8,601 bytes. 98 x 440 pixels.
| astronautix.com | SLV-3 Atlas / Agena D |
|
| SLV-3 Atlas/Agena D - SLV-3 Atlas / Agena D - COSPAR 1966-012 8,601 bytes. 98 x 440 pixels. |
Standardized Atlas booster with Agena D upper stage.
LEO Payload: 2,000 kg. to: 180 km Orbit. at: 108.0 degrees.
NASA Associate Administrator Robert C. Seamans, Jr., and John H. Rubel, Department of Defense (DOD) Deputy Director for Defense Research and Engineering, offered recommendations to Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara on the division of effort between NASA and DOD in the Mark II program. They stressed NASA's primary responsibility for managing and directing the program, although attaining the program objectives would be facilitated by using DOD (especially Air Force) resources in a contractor relation to NASA. In addition, DOD personnel would aquire useful experience in manned spaceflight design, development, and operations. Space Systems Division of Air Force Systems Command became NASA's contractor for developing, procuring, and launching Titan II and Atlas-Agena vehicles for the Mark II program.
In Houston, Director Robert R. Gilruth of Manned Spacecraft Center announced plans to develop a two-man Mercury capsule. Built by McDonnell, it would be similar in shape to the Mercury capsule but slightly larger and from two to three times heavier. Its booster would be a modified Titan II. A major program objective would be orbital rendezvous. The two-man spacecraft would be launched into orbit and would attempt to rendezvous with an Agena stage put into orbit by an Atlas. Total cost of 12 capsules plus boosters and other equipment was estimated at $500 million. The two-man flight program would begin in the 1963-1964 period with several unmanned ballistic flights to test overall booster-spacecraft compatibility and system engineering. Several manned orbital flights would follow. Besides rendezvous flybys of the target vehicle, actual docking missions would be attempted in final flights. The spacecraft would be capable of missions of a week or more to train pilots for future long-duration circumlunar and lunar landing flights. The Mercury astronauts would serve as pilots for the program, but additional crew members might be phased in during the latter portions of the program.
NASA would be responsible for overall program planning, direction, systems engineering, and operation-including Gemini spacecraft development; Gemini/Agena rendezvous and docking equipment development; Titan II/Gemini spacecraft systems integration; launch, flight, and recovery operations; command, tracking, and telemetry during orbital operations; and reciprocal support of Department of Defense space projects and programs within the scope of the Gemini program. Department of Defense would be responsible for: Titan II development and procurement, Atlas procurement, Agena procurement, Atlas-Agena systems integration, launch of Titan II and Atlas-Agena vehicles, range support, and recovery support. A slightly revised version of the plan was signed in approval on March 27 by General Bernard A. Schriever, Commander, Air Force Systems Command, for the Air Force, and D. Brainerd Holmes, Director of Manned Space Flight, for NASA.
Purpose of the rendezvous radar, sited in the recovery section of the spacecraft, was to locate and track the target vehicle during rendezvous maneuvers. The transponder, a combined receiver and transmitter designed to transmit signals automatically when triggered by an interrogating signal, was located in the Agena target vehicle.
Following a Lockheed briefing on pulse-code-modulation (PCM) instrumentation systems, representatives of Goddard Space Flight Center and Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC) formed a small working group to discuss the feasibility of making the Gemini telemetry system a full PCM system. PCM was a digital telemetry system which could provide more channels of information, faster data rates, improved accuracy, and less weight of equipment per data channel. Goddard had already reviewed several PCM ground station proposals and had concluded that such a system could handle future NASA programs. All who attended the meeting agreed that a full PCM telemetry system, airborne and ground, could be implemented in time to support the Gemini program. Gemini Project Office approved the formation of an MSC-Gemini PCM Instrumentation Working Group to be responsible for the implementation and compatibility of the airborne and ground PCM system for Gemini. On June 27, Walter C. Williams, MSC Associated Director, notified Goddard of NASA's decision 'to utilize a PCM telemetry system for Gemini and Agena real time data.' Ten sites were selected for the installation of PCM equipment; each of these also received dual acquisition equipment, dual digital command system, and pulse coders for distinguishing between the manned Gemini spacecraft and the Agena target when both were in orbit.
James E. Webb, NASA's new Administrator, reviewed the Gemini program. Project Gemini cost estimates at this point ($744.3 million) had increased substantially over the original estimate of $250 million. Estimated spacecraft cost had risen from $240.5 to $391.6 million; Titan II cost, from $113.0 to $161.8 million; Atlas-Agena, from $88.0 to $106.3 million; and supporting development (including the paraglider program), from $29.0 to $36.8 million. Estimated operations costs had declined from $59.0 to $47.8 million.
Target dates established were (1) stand availability, July 1, 1963; (2) estimated beneficial occupancy date, November 1, 1963; and (3) vehicle on-stand date, February 1, 1964. Complex 14 would be used for launching the Gemini-Agena target vehicle and Mariner spacecraft, but basic modifications would be primarily for the Gemini program. On November 15, 1962, Air Force Space Systems Division reviewed the criteria summary report for complex 14 modifications and suggested only minor engineering changes.
Wesley L. Hjornevik, Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC) Assistant Director for Administration, described to members of MSC's senior staff the implications of NASA Headquarters' recent decision to cut the MSC budget for fiscal year 1963 from $687 million to $660 million, the entire reduction to be borne by the Gemini program. Hjornevik feared that the Gemini budget, already tight, could absorb so large a cut only by dropping the paraglider, Agena, and all rendezvous equipment from the program. Gemini Project Office (GPO) reported that funding limitations had already forced Martin and McDonnell to reduce their level of activity. The first Gemini flight (unmanned) was rescheduled for December 1963, with the second (manned) to follow three months later, and subsequent flights at two-month intervals, with the first Agena (fifth mission) in August or September 1964. This four-month delay imposed by budget limitations required a large-scale reprogramming of Gemini development work, reflected chiefly in drastic reduction in the scale of planned test programs. Details of the necessary reprogramming had been worked out by December 20, when GPO Manager James A. Chamberlin reported that December 1963 was a realistic date for the first Gemini flight. Gemini funding for fiscal year 1963 totaled $232.8 million.
Subsequent meetings on November 2 and November 20 worked out the changes necessary to implement the Agena program at minimum cost. The overall test program for the Agena and its propulsion systems was significantly reduced, but in general neither the scope nor the requirements of the Agena program were altered. The major result of the reprogramming was a four-month slip in the scheduled launch date of the first Agena (to September 1964); this delay was about a month and a half less than had been anticipated when reprogramming began. In addition, Lockheed was to continue its program at a reduced level through the rest of 1962, a period of about six weeks, and to resume its normal level of activity on January 1, 1963.
Andre J. Meyer, Jr., of Gemini Project Office reported that Space Technology Laboratories was conducting a study for NASA Headquarters on a 'T-back' pod to be used in the spacecraft adapter as the rendezvous target instead of the Agena. The pod would be stabilized but would have no translation capabilities. Although it would be almost as expensive as the Agena, it would avoid separate launch problems.
Each station would need five consoles: Gemini system, Agena system, command, aeromedical, and maintenance and operations. The Gemini and Agena consoles would have 42 analog display meters and 40 on/off indicators.
Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC) assumed complete responsibility for the Gemini target vehicle program from Marshall Space Flight Center following a meeting between MSC and Marshall on January 11 establishing procedures for the transfer. Marshall was to continue to participate actively in an advisory capacity until March 1 and thereafter as technical consultant to MSC upon request. All other NASA Atlas-Agena programs were transferred to Lewis Research Center in a move aimed at freeing Marshall to concentrate on Saturn launch vehicle development and consolidating Atlas launch vehicle technology at Lewis. NASA Headquarters had decided to effect the transfer on October 12, 1962.
The agreement provided for the establishment of a joint NASA-DOD Gemini Program Planning Board. The board would plan experiments, conduct flight tests, and analyze and disseminate results. NASA would continue to manage Project Gemini, while DOD would take part in Gemini development, pilot training, preflight checkout, launch, and flight operations, and would be specifically responsible for the Titan II launch vehicle and the Atlas-Agena target vehicle. DOD would also contribute funds toward the attainment of Gemini objectives.
At a Gemini Rendezvous and Reentry Panel meeting, it was reported that attempts to obtain information on flight controller procedures to command the Agena in orbit had been delayed by the Air Force Agena security program.
Upon receipt at Cape Canaveral, the target vehicle would be inspected and certified. After this action, mechanical mate and interface checks with the target docking adapter would be accomplished. Agena-Gemini spacecraft compatibilty tests would then be conducted, and the Agena would undergo validation and weight checks. Subsequently, a joint checkout of the spacecraft and Agena would be conducted with tests on the Merritt Island radar tower.
They agreed on the following general rules: (1) when the launch was on time, the terminal maneuver would be initiated when the Agena came within range of the spacecraft's sensors, which would occur between spacecraft insertion and first apogee; (2) automatic and optical terminal guidance techniques would always back each other up, one method being selected as an objective for each mission and the other serving as a standby; (3) during early rendezvous missions, the terminal phase would be initiated by the third spacecraft apogee or delayed until the twelfth because of range radar tracking limitations; (4) for the same reason, no midcourse corrections should be made during orbits 4 through 11; (5) in case of extreme plane or phase errors, the Agena would be maneuvered to bring it within the spacecraft's maneuver capability; and (6) after such gross Agena maneuvers, the Agena orbit would be recircularized and two orbits of spacecraft catchup would precede the initiation of terminal rendezvous plan.
The Model 8247 engine for the Gemini Agena's primary propulsion system was developed from the Model 8096 currently being flown in satellite and probe programs for NASA and the Air Force. Unlike the operational engine, the new engine was capable of being restarted several times in orbit, a Gemini program requirement. The principle change in the new engine was the substitution of liquid propellants for solid pyrotechnic 'starter cans' to start the gas generator. The unit tested was the development engine that had been assembled in March. In mid-April, the test engine was shipped to Arnold Engineering Development Center (AEDC), Tullahoma, Tennessee, for further development tests. At AEDC, test cell arrangements were completed April 12, with testing scheduled to begin in May.
Patterned after similar meetings regularly held between SSD, Lewis Research Center, and Lockheed on medium space vehicle satellite and probe programs, the Gemini Target Management Review Meetings encompassed a comprehensive monthly review of the status of the GATV program.
Late delivery of the spacecraft systems coupled with the unexpectedly small number of Mercury systems incorporated in the Gemini spacecraft had forced GPO to review the flight program critically. In the revised program, the first flight was still set for December 1963 and was still to be unmanned, but it was now to be orbital rather than suborbital to flight-qualify launch vehicle subsystems and demonstrate the compatibility of the launch vehicle and spacecraft; no separation or recovery was planned. The second mission, originally a manned orbital flight, now became an unmanned suborbital ballistic flight schedule for July 1964. Its primary objection was to test spacecraft reentry under maximum heating-rate reentry conditions; it would also qualify the launch vehicle and all spacecraft systems required for manned orbital flight. The third flight, formerly planned as a manned orbital rendezvous mission, became the first manned flight, a short-duration (probably three-orbit) systems evaluation flight scheduled for October 1964. Subsequent flights were to follow at three-month intervals, ending in January 1967. Rendezvous terminal maneuvers were planned for missions 3 (if flight duration permitted) and 4, a seven-day mission using a rendezvous pod. The sixth flight was to be a 14-day long-duration mission identical to 4 except that no rendezvous maneuver missions with the Atlas-launched Agena D target vehicle. Water landing by parachute was planned for the first six flights and land landing by paraglider from flight 7 on.
Modifications of launch complexes 19 and 14, of the tracking network, and of Atlantic Missile Range checkout facilities were all on schedule, although no margin remained for complex 19 work. The Atlas and Agena presented no problems, but the Gemini launch vehicle schedule was tight; technical problems, notably stage I longitudinal oscillations and stage II engine instability, were compounded by funding difficulties. The Gemini spacecraft, suffering from late deliveries by subcontractors, was being reprogrammed.
The purpose of Plan X was to verify the Gemini spacecraft's ability to command the Agena target vehicle both by radio and hardline; to exercise all command, data, and communication links between the spacecraft, target vehicle, and mission control in all practical combinations, first with the two vehicles about six feet apart, then with the vehicles docked and latched but not rigidized; and to familiarize the astronauts with operating the spacecraft/target vehicle combination in a simulated rendezvous mission. Site of the test was to be the Merritt Island Launch Area Radar Range Boresight Tower ('Timber Tower'), a 65 x 25 x 50-foot wooden structure.
Development tests of the Agena Model 8247 main engine at Arnold Engineering Development Center ended when the latch-type gas generator valve failed in testing, making an emergency shutdown of the engine necessary. The wrong choice of emergency shutdown procedures caused turbine overspeed and total failure of the engine's turbine pump assembly. As a result of this failure, the valve was redesigned. Because success of the new design was doubtful, a parallel program was initiated to design and develop an alternative valve configuration, solenoid-operated rather than latch-type. Intensive development testing followed; and in a meeting at Bell Aerosystems on November 15, the solenoid type was selected for use in the first flight system of the Agena target vehicle. The new valve allowed significant reductions in engine complexity and increased reliability, but the development effort imposed a serious delay in Preliminary Flight Rating Tests, which had been scheduled to begin in September 1963.
As a result of the seven-and-one-half-month relaxation of the required launch date for the first GATV, Lockheed was directed to use the improved version of the standard Agena, the AD-62 block of vehicles, instead of AD-13. The AD-62 block originally included the multistart engine, subsequently slipped to the AD-71 block. Lockheed accordingly was directed in January 1964 to substitute the AD-71 for AD-62. The combined effect of these changes was to use up much of the seven-and-one-half-month leeway. The change to AD-62 caused a two-month slip, and changing to AD-71 added a five-week slip. With much of the contingency time gone, the Agena schedule was now tight, and further slippage threatened to cause launch delays.
The tests demonstrated that Gemini spacecraft and Agena telemeter and recorder formats were compatible with NASA ground stations.
The new schedule reflected the revised Gemini flight program of April 29 and the corresponding revision of the Agena program which followed. It displayed key events in the progress of the first GATV taking place between five and six months later than the January schedule. Engineering development was now scheduled to be completed by May 15, 1964, rather than by December 11, 1963. Completion of modification and final assembly was now planned for June 12 rather than January 10, 1964; preliminary vehicle systems testing was rescheduled from April 10 to September 11, 1964. Special tests, including a Radio frequency Interference Test in the later schedule in addition to the hot-firing scheduled earlier, were to end November 20 instead of May 22, 1964. Final Vehicle Systems Tests were to be completed December 18 instead of June 19, 1964, with shipment to follow on January 6, 1965, rather than June 30, 1964. Launch was now expected on April 15, 1965, seven and one-half months later than the September 1, 1964, date that had been planned in January 1963.
The shroud, which protected the TDA during the launch and ascent of the Agena target vehicle, was tested under simulated altitude conditions to show proper operation of pyrotechnic devices and adequate clearance between shroud and TDA during separation. Successfully concluded on November 21, and tests demonstrated the compatibility of the TDA with the shroud system during operational performance, with no indication of damage or failure of the TDA structure.
GT-4 would be a battery-powered long-duration flight. The pod would go on GT-5, and thus the first planned Agena flight would probably slip in the schedule.
Tests were expected to be completed April 24 but were not actually concluded until late June. Testing proceeded with only minor problems through the first week of April. But in the following week PPS testing encountered what proved to be a six-week delay when the test unit's fuel and oxidizer start tanks failed. The two start tanks, stainless steel canisters with an internal bellows arrangement, supplied the propellants required to initiate the main engine start sequence. Visible longitudinal cracks in the outer shell allowed the gas which forced the propellants out of the tank to escape. Investigation revealed that the cracks had resulted from intergranular corrosion of the stainless steel tanks. The defective tanks were replaced by start tanks with a new heat-treated shell (delivered April 24), and PFRT resumed early in May.
This engine was installed in the propulsion test vehicle assembly (PTVA), a unit to be used for a series of tests on the Agena primary and secondary propulsion systems at Lockheed's Santa Cruz Test Base. Bell delivered the two secondary propulsion system modules for the PTVA on March 6 and 14. Installation was completed and the PTVA delivered to Santa Cruz Test Base on March 26.
After proceeding through the acceleration and vibration test phases of PFRT without incident, the SPS began calibration firings early in April. The failure of a propellant valve in Unit I (the 16-pound thrust chamber fired prior to starting the main engine in order to orient propellant) of the SPS imposed a minor delay, but a more serious problem emerged late in April during high-temperature firings. The wall of the Unit II 200-pound thrust chamber burned through near the injector face after an accumulated PFRT firing time of 354 seconds, below the specification limit of 400 seconds although well in excess of the maximum orbital useful time of 200 seconds. The thrust chamber was replaced and testing continued, but PFRT, originally scheduled to end June 19, was first slipped to July 8, and finally completed in mid-August. To resolve the burn-through problem, Bell began a test program in September to determine the cause of failure.
Mathews had assigned Lewis R. Fisher of his office to head a Systems Integration Office within Gemini Project Office to oversee these efforts by keeping very precise accounts of spacecraft weight, interface actions between the spacecraft and launch vehicle, and interface actions between the spacecraft and the Agena target vehicle.
Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC) approved Air Force Space Systems Division's (SSD) recommendations for a test program to increase confidence in 16 critical electronic and electrical components of the Gemini Agena target vehicle. The program included complete electromagnetic interference (EMI) testing of all components peculiar to the Gemini mission, as well as elevated stress tests and extended life tests. SSD had also recommended subsystem-level, as well as component-level, EMI testing, but this part of the program MSC disapproved. SSD directed Lockheed to proceed with the program on March 23. EMI tests were scheduled to be completed by July 1, stress and life tests by September 1, 1964.
At a meeting of the Gemini Project Office's Trajectories and Orbits Panel, members of Flight Operations Division described two mission plans currently under consideration for the first Agena rendezvous flight. One was based on the concept of tangential Agena and spacecraft orbits, as proposed by Howard W. Tindall, Jr., and James T. Rose when they were members of Space Task Group. The second plan, based on a proposal by Edwin E. Aldrin, Jr., then of Air Force Space Systems Division, involved orbits which were concentric rather than tangential. The most significant advantage of the second plan was that it provided the greatest utilization of onboard backup techniques; that is, it was specifically designed to make optimum use of remaining onboard systems in the event of failure in the inertial guidance system platform, computer, or radar.
It consisted of a basic Agena structure with propellant pressurization, feed-and-load system, the primary propulsion system (PPS), and two secondary propulsion system (SPS) modules attached to the aft rack. The test program called for loading operations and hot firings of both propulsion systems to establish the adequacy of PPS and SPS propellant loading systems and associated ground equipment, to demonstrate proper overall system operation, and to provide engineering data on systems operation and the resulting environment. Start of testing was delayed by the PPS start tank problems which showed up during Preliminary Flight Rating Tests at Bell Aerosystems during April. Lockheed returned the PTVA main engine start tanks to Bell, where they were inspected and found to be defective. New tanks were ready by mid-May, but additional minor problems delayed the initiation of hot-firing until June 16.
Gemini Project Office (GPO) rejected this plan, regarding it as impractical within current schedule, launch sequence, and cost restraints. GPO accepted, however, SSD's alternate recommendation that one target vehicle be designated a development test vehicle (DTV) to permit more extensive subsystems and systems testing, malfunction studies, and modifications at the Lockheed plant. Gemini Agena target vehicle (GATV) 5001 was designated the DTV, but GPO insisted that it be maintained in flight status until the program office authorized its removal. All previously planned tests were still necessary to demonstrate satisfactory performance of GATV 5001 as a flight vehicle. GATV 5001 was the first Agena for the Gemini program.
Air Force Space Systems Division (SSD) accepted the first Agena D (AD-71) for the Gemini program. The Agena D was a production-line vehicle procured from Lockheed by SSD for NASA through routine procedures. Following minor retrofit operations, the vehicle, now designated Gemini Agena target vehicle 5001, entered the manufacturing final assembly area at the Lockheed plant on May 14. There began the conversion of the Agena D into a target vehicle for Gemini rendezvous missions. Major modifications were installation of a target docking adapter (supplied by McDonnell), an auxiliary equipment rack, external status displays, a secondary propulsion system, and an L-band tracking radar.
A few vibration problems with the pulse-code-modulation system were reported. Gemini-Agena systems were simulated by an instrumented Lockheed Super Constellation aircraft.
Plan No. 3, as yet incomplete, provided for rendezvous at first apogee on a perfectly nominal mission.
In cooperation with Air Force and NASA, Lockheed inaugurated the Gemini Extra Care Program to reduce the incidence of equipment failures and discrepancies resulting from poor or careless workmanship during the modification and assembly of the Agena target vehicle. The program included increased inspection, exhortation, morale boosters, special awards, and other activities aimed at fostering and maintaining a strong team spirit at all levels. Results of the program were evidenced in a drastic decline in the number of FEDRs (Failed Equipment and Discrepancy Reports) recorded in the Gemini final manufacturing area on successive vehicles.
The program, undertaken because of extensive changes in the propulsion system required to adapt the standard Agena D for use in Gemini missions, comprised three series of static-firing tests. The first series, in addition to providing base line performance for both primary and secondary propulsion systems (PPS and SPS), also subjected one SPS module to the dynamic and acoustic environment created by 55 seconds of PPS firing. The second series, successfully completed July 16, simulated a possible Gemini mission profile, including multiple firings and various coast and burn times on both PPS and SPS units. The third series, which concluded the test program on August 7, involved a maximum number of starts and minimum-impulse firings on both PPS and SPS. All firings were successful, and review of test data revealed only minor anomalies. The entire test program comprised 27 PPS firings for a run time totaling 545 seconds, 30 SPS Unit I firings totaling 286 seconds, and 11 SPS Unit II firings totaling 268 seconds. Post-test disassembly revealed no physical damage to any equipment.
General Dynamics finished the installation and checkout of equipment in the Launch Operations Building on July 20. Lockheed equipment in the Launch Operations Building was installed and checked out by July 31.
KH-7 type satellite. Space craft engaged in investigation of spaceflight techniques and technology (US Cat A).
One change concerned a previous assumption of a 20-day Agena lifetime; it was now established that the Agena would not be modified to provide this. As a result, greater emphasis had to be placed on ensuring spacecraft launch on the same day as the Agena, primarily by relieving the constraint of no Agena maneuvers. The restriction on using Agena maneuvers had been removed to increase the probability of achieving rendezvous within the few days that the Agena would remain an acceptable target.
KH-7 type satellite. Space craft engaged in investigation of spaceflight techniques and technology (US Cat A).
Lockheed began the task of hooking the vehicle up for systems testing the next day, September 25.
KH-7 type satellite.
The SPS had first gone through a 20-day dry (unloaded) period, followed by a 20-day wet (loaded) period. The system reverted to hold condition and was successfully refired November 2.
Minor anomalies required portions of the test to be rerun. This concluded GATV 5001 systems tests in preparation for captive-firing tests to be conducted at Lockheed's Santa Cruz Test Base. The vehicle was shipped November 30.
Primary test objective was verifying the operational capabilities of the GATV during actual firing of the primary and secondary propulsion systems. Other objectives included developing operational procedures and techniques for vehicle handling, launch preparation, servicing, countdown, and postfire servicing, as well as verifying ground equipment peculiar to the Gemini program, including the pulse-code-modulated telemetry ground station. The target docking adapter (TDA), manufactured by McDonnell, was also to be installed and tested as an integral system. When the TDA was hoisted into the test stand on December 17 to be physically mated with the GATV, the interface between the two vehicles emerged as a major problem. After some preliminary difficulties, the physical mate was accomplished, but discrepancies were discovered in wiring continuity. The captive flight test was delayed until January 20, 1965.
KH-7 type satellite. Space craft engaged in investigation of spaceflight techniques and technology (US Cat A).
On March 6, 1965, GPO reported its decision to eliminate the seventh Agena as well.
Lockheed then transferred it to the vehicle final assembly area for modification to Gemini Agena target vehicle 5002. Work was scheduled to begin in mid-January 1965.
The test simulated a full 20,000-second mission, including multiple firings of both the primary and secondary propulsion systems and transmission of operational data in real time to two PCM (pulse-code-modulated) telemetry ground stations, one at the test site and one in Sunnyvale. Major test anomaly was a series of command programmer time-accumulator jumps, seven of which totaled 77,899 seconds. The vehicle was removed from the test stand on February 1 and returned to Sunnyvale.
KH-7 type satellite. Space craft engaged in investigation of spaceflight techniques and technology (US Cat A).
After a brief stopover in systems test complex C-10, the vehicle was transferred to the anechoic chamber for elecromagnetic interference and radio-frequency-interference tests. Tests preparations began February 23. At this point, GATV 5001 was 37 calendar days behind schedule, 20 days of which were caused by the time-accumulator anomaly that had developed during hot-firing tests. A temporary fix for the time-accumulator jumps was installed, while Lockheed continued its efforts to diagnose the problem and find a permanent remedy.
The Agena command and communication (C and C) system comprised the electronic systems for tracking the vehicle, for monitoring the performance of its various subsystems, and for verifying operating commands for orbital operations. Because of the unique requirements of the Gemini mission, in particular rendezvous and docking, Lockheed had had to design and develop a new C and C system for the Gemini target vehicle. Numerous failures and problems calling for rework during the initial manufacturing stages of the C and C system suggested the existence of mechanical and electronic design deficiencies. Aerospace, which had assumed technical surveillance functions for the Gemini Agena in the fall of 1964, was instrumental in bringing these problems to the attention of Air Force and Lockheed top management. Among the results of the 10-point plan were several redesigned programmer circuits and packaging changes, closer monitoring of vendor work, expedited failure analysis, and improved quality control.
It remained in the chamber, however, until March 17 while Lockheed verified the corrective action that had been taken to eliminate programmer time-accumulator jumps and telemetry synchronization problems. The vehicle was then transferred to systems test complex C-10 for final Vehicle Systems Tests on March 18.
At a meeting of the Gemini Trajectory and Orbits Panel, Air Force Space Systems Division repeated its position that on Gemini-Titan 6 the nominal plan should not call for use in orbit of the Agena primary propulsion system, since it would not be qualified in actual flight before this mission. At the same meeting , Gemini Program Office announced that a decision had been made to provide only enough electrical power for 22 orbits on spacecraft No. 6. This spacecraft constraint, combined with reentry and recovery considerations, would restrict the nominal mission plan to approximately 15 orbits.
KH-7 type satellite. Space craft engaged in investigation of spaceflight techniques and technology (US Cat A).
Six days were scheduled for vehicle modifications before beginning final systems tests. Unexpected difficulties in incorporating filters in the command controller, which required considerable redesign, and alignment problems with the forward auxiliary rack, which required extensive machining, imposed a lengthy delay. These problems added 29 days of slippage to the GATV 5001 schedule, leaving the vehicle 66 calendar days behind schedule by the end of March. Machining of the forward auxiliary rack was completed April 5, and vehicle systems testing finally began April 9.
Representatives of Air Force Space Systems Division (SSD), Aerospace, Lockheed, and Gemini Program Office met at Sunnyvale for the monthly Gemini Agena Target Vehicle (GATV) Management-Technical Review. SSD recommended that the current configuration of the oxidizer gas generator solenoid valve be removed from GATV 5001 because of the recent failure of the valve during 38-day oxidizer star-system storage tests at Bell Aerosystems. Following the meeting, Lockheed formed a team to evaluate the design of the valve. A redesigned valve began qualification tests in July.
Failed. Space craft engaged in investigation of spaceflight techniques and technology (US Cat A).
Carried SNAP-9A nuclear power source. The on-board nuclear reactor provided electrical power for a 1 kgf ion engine. Telemetry failed.
KH-7 type satellite. Space craft engaged in investigation of spaceflight techniques and technology (US Cat A).
Radar monitoring.
The vehicle was disconnected from the test complex on May 14, and data analysis was completed May 19. Meanwhile, the First Article Configuration Inspection on GATV 5001 began on May 10.
A team of representatives from NASA, Air Force Space Systems Division, Aerospace, and Lockheed began the First Article Configuration Inspection (FACI) of Gemini Agena target vehicle (GATV) 5001 at Sunnyvale. A FACI acceptance team reviewed and evaluated all drawings, specifications, test procedures and reports, component and assembly log books, and qualification and certification documentation relating to GATV 5001. The resulting record of discrepancies then served as a basis for corrective action. FACI, a standard Air Force procedure established in June 1962, was essentially an audit performed by the Air Force with contractor support to reconcile engineering design, as originally released and subsequently modified, with the actual hardware produced. Its purpose was to establish the production configuration base line under which remaining contract end items (in this case, GATV 5002 and up) of the same configuration were to be manufactured and delivered to the Air Force. FACI on GATV 5001 was completed May 26.
The transfer had been scheduled for May 5 but was delayed by parts shortages, engineering problems, and considerable work backlog. The major source of delay was correcting a gap between the forward auxiliary rack and the vehicle; machining and aligning the rack and refinishing the scraped surfaces proved time-consuming. GATV 5002 was still short several items of command equipment. Systems testing began May 21.
KH-7 type satellite. Space craft engaged in investigation of spaceflight techniques and technology (US Cat A).
It was moved to the Missile Assembly Building (Hanger E) for testing. The target vehicle was mated with target docking adapter No. 1 on June 18, and Combined Interface Tests began June 19. Testing was completed July 8 with secondary propulsion system (SPS) functional and static leak checks, SPS installation and postinstallation checks, and thermal control surface preparation. Target vehicle 5001 was then transferred to complex 14 to be mated to target launch vehicle 5301.
Radar monitoring.
KH-7 type satellite. Space craft engaged in investigation of spaceflight techniques and technology (US Cat A).
The vehicle was disconnected from the test complex on July 13, after NASA, Air Force Space Systems Division, Aerospace, and Lockheed representatives agreed that all data discrepancies from the final systems tests had been resolved.
KH-7 type satellite.
A Simultaneous Launch Demonstration (SLD) was conducted between the Gemini Atlas-Agena target vehicle on complex 14 and Gemini-Titan (GT) 5 on complex 19, in conjunction with the Wet Mock Simulated Launch (WMSL) of GT-5. The Gemini launch vehicle tanking exercise, normally a part of WMSL, was conducted separately for convenience on July 17. SLD was a dress rehearsal to demonstrate the coordination required to conduct a single countdown on two vehicles and was subsequently performed on all rendezvous missions. The mission control centers at Houston and the Cape, as well as Eastern Test Range support facilities, were integral parts of the combined countdown. A failure in the Houston computer system caused several spurious commands to be transmitted to the target vehicle. Although some of these commands were accepted, results were not serious because they were mostly stored program command loads. Following SLD, the Atlas and Agena were demated on July 26.
The vehicle was then shipped by air to Eastern Test Range on July 24, arriving July 25. Although GATV 5002 was accepted, several items of equipment remained in 'not qualified' status, including the shroud, secondary and primary propulsion systems, and components of both the electrical power and command systems.
While in storage, several pieces of AD-108 equipment had been removed for modification to the Gemini configuration. Final assembly began August 8.
Radar monitoring.
KH-7 type satellite. Space craft engaged in investigation of spaceflight techniques and technology (US Cat A).
Major objectives of the eight-day mission were evaluating the performance of the rendezvous guidance and navigation system, using a rendezvous evaluation pod (REP), and evaluating the effects of prolonged exposure to the space environment on the flight crew. Secondary objectives included demonstrating controlled reentry guidance, evaluating fuel cell performance, demonstrating all phases of guidance and control system operation needed for a rendezvous mission, evaluating the capability of either pilot to maneuver the spacecraft in orbit to rendezvous, evaluating the performance of rendezvous radar, and executing 17 experiments. The mission proceeded without incident through the first two orbits and the ejection of the REP. About 36 minutes after beginning evaluation of the rendezvous guidance and navigation system, the crew noted that the pressure in the oxygen supply tank of the fuel cell system was falling. Pressure dropped from 850 pounds per square inch absolute (psia) at 26 minutes into the flight until it stabilized at 70 psia at 4 hours 22 minutes, and gradually increased through the remainder of the mission. The spacecraft was powered down and the REP exercise was abandoned. By the seventh revolution, experts on the ground had analyzed the problem and a powering-up procedure was started. During the remainder of the mission the flight plan was continuously scheduled in real time. Four rendezvous radar tests were conducted during the mission, the first in revolution 14 on the second day; the spacecraft rendezvous radar successfully tracked a transponder on the ground at Cape Kennedy. During the third day, a simulated Agena rendezvous was conducted at full electrical load. The simulation comprised four maneuvers - apogee adjust, phase adjust, plane change, and coelliptical maneuver - using the orbit attitude and maneuver system (OAMS). Main activities through the fourth day of the mission concerned operations and experiments. During the fifth day, OAMS operation became sluggish and thruster No. 7 inoperative. Thruster No. 8 went out the next day, and the rest of the system was gradually becoming more erratic. Limited experimental and operational activities continued through the remainder of the mission. Retrofire was initiated in the 121st revolution during the eighth day of the mission, one revolution early because of threatening weather in the planned recovery area. Reentry and landing were satisfactory, but the landing point was 145 km short, the result of incorrect navigation coordinates transmitted to the spacecraft computer from the ground network. Landing occurred August 29, 190 hours 55 minutes after the mission had begun. The astronauts arrived on board the prime recovery ship, the aircraft carrier Lake Champlain, at 9:25. The spacecraft was recovered at 11:51 a.m.
With this flight, the US finally took the manned spaceflight endurance record from Russia, while demonstrating that the crew could survive in zero gravity for the length of time required for a lunar mission. However the mission was incredibly boring, the spacecraft just drifting to conserve fuel most of the time, and was 'just about the hardest thing I've ever done' according to a hyperactive Pete Conrad. An accident with freeze dried shrimp resulted in the cabin being filled with little pink subsatellites. Additional Details: Gemini 5.
Gemini Agena target vehicle 5002 completed preliminary systems testing at Hanger E and was transferred to Merritt Island Launch Area, where it was joined by spacecraft No. 6 for Plan X testing. After ground equipment checks, Plan X tests proceeded on August 25. No significant interference problems were found, and testing ended on August 31.
The next day GATV 5002 was returned to Hanger E from MILA, where it began a series of tests to verify the operational readiness of all vehicle systems prior to erection and mating with the launch vehicle.
This was the last remaining component of the Agena primary propulsion system needing test qualification. Testing had been completed August 26; disassembly, inspection, and evaluation were concluded September 3. The consensus of those attending was that the successful test program had demonstrated flightworthiness of this configuration. This concluded qualification of all propulsion system components.
Preliminary checks were followed, on October 4, by the Joint Flight Acceptance Composite Test (J-FACT). J-FACT was a combined check of all contractors, the range, the vehicles, and aerospace ground equipment in a simulated countdown and flight; propellants and high pressure gases were not loaded, nor was the gantry removed. Simultaneous Launch Demonstration was successfully completed October 7.
KH-7 type satellite. Space craft engaged in investigation of spaceflight techniques and technology (US Cat A).
Following WMSL, the spacecraft and launch vehicle were demated to allow the spacecraft battery to be replaced. They were remated October 8-13. Spacecraft Systems Test was completed October 15. Prelaunch testing concluded October 20 with the Simulated Flight Test.
Testing began October 18.
NASA Associate Administrator Robert C. Seamans, Jr., informed George E. Mueller, Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight, that the catastrophic anomaly of Gemini Agena target vehicle (GATV) 5002 on October 25 had been defined as a mission failure. Accordingly, Seamans asked Mueller to establish a GATV Review Board to investigate all aspects of the Agena failure, managerial as well as technical. Manned Spacecraft Center Director Robert R. Gilruth and Major General O. J. Ritland, Deputy Commander for Space, Air Force Systems Command, were designated cochairmen of the review board. Primary responsibility for determining the cause of failure lay with Air Force Space Systems Division, which would make its findings available to the board.
The major portion of 819 discrepancies remaining from the First Article Configuration Inspection (FACI) of Gemini Agena target vehicle 5001 in June were cleared; 128 that had not been applied against the acceptance document (DD-250) remained. All subsystem FACI discrepancies were also closed out during October.
The subpanel, chaired by Colonel John B. Hudson, Deputy Commander for Launch Vehicles, Air Force Space Systems Division, reviewed Lockheed's flight safety analysis of the failure of Gemini Agena target vehicle (GATV) 5002 on October 25. The subpanel approved the conclusions reached by Lockheed's analysts, that the catastrophic anomaly was apparently caused by a 'hard start' of the Agena's main engine, most probably resulting from a fuel rather than oxidizer lead into the thrust chamber before ignition. Unlike all previous standard Agenas, the GATV had been intentionally sequenced for a fuel lead to conserve oxidizer for the many programmed restarts. The subpanel reported its findings to the parent board on November 3.
The board, chaired by George E. Mueller, NASA Associate Administrator of Manned Space Flight, reviewed the findings of the subpanel for Gemini VI and reached the same conclusion: the failure resulted from a hard start probably caused by the fuel lead. The next day the board presented its recommendation to Air Force Space Systems Division for a contractural change covering a program to modify the design of the Model 8247 main rocket engine to revert to oxidizer lead. Design verification testing would follow. Existing engines would be recycled through Bell Aerosystems to allow the incorporation of the design modifications. Since two existing engines would be used for design verification testing, two new engines were to be procured as replacements.
Space craft engaged in investigation of spaceflight techniques and technology (US Cat A).
Not identified as a subsatellite ferret by McDowell.
An electrical interface jumper cable connected the spacecraft, suspended about six feet above stage II, to the GLV. No Wet Mock Simulated Launch (WMSL) was performed on Gemini VII or any subsequent vehicle. WMSL was replaced by the Simultaneous Launch Demonstration (SLD) and a separate tanking test. For Gemini VII, the SLD was also eliminated because no simultaneous Atlas-Agena launch was planned. The elimination of the erector lowering associated with WMSL made it possible to postpone mechanical mating until later in the test sequence. This had the advantage of allowing access to the spacecraft adapter without demating and remating the spacecraft and launch vehicle, while at the same time permitting integrated testing to continue and shortening the test schedule. The Electrical Interface Integrated Validation and Joint Guidance and Control Test was completed November 13. The Joint Combined Systems Test was run November 15. The only countdown exercise performed for Gemini VII was the GLV tanking test on November 16. The spacecraft Final Systems Test was completed November 20. Spacecraft and launch vehicle were mechanically mated November 22, and the Simulated Flight Test was finished November 27.
Because too little diagnostic information had been obtained from the flight of Gemini Agena target vehicle (GATV) 5002 to determine the exact nature of the probable hard start, it was not certain that the proposed modification - a return to oxidizer lead - would definitely prevent a recurrence of the malfunctions. Sixteen propulsion specialists (brought together from Government, industrial, and university organizations) assembled for the symposium and concentrated on clarifying the hard-start phenomenon, isolating possible hard-start mechanisms of the Agena engine, and determining meaningful supporting test programs. They agreed with earlier conclusions on the probable cause of the failure. Their recommendations, with Lockheed's analysis of the GATV 5002 failure, were combined into a proposed GATV engine modification and test program that was presented to Air Force Space Systems Division on November 15.
Lockheed presented its proposed Gemini Agena target vehicle (GATV) engine modification and test program to Colonel A. J. Gardner, Gemini Target Vehicle Program Director, Air Force Space Systems Division (SSD). The proposal was immediately turned over to a three-man team comprising B. A. Hohmann (Aerospace), Colonel J. B. Hudson (Deputy Commander for Launch Vehicles, SSD), and L. E. Root (Lockheed) for consideration. On November 18, the group decided on a final version of the proposal that called for: (1) modifying the Agena engine to provide oxidizer lead during the start sequence, (2) demonstrating sea-level engine flightworthiness in tests at Bell Aerosystems, and (3) conducting an altitude test program at Arnold Engineering Development Center. The final proposal was presented to the GATV Review Board at Manned Spacecraft Center on November 20.
The GATV was still being stored in Hanger E, Eastern Test Range, minus its main engine which SSD had directed Lockheed to ship to Bell Aerosystems on November 9 for modification. Although SSD and NASA had considered using GATV 5001 as the second flight vehicle, it needed to be refurbished, repaired, and updated - work which could be done only at the Lockheed plant. A dummy engine was installed to simulate weight and center of gravity, and the vehicle left the Cape by commercial van on November 20, arriving at Sunnyvale November 24.
Surefire was the code name for the Gemini Agena Target Vehicle (GATV) Modification and Test Program designed to correct the malfunction which had caused the failure of GATV 5002 on October 25. SSD gave Lockheed a tentative go-ahead for Project Surefire on November 27 and established an emergency priority for completing the program. On the same day, Lockheed announced the formation of a Project Surefire Engine Development Task Force to carry out the program. Work was geared to meet the scheduled launch of GATV 5003 for Gemini VIII. GATV 5003 systems testing was halted. The main engine was removed November 23 and shipped to Bell Aerosystems for modification. Work on GATV 5004 was reprogrammed to allow it to complete final assembly with a modified engine.
The augmented target docking adapter (ATDA) would serve as an alternative to the Gemini Agena target vehicle (GATV) if efforts to remedy the GATV problem responsible for the October 25 mission abort did not meet the date scheduled for launching Gemini VIII. Using Gemini-qualified equipment, the ATDA (as its name implied) was essentially a target docking adapter (TDA) with such additions as were needed to stabilize it and allow the spacecraft to acquire and dock with it. In addition to the shroud and TDA, these included a communications system (comprising tracking, telemetry transmission, and command subsystems), instrumentation, a guidance and control system (made up of a target stabilization system and rendezvous radar transponder), electrical system, and a reaction control system identical to the Gemini spacecraft's. Robert C. Seamans, Jr., NASA Associate Administrator, approved the procurement of the ATDA on December 9, and McDonnell began assembling it December 14.
The vehicle was stripped down to its major structural components to expose all areas of possible contamination.
The engine was shipped immediately and arrived at Lockheed December 18. Lockheed completed reinstalling the engine on December 20. GATV 5003 systems retesting began December 27 after other equipment modifications had been installed.
No vehicle discrepancy marred the rerun. Air Force Space Systems Division formally accepted GATV 5003 on January 18, after the vehicle acceptance team inspection. It was shipped to Eastern Test Range the same day, but bad weather delayed delivery until January 21. GATV 5003 was to be the target vehicle for Gemini VIII.
Bell's part in the test program was to demonstrate the sea-level flightworthiness of the modified Agena main engine. Bell completed testing on March 4 with a full 180-second mission simulation firing. The successful completion of this phase of the test program gave the green light for the launch of Gemini Agena target vehicle 5003, scheduled for March 15.
Gemini VIII would have three periods of extravehicular activity (EVA) - two in daylight, one in darkness - and would undock during EVA with the right hatch snubbed against the umbilical guide and the astronaut strapped into the adapter section. A redocking would be performed with one orbit of stationkeeping performed before each docking. EVA would include retrieval of the emulsion pack from the adapter, the starting of the S-10 (Micrometeorite Collection) experiment on the Agena, and the use of a power tool. The astronaut would don the extravehicular support pack, use the hand-held maneuvering unit, and check different lenghts of tether. The spacecraft would maneuver to the astronaut and the astronaut to the Agena. It would incorporate a secondary propulsion system burn with the Agena and would be a three-day mission. Gemini IX would also be a three-day mission and would include a simulated lunar module (LM) rendezvous (third apogee rendezvous), a primary propulsion system (PPS) burn with the docked Agena, a rendezvous from above, a simulated LM abort, a phantom rendezvous with three PPS burns (double rendezvous), EVA with the modular maneuvering unit, and the parking of the Gemini VIII and Gemini IX Agenas. Gemini X would include a dual rendezvous with a parked Agena and the retrieval of the S-10 experiment after undocking with the new Agena, using EVA.
KH-7 type satellite. Space craft engaged in investigation of spaceflight techniques and technology (US Cat A).
Not identified as a subsatellite ferret by McDowell.
McDonnell had delivered TDA-3 to Cape Kennedy on January 8. The GATV/TDA interface functional test was completed January 24, and the vehicle was transferred to Merritt Island Launch Area for integrated tests with spacecraft No. 8 and extravehicular equipment, which were completed January 28.
Its modified main engine had been received on schedule from Bell Aerosystems January 12 and installed by January 20. Because of GATV 5003 priority, however, several main electronic assemblies, including the command system, had been removed from GATV 5004 and used in GATV 5003 final acceptance tests. As a result, GATV 5004 had fallen eight days behind its scheduled transfer date, January 18.
Systems Verification and Combined Interface Tests were conducted through February 18, followed by functional checks of the primary and secondary propulsion systems. Hanger E testing ended February 28, and the GATV was transferred to complex 14.
The last item on the agenda was a reminder from McDonnell that the Gemini spacecraft was capable of flying to a relatively high elliptic orbit from which it could safely reenter under certain circumstances. The type of orbit McDonnell suggested had an apogee of 500-700 nautical miles. This would involve using the Agena primary propulsion system both to get into this orbit and to return to a 161-mile circular orbit for nominal reentry.
It was transferred to the final assembly area at Sunnyvale for modification to Gemini Agena target vehicle 5005.
The ATDA, which was intended to back up the Gemini Agena target vehicle (GATV), was then placed in storage (March 8) where it remained until May 17, when the failure of target launch vehicle 5303 prevented GATV 5004 from achieving orbit. The ATDA became the target for Gemini IX-A.
KH-7 type satellite. Space craft engaged in investigation of spaceflight techniques and technology (US Cat A).
Space craft engaged in investigation of spaceflight techniques and technology (US Cat A).
Space craft engaged in investigation of spaceflight techniques and technology (US Cat A).
It was formally accepted by the Air Force on March 11, following the vehicle acceptance team inspection. The next day (March 12), GATV 5004 was shipped by air to Eastern Test Range, arriving March 14.
The Simultaneous Launch Demonstration with the Gemini Atlas-Agena target vehicle on complex 14 was completed March 9. The Final Simulated Flight Test concluded prelaunch tests on March 10.
The main engine was fired nine times, four more than required by contract, and 5000 commands were received and executed by the command and communications system, as against a contractural requirement of 1000. GATV 5003 electrical power was exhausted during the 10th day of orbit and the vehicle could no longer be controlled. Before that, however, all attitude control gas was vented overboard to preclude errant thruster malfunction, and the vehicle was placed into a 220-nautical mile circular decay orbit, one of the secondary objectives of the Gemini VIII mission. This would put GATV 5003 low enough during the Gemini X mission to be inspected by the astronauts.
Target vehicle for Gemini 8.
Not identified as a subsatellite ferret by McDowell.
Space craft engaged in investigation of spaceflight techniques and technology (US Cat A).
Air Force Space Systems Division and Lockheed agreed not to curtail the Project Surefire test program despite the excellent performance of Gemini Agena target vehicle (GATV) 5003 during the Gemini VIII mission. The final test phase of Project Surefire began March 28 with two firings at Arnold Engineering Development Center. This phase of testing included low temperature starts and planned malfunctions. Testing culminated on April 4 with a planned fuel lead test. As predicted, an engine hard start occurred. Data from analysis of engine damage correlated well with data from the GATV 5002 failure, tending to confirm the hypothesis that failure resulted from a hard start caused by fuel preceding oxidizer into the thrust chamber during ignition.
Orbiting Astronomical Observatory. Spacecraft engaged in research and exploration of the upper atmosphere or outer space (US Cat B).
CIT ended April 22 and engine functional tests of both the primary and secondary propulsion systems followed. Hanger E testing was completed May 1.
Associate Administrator for Manned Space Fight George E. Mueller informed Deputy Administrator Robert C. Seamans, Jr., of the Saturn/Apollo Applications Program Office's evaluation of a Lockheed proposal to launch space probes from orbit using Agena rockets launched from AAP stations in space. The proposal was feasible, Mueller advised, but did not seem a desirable mission for inclusion in the AAP. Additional Details: Evaluation of a Lockheed proposal to launch space probes from orbit using Agena rockets launched from AAP stations in space..
KH-7 type satellite. Space craft engaged in investigation of spaceflight techniques and technology (US Cat A).
The vehicle was formally accepted by the Air Force on May 14 and delivered to Eastern Test Range on May 16.
The task force's function was to see that GATV 5001 reached a flightworthy condition on time and as economically as possible. The reassembly plan provided an operational base line as well as guidelines for reassembling the vehicle, which was completely disassembled down to the level of riveted or welded parts. GATV 5001 was scheduled for acceptance on September 20 and would be the target vehicle for Gemini XII.
KH-7 type satellite. Space craft engaged in investigation of spaceflight techniques and technology (US Cat A).
Radar monitoring.
Launch and flight were normal until about 120 seconds after liftoff, 10 seconds before booster engine cutoff. At that point, booster engine No. 2 gimbaled to full pitchdown position. Automatic correction was ineffective. Stabilization was achieved after booster separation, but in the meantime the vehicle had executed a 216-degree pitchdown maneuver and was pointing toward Cape Kennedy at a climbing angle of about 13 degrees above the horizontal. Ground guidance was also lost, and the vehicle continued on the new trajectory with normal sequencing through vernier engine cutoff. The Agena separated normally but could not attain orbit. It fell into the Atlantic Ocean some 90 miles off the Florida coast about seven and one-half minutes after launch. Subsequent investigation indicated that the failure had been caused by a short in the sevo control circuit.
McDonnell had delivered the TDA on May 4. After mating, interface functional tests were performed, May 25-27. Preparations then began for Plan X testing with spacecraft No. 10 at Merritt Island Launch Area.
10. Plan X tests had first been scheduled for May 23 but were rescheduled for June 2-3. To avoid an impact on the schedule, the delay was absorbed by conducting several activities normally performed after Plan X: secondary propulsion system (SPS) modules fit check and alignment, SPS heatshield fit check, and booster adapter fit check. But the vehicle work plan was again rescheduled, and Plan X did not begin until June 7. Following the successful completion of Plan X on June 8, the vehicle was returned to Hanger E for systems verification tests, which began on June 9. Cause of rescheduling was the Gemini IX-A launch.
Not identified as a subsatellite ferret by McDowell.
KH-7 type satellite. Space craft engaged in investigation of spaceflight techniques and technology (US Cat A).
Although the vehicle lacked the flight control electronics package and guidance module, testing began immediately. The guidance module was received June 7 and the flight control electronics package June 9. Preliminary VST was completed June 17. The Air Force Plant Representative Office at Sunnyvale authorized final acceptance test to begin on June 20.
Missile Defense Alarm System. Left in transfer orbit.
Space craft engaged in investigation of spaceflight techniques and technology (US Cat A).
Metal-to-metal bonding experiments. Space craft engaged in investigation of spaceflight techniques and technology (US Cat A).
CIT was completed June 22, with no significant anomalies detected. Primary and secondary propulsion system functional checks were completed June 30. The GATV was then moved to complex 14.
Alan L. Bean, command pilot, and Clifton C. Williams, pilot, would be the backup crew. Mission plans would include rendezvous, docking, and extravehicular activity. The spacecraft was scheduled to rendezvous and dock with an Agena target vehicle which was to be launched the same day. If possible, Gemini X would also rendezvous with the Agena launched in the March 16 Gemini VIII mission.
The vehicle was disconnected from the test complex July 6 and formally accepted by the Air Force on July 13, two days ahead of schedule. Shipment of the vehicle to Eastern Test Range (ETR), planned for July 13, was delayed until July 14 by wind conditions. It arrived at ETR in the early morning of July 15.
Joint Flight Acceptance Composite Test was completed July 8. Complex 14 systems tests were completed July 12 with the Simultaneous Launch Demonstration.
KH-7 type satellite. Space craft engaged in investigation of spaceflight techniques and technology (US Cat A).
McDonnell had delivered TDA-6 to Cape Kennedy July 7. The interface functional test was completed July 21. The next day GATV 5006 was moved to the Merritt Island Launch Area for integrated tests with spacecraft No. 11 and extravehicular equipment.
Space craft engaged in investigation of spaceflight techniques and technology (US Cat A).
Gemini Agena target vehicle 5001 was transferred to systems test complex C-10 at Sunnyvale, after the long process of refurbishing it had been completed; however, it was still short several pieces of equipment.
Its primary propulsion system (PPS) fired to put the vehicle in a 750.5 by 208.6 nautical mile orbit in order to determine the temperature effects of such an orbit on the vehicle. Temperature data showed no appreciable difference from that obtained at lower orbits. The PPS fired again to circularize the orbit and a secondary propulsion system Unit II maneuver placed the GATV in a 190 nautical mile circular orbit for possible use as a Gemini XI rendezvous target. During its time in orbit, the GATV received and executed 1700 commands, 1350 by ground controllers and 350 from spacecraft 10.
Lunar Orbiter I was launched from Cape Kennedy Launch Complex 13 at 3:26 p.m. EDT August 10 to photograph possible Apollo landing sites from lunar orbit. The Atlas-Agena D launch vehicle injected the spacecraft into its planned 90-hour trajectory to the moon. A midcourse correction maneuver was made at 8 p.m. the next day; a planned second midcourse maneuver was not necessary. A faultless deboost maneuver on August 14 achieved the desired initial elliptic orbit around the moon, and one week later the spacecraft was commanded to make a transfer maneuver to place it in a final close-in elliptic orbit of the moon.
During the spacecraft's stay in the final close-in orbit, the gravitational fields of the earth and the moon were expected to influence the orbital elements. The influence was verified by spacecraft tracking data, which showed that the perilune altitude varied with time. From an initial perilune altitude of 58 kilometers, the perilune decreased to 49 kilometers. At this time an orbit adjustment maneuver began an increase in the altitude, which was expected to reach a maximum after three months and then begin to decrease again. The spacecraft was expected to impact on the lunar surface about six months after the orbit adjustment.
During the photo-acquisition phase of the flight, August 18 to 29, Lunar Orbiter I photographed the 9 selected primary potential Apollo landing sites, including the one in which Surveyor I landed; 7 other potential Apollo landing sites; the east limb of the moon; and 11 areas on the far side of the moon. Lunar Orbiter I also took photos of the earth, giving man the first view of the earth from the vicinity of the moon (this particular view has been widely publicized). A total of 207 frames (sets of medium- and high-resolution pictures) were taken, 38 while the spacecraft was in initial orbit, the remainder while it was in the final close-in orbit. Lunar Orbiter I achieved its mission objectives, and, with the exception of the high-resolution camera, the performance of the photo subsystem and other spacecraft subsystems was outstanding. At the completion of the photo readouts, the spacecraft had responded to about 5,000 discrete commands from the earth and had made about 700 maneuvers.
Photographs obtained during the mission were assessed and screened by representatives of the Lunar Orbiter Project Office, U.S. Geological Survey, DOD mapping agencies, MSC, and Jet Propulsion Laboratory. The spacecraft was deliberately crashed into moon after the mission was completed.
Analysis of test data was completed by August 24 and the vehicle was disconnected from the test complex.
KH-7 type satellite. Space craft engaged in investigation of spaceflight techniques and technology (US Cat A).
Radar monitoring.
Cold welding experiments. Space craft engaged in investigation of spaceflight techniques and technology (US Cat A).
Space craft engaged in investigation of spaceflight techniques and technology (US Cat A).
Missile Defense Alarm System.
Joint Flight Acceptance Composite Test was performed August 26, Simultaneous Launch Demonstration on August 31.
It was shipped from Sunnyvale on September 3 and arrived at Eastern Test Range on September 4.
McDonnell had delivered TDA 7A to the Cape August 19. After functional verification tests (September 13-15), the vehicle was moved (September 19-20) to the Merritt Island Launch Area for Plan X integrated tests with spacecraft No. 12.
Docking target for Gemini 11.
KH-7 type satellite. Space craft engaged in investigation of spaceflight techniques and technology (US Cat A).
Radar monitoring.
Systems testing was completed September 29. The Combined Interface Test (September 29-October 13) was followed by functional tests of the primary and secondary propulsion systems, completed October 22. GATV 5001 was then moved to complex 14.
Space craft engaged in investigation of spaceflight techniques and technology (US Cat A).
Missile Defense Alarm System.
KH-7 type satellite. Space craft engaged in investigation of spaceflight techniques and technology (US Cat A).
Not identified as a subsatellite ferret by McDowell.
Joint Flight Acceptance Composite Test was completed October 28, Simultaneous Launch Demonstration on November 1.
KH-7 type satellite. Space craft engaged in investigation of spaceflight techniques and technology (US Cat A).
Not identified as a subsatellite ferret by McDowell.
Lunar Orbiter II was launched at 6:21 p.m. EST from Launch Complex 13 at Cape Kennedy, to photograph possible landing sites on the moon for the Apollo program. The Atlas-Agena D booster placed the spacecraft in an earth-parking orbit and, after a 14-minute coast, injected it into its 94-hour trajectory toward the moon. A midcourse correction maneuver on November 8 increased the velocity from 3,051 to 3,133 kilometers per hour. At that time the spacecraft was 265,485 kilometers from the earth.
The spacecraft executed a deboost maneuver at 3:26 p.m., November 10, while 352,370 kilometers from the earth and 1,260 kilometers from the moon and traveling at a speed of 5,028 kilometers per hour. The maneuver permitted the lunar gravitational field to pull the spacecraft into the planned initial orbit around the moon. On November 15, a micrometeoroid hit was detected by one of the 20 thin-walled pressurized sensors.
The spacecraft was transferred into its final close-in orbit around the moon at 5:58 p.m. November 15 and the photo-acquisition phase of Lunar Orbiter II's mission began November 18. Thirteen selected primary potential landing sites and a number of secondary sites were to be photographed. By the morning of November 25, the spacecraft had taken 208 of the 211 photographs planned and pictures of all 13 selected potential landing sites. It also made 205 attitude change maneuvers and responded to 2,421 commands.
The status report of the Lunar Orbiter II mission as of November 28 indicated that the first phase of the photographic mission was completed when the final photo was taken on the afternoon of November 25. On November 26, the developing web was cut with a hot wire in response to a command from the earth. Failure to achieve the cut would have prevented the final readout of all 211 photos. Readout began immediately after the cut was made. One day early, December 6, the readout terminated when a transmitter failed, and three medium-resolution and two high-resolution photos of primary site 1 were lost. Full low-resolution coverage of the site had been provided, however, and other data continued to be transmitted. Three meteoroid hits had been detected.
Docking target for Gemini 12.
Two very serious astronauts get it all right to end the program. Docked and redocked with Agena, demonstrating various Apollo scenarios including manual rendezvous and docking without assistance from ground control. Aldrin finally demonstrates ability to accomplish EVA without overloading suit by use of suitable restraints and careful movement.
Major objectives of the mission were to rendezvous and dock and to evaluate extravehicular activities (EVA). Among the secondary objectives were tethered vehicle evaluation, experiments, third revolution rendezvous and docking, automatic reentry demonstration, docked maneuvering for a high-apogee excursion, docking practice, systems tests, and Gemini Agena target vehicle (GATV) parking. The high-apogee excursion was not attempted because an anomaly was noted in the GATV primary propulsion system during insertion, and parking was not attempted because the GATV's attitude control gas was depleted. All other objectives were achieved. Nine spacecraft maneuvers effected rendezvous with the GATV. The onboard radar malfunctioned before the terminal phase initiate maneuver, but the crew used onboard backup procedures to calculate the maneuvers. Rendezvous was achieved at 3 hours 46 minutes ground elapsed time, docking 28 minutes later. Two phasing maneuvers, using the GATV secondary propulsion system, were accomplished, but the primary propulsion system was not used. The first of two periods of standup EVA began at 19 hours 29 minutes into the flight and lasted for 2 hours 29 minutes. During a more than two-hour umbilical EVA which began at 42 hours 48 minutes, Aldrin attached a 100-foot tether from the GATV to the spacecraft docking bar. He spent part of the period at the spacecraft adapter, evaluating various restraint systems and performing various basic tasks. The second standup EVA lasted 55 minutes, ending at 67 hours 1 minute ground elapsed time. The tether evaluation began at 47 hours 23 minutes after liftoff, with the crew undocking from the GATV. The tether tended to remain slack, although the crew believed that the two vehicles did slowly attain gravity-gradient stabilization. The crew jettisoned the docking bar and released the tether at 51 hours 51 minutes. Several spacecraft systems suffered problems during the flight. Two fuel cell stacks failed and had to be shut down, while two others experienced significant loss of power. At 39 hours 30 minutes ground elapsed time, the crew reported that little or no thrust was available from two orbit attitude and maneuver thrusters. Retrofire occurred 94 hours after liftoff. Reentry was automatically controlled. The spacecraft landed less than 5 km from the planned landing point on November 15. The crew was picked up by helicopter and deposited 28 minutes later on the deck of the prime recovery ship, the aircraft carrier Wasp. The spacecraft was recovered 67 minutes after landing. Additional Details: Gemini 12.
KH-7 type satellite. Space craft engaged in investigation of spaceflight techniques and technology (US Cat A).
Applications Technology Satellite; communications and meteorological experiments.
KH-7 type satellite. Space craft engaged in investigation of spaceflight techniques and technology (US Cat A).
Crashed into Moon; returned 182 photos of lunar surface. Selenocentric orbit. Spacecraft engaged in research and exploration of the upper atmosphere or outer space (US Cat B).
Launch vehicle failure left in useless orbit; communications tests.
Returned 163 photos of lunar surface before impacting Moon. Selenocentric orbit. Spacecraft engaged in research and exploration of the upper atmosphere or outer space (US Cat B).
Not identified as a subsatellite ferret by McDowell.
KH-7 type satellite. Space craft engaged in investigation of spaceflight techniques and technology (US Cat A).
KH-7 type satellite. Space craft engaged in investigation of spaceflight techniques and technology (US Cat A).