the=
 flames. During construction, Soviet designers chose not to purchase electri=
c power line cable with nonflammable cladding from the West and used cheaper=
 Russian electrical lines. "The designers knew the tower was dangerous even=20=
when it was being built," Moscow electrical engineer Mikhail Ryzhok, a veter=
an of the cable installation, told Business Week.
 =20
In recent years, new private television stations just squeezed their equipme=
nt into whatever spaces were available. From the tower's upper spire, at the=
 460-meter level, down to the 334-meter level, with its observation deck and=
 rotating restaurant, the tower was crammed with broadcasting equipment for=20=
11 TV and 12 radio stations, and 17 additional satellite TV programs. No one=
 paid attention to fire safety.
 =20
In fact, the fire started in the upper spire, in electrical equipment owned=20=
by a Moscow paging service. The fire rode down cable ducts to the 460-meter=20=
observation level, and stopped only at the=20
70-meter level, where firefighters had erected a barricade of asbestos sheet=
s. Most of the structure above that level was gutted, and steel support cabl=
es appear to have been damaged. The top of the=20
tower now tilts 2 meters off vertical.

Obviously the tower's safety and anti-fire systems were outdated, said Eduar=
d Sagalayev, the head of Russia's broadcasters association. Suppressant syst=
ems either were never activated or soon=20
ran out of foam. Moreover, a day after the fire was extinguished, firefighte=
rs found that some power cables in the tower were still hot, despite a suppo=
sedly complete power-down during the fire. The discovery was made when a fir=
efighter inspecting damage at the 147-meter level noticed that wall clocks w=
ere still keeping time.Now, with an estimated repair cost of US $1 billion,=20=
the tower faces an uncertain future.

SPACE PROJECTS IN POOR SHAPE

Meanwhile, for lack of funding, Russia's own fleet of space applications sat=
ellites are wearing out and breaking down. This could leave the country half=
-blind to foreign missile launches,=20
half-deaf to its own domestic communications, half senseless due to the loss=
 of weather satellites, and lost without a functioning navigation satellite=20=
network.

"The past 10 years have already seen failures of equipment on board spacecra=
ft increase by more than three times," space forces commander Valeriy Grin t=
old a reporter in mid-1999. Of the 90 military satellites at his disposal, m=
ore than 80 percent had already exceeded their design lifetimes.

The situation with the Glonass space-based navigation constellation graphica=
lly illustrates the infrastructure crisis in the domestic space program. Dev=
eloped as a Soviet response to the U.S. Department of Defense's Global Posit=
ioning System (GPS), Glonass planned to deploy 24 satellites in 12-hour circ=
ular orbits. Beginning in 1982, the satellites (code name Uragan, for hurric=
ane) were launched three at a time by Proton rockets.

By 1993, the  orbital alignment of the entire fleet of satellites, was near=20=
enough complete for the system to be formally accepted by the Russian Defens=
e ministry. But within two years, replacement launchings ceased as funding l=
evels plummeted. By mid-2000, only 10 of the operational slots were filled;=20=
the rest had simply died in orbit. All of the surviving payloads have gone f=
ar beyond their nominal lifetimes of three years, lasting on average about 4=
.5 years before failing.

After a five-year gap, three new Glonass satellites were launched last 13 Oc=
tober. Their launch had been scheduled for 27 September but was postponed af=
ter an accident damaged one of the payloads at the Baykonur base. It was bei=
ng transferred by rail from the launch site to a fueling facility 30 km away=
, when an improperly operated handcar ran into the carrier.

The payload suffered minor damage, but was airlifted to the factory in Omsk,=
 repaired and recertified, and then returned to the launch site. While this=20=
urgent repair was being made, two of the remaining 10 satellites in orbit su=
ddenly died. The three new payloads reached orbit successfully, but the netw=
ork is still non-functional, with more launches planned for next year.

Eventually, Glonass managers hope to limp along on a bare-bones 12-satellite=
 network for the next four years, until a new-generation Glonass-M payload c=
an be built. It will have a life span of seven to eight years. Eventually, a=
 lightweight Glonass-K satellite, to be launched one at a time from a base i=
nside Russia, will replace these designs.

launch warnings collapse

Perhaps more alarmingly, Russia's network of missile launch warning satellit=
es is also collapsing. A full constellation needs 21 satellites, but as of m=
id-1999, there were only three left, the last=20
of which had been launched in 1997. On average, the surviving payloads provi=
de only "single-string" coverage, meaning there is no possibility of a launc=
h warning being confirmed by another satellite.=20

And even that single-string coverage exists for only about half of every day=
. Six new satellite launches are required to resume 24-hour coverage, but ne=
ither the payloads nor the boosters have been funded.

Other satellite systems are also suffering. Last August, for example, a Russ=
ian Space Agency official, Vladimir Umnikov told a TASS news agency reporter=
 that 34 of the 44 satellites dedicated to economic applications and scienti=
fic research "have used up their resources." He added that any or all of the=
m "could break down at any moment."=20

Earlier this year, Aleksandr Frolov, of the Russian federal weather forecast=
ing service, informed TASS that the situation with the weather satellite net=
work was "critical." The satellites remain in=20
orbit, he admitted, but "their equipment on board is not functioning."

OTHER PROJECTS SHINE

But throughout the year, and in stark contrast to the public perception of o=
verall deterioration,  Russian space engineers have displayed high levels of=
 reliability and innovation and shown impressive competence. But their succe=
ss is fueled by money from the West.

Take the return-to-flight of the heavy Proton booster rocket. Its blistering=
 pace of flights will set a record for the year. Earlier failures were trace=
d to engines improperly assembled during a=20
financial crisis in 1991-2. Recent launches included both commercial payload=
s to geosynchronous orbit and the successful launch of the Service Module fo=
r the International Space Station (ISS).=20
An improved Proton-M variation was introduced, and the Proton=92s new Briz u=
pper stage had its first successful flight.=20

The new Fregat upper stage for the mid-sized Soyuz booster was introduced, a=
nd there was the world's first demonstration of an inflatable heat shield so=
 that a rocket stage can return from orbit. Four Progress supply ships have=20=
been launched (three to the Mir space station, one to the International Spac=
e  Station), bringing the unbroken run of successes to more than a hundred.

There's been a demonstration launch of the new Rokot commercial small-satell=
ite launcher, based on a converted intercontinental ballistic missile, and t=
he first launch from the Plesetsk cosmodrome=20
inside Russia of applications satellites into the sun-synchronous near-polar=
 orbit. (All previous launches into this orbital path had been made from the=
 Baykonur space base in Kazakhstan).

Although Russia=92s contributions to the International Space Station are mai=
nly funded by the government, they benefit from spillover from commercial pr=
ofits of the organizations involved. The Service module, which received its=20=
first permanent crew for the space station last month, may have been years l=
ate, but when it arrived it was of classic Soviet-era quality.

Where money obviously makes a difference is seen around Moscow. Construction=
 of all kinds is booming throughout the Russian capital, funded in part from=
 sales of  expensive properties to western companies, and in part from Russi=
an tax revenues.  On 30 October, Moscow region governor Boris Gromov told ne=
wsmen of his plans to attract a billion dollars in western investments next=20=
year, including funding for the food industry, manufacturing, trade, and con=
struction. Western investments for 2000 would be about $650 million, he pred=
icted.

Moscow is becoming a  "showcase city." Repaving the ring roads around the ci=
ty and building a third, outer one, along with special highways such as the=20=
Rublevka in northwest Moscow (connecting the downtown with the most exclusiv=
e suburbs), are producing world-class roads. In contrast, and with a few exc=
eptions, roads outside Moscow are third-world class at best. The route from=20=
St Petersburg to Tallinn, Estonia, for example, is a two-lane unlighted quas=
i-dirt road.=20

Optical-fiber cables are being laid throughout Moscow, for the use of commer=
cial clients with cash. But in general the Russian telephone system is "dism=
al," according to a recent=20
article in The Economist. The article states that Russia must spend $6.5 bil=
lion to end=20
the six-month waiting list for new phones, plus $9 billion to make existing=20=
old-fashioned lines digital, and a further $6.5 billion on modernizing the i=
n-country, long-distance system. Less than half a billion is spent annually.

PERCEPTION WAS NOT REALITY

To a large degree, the contrast between today's disasters and Soviet-era "no=
rmalcy" is one of perception. In Soviet times, accidents such as the Kursk s=
inking were not even reported, so the=20
level of infrastructure decay was hidden. And along with a precipitous decli=
ne in maintenance funding in the past decade, has simply come the aging of t=
he equipment that is now beyond its design life.

Observers also suspect that people are more careless these days, and less li=
kely to obey safety regulations than in Soviet times. In the 1980s the armie=
s of underpaid but officious inspectors and social wardens probably contribu=
ted to early detection of hazardous conditions. But the Soviet-era response=20=
to infrastructure failure was usually coverup rather than cleanup.

Today's pattern is clear: when money is adequate, Russia's engineers can del=
iver. Without money--for hiring more engineers, performing hardware and soft=
ware design and development, and buying new equipment--they are not miracle=20=
workers.=20

The outlook for the rest of Russia's technological infrastructure remains gr=
im, experts insist. At the Harvard conference, Charles Frank described the p=
roblems ahead. Almost 70 percent of the population drinks water that is unfi=
t by U.S. standards. One-third of waste water is released untreated. Railway=
s, electricity, oil and gas pipelines, roads and bridges all need massive in=
fusions of cash, he said.

Leonid Gozman, an official with a Russian electrical power monopoly, told th=
e same conference that the Russian national electric grid will need at least=
 $70 billion over the next five to seven years to maintain current levels of=
 power output, or the country will face a severe energy crisis as the power=20=
distribution system collapses. In Moscow earlier this year, the Emergency Si=
tuations Ministry issued an apocalyptic prediction that Russia was becoming=20=
vulnerable to innumerable technological disasters, such as fires, collapsing=
 buildings, radiation leaks, pipeline ruptures, and toxic spills. Experts wa=
rned that much of Russia's industrial equipment might become virtually usele=
ss within five years.

The estimated cost of these needed repairs is about a hundred billion dollar=
s, about five times the total annual budget of the Federal government.

It seems the only resource in adequate supply is humor, as the optimist/pess=
imist joke exemplifies. Even the psychological impact of the recent disaster=
s was ameliorated by another immediately famous joke.

"The fire in the TV tower has now been explained," the story goes. "They fou=
nd out it had collided with another TV tower, probably a NATO one."


ABOUT THE AUTHOR

James Oberg is a 22-year veteran of NASA Mission Control in Houston and now=20=
a writer and consultant. His most recent article in Spectrum, "NASA's big pu=
sh for the space station," appeared just last month.






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