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ronology

1965 Aug 10 - Schedule dates set for detailed Apollo LEM test plans
ASPO forwarded to Grumman the following schedule dates which should be used for submission of detailed vehicle test plans:
AS Mission Vehicle Test Plan Schedule Date
206 LEM-1 9-1-65
207 LEM-2 12-1-65
503 LEM-3 2-1-66
504 LEM-4 5-1-66
505 LEM-5 7-1-66
506 LEM-6 11-1-66
When determination of LEM test articles to be used on Missions 501 and 502 had been finalized, test plan dates would be forwarded. Current dates for 501 and 502 detailed vehicle test plans were 8-15-65 and 11-1-65, respectively.
- December 30-January 6 1965 - Grumman and MSC reached agreement to continue with Freon for prelaunch cooling of Apollo LEM-1
Grumman and MSC reached agreement to continue with Freon for prelaunch cooling of LEM-1. By changing to a different Freon the additional heat sink capability was obtained with minor changes to flight hardware. The ground support equipment for supplying Freon had to be modified to increase the flow capability, but this was not expected to be difficult. Plans were to use the same prelaunch cooling capability for LEM-2 and LEM-3.
1966 Oct 12 - Apollo LM-1 not capable of manned flight
MSC Apollo Spacecraft Program Office Manager Joseph F. Shea reported that LM-1 would no longer be capable of both manned and unmanned flight and that it would be configured and checked out for unmanned flight only. In addition, LM-2 would no longer be capable of completely unmanned flight, but would be configured and checked out for partially manned flights, such as the planned AS-278A mission (with unmanned final depletion burn of the ascent stage) and AS-278B (with all main propulsions unmanned).
- April 20-26 1967 - Fire in the Bell Apollo LM ascent engine test facility
A fire broke out in the Bell Aerosystems Test Facility, Wheatfield, N.Y., at 2:30 a.m. April 20. Early analysis indicated the fire was started by overpressurization of the ascent engine's propellant- conditioning system, which caused the system relief valve to dump propellant into an overflow bucket. The bucket in turn overflowed and propellant spilled onto the floor, coming into contact with a highly oxidized steel grating. Contact was believed to have initiated combustion and subsequently an intense, short-duration fire.
The fire began in the test facility building near the altitude chamber and fuel tanks and spread to the inside of the altitude chamber. Among the effects of the fire on the program were
1. about four weeks' requirement to repair the LM ascent engine test facility,
2. tests delayed accordingly, and
3. delay of the acceptance test of the LM-2 ascent engine.
On April 26, a small localized fire occurred in Test Cell No. 3G at the Bell Aerosystems Test Center in Porter, N.Y. Preliminary reports indicated that a LM ascent engine bipropellant valve had been tested as a valve injector assembly but was not connected to an injector at the time of the fire. This valve was being purged with nitrogen on the fuel side and water on the oxidizer side in preparation for flushing. A very small quantity of fuel had spilled from the valve during hookup to the flush stand. When the water started to flush through the oxidizer side, a loose connector allowed oxidizer to come in contact with the spilled fuel and the fire resulted. No one was injured; damage was estimated at $250.
ASPO Manager George Low received a message from NASA Hq. May 3 expressing concern that the two fires within one week might be symptomatic of inadequate test procedures and personnel training, which could lead to a more serious accident. Headquarters requested results of the investigations and notice of corrective action taken to prevent future incidents.
1967 Jun 23 - Apollo LM-1 wiring harness not accepted for manned flight
Although the LM-1 wiring harness had been accepted by the Customer Acceptance Readiness Review Board it was not clear that the harness would also have been accepted for manned flight, ASPO Manager George M. Low told Apollo Systems Engineering Assistant Chief R. W. Williams. Low asked Williams to assign someone to prepare a plan of actions needed to ensure that the harnesses in LM-2 and subsequent vehicles would be acceptable.
1967 Jul 25 - Apollo LM-2 options
MSC Director of Flight Operations Christopher C. Kraft, Jr., raised questions about lunar module number 2: Would it be possible for LM-2 to be a combined manned and unmanned vehicle; that is, have the capability to make an unmanned burn first and then be manned for additional activities? Would additional batteries in the LM provide greater flexibility for earth-orbital missions? Mission flexibility would be worthwhile only if it allowed deletion of a subsequent mission, at least on paper.
1967 Sep 26 - Flammability Test Review Board for Apollo LM M-6
The Flammability Test Review Board met at MSC to determine if the M-6 vehicle (a full-scale mockup of the LM cabin interior) was ready for test and that the ignition points, configuration, instrumentation, and test facility were acceptable for verifying the fire safety of LTA-8 and LM-2 vehicles. The Board agreed that the M-6 did accurately and adequately simulate the LTA-8 and the LM-2 and established that the M-6 mockup was ready for testing. The Board was composed of Robert R. Gilruth, Chairman; Carroll H. Bolender; Aleck C. Bond; Maxime A. Faget; Christopher C. Kraft, Jr.; Donald K. Slayton; A. Duane Catterson, all of MSC; E. Z. Gray of Grumman; and G. H. Stoner of Boeing, a nonvoting observer.
1967 Oct 2 - Apollo LM-2 and LM-3 flight alternatives
Apollo Program Director Samuel C. Phillips, NASA Hq., reaffirmed that the following was the best course of action to follow with LM-2 and LM-3 : "Decide now to configure LM-2 for its unmanned contingency mission and reassign LM-3 to join with CSM 103 for a manned CSM-LM mission. In the event the LM-2 unmanned contingency mission is not required, LM-2 could be reworked to manned configuration and cycled back into the GAEC (Grumman) line for later delivery. On this basis, LM-2 could be delivered in unmanned configuration in late January 1968, or immediately after the Apollo 5 flight, and could be flown on AS-206 about 3½ months after delivery; i.e., in May 1968. The outlook for LM-3 indicates an April 1968 delivery which appears to be compatible with the expected delivery date of CSM 103."
- Week Ending December 1 1967 - Apollo LM testing meeting
A meeting on LM testing was held at Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corp., with Robert R. Gilruth and George M. Low, MSC; George Hage, OMSF; Hilliard Paige, General Electric Co.; and George Stoner, Boeing Co., in addition to Grumman personnel. After NASA reviewed the LM vibration environment and previous acceptance test decisions, Grumman recommended that complete vehicle vibration testing with externally mounted acoustic horns should be continued beyond LM-2; that wider use of thermovacuum testing at the component level be considered; and that the LM designated for the lunar landing mission be subjected to complete thermovacuum tests either at MSC or KSC.
MSC concluded that
1. for schedule purposes it would plan to continue complete vehicle acoustic testing after LM-2; however, implementation of this decision would depend on the results of the LM-2 testing;
2. MSC would reexamine the application of more widespread thermal testing at the component level; and
3. the Grumman proposal to subject the LM designated for the lunar mission to more testing than earlier manned flights was unacceptable. Past experience had shown that earlier vehicles should always have more testing than later ones.
1967 Dec 22 - First fire-in-the-hole Apollo LM test
The first fire-in-the-hole test was successfully completed at the White Sands Test Facility (WSTF). The vehicle test configuration was that of LM-2 and the test cell pressure immediately before the test was equivalent to a 68,850-meter altitude. All test objectives were satisfied and video tapes of TV monitors were acquired. Test firing duration was 650 milliseconds with zero stage separation.
1968 Jan 26 - Apollo LM-2 flight and requirement meeting
A LM-2 flight and requirement meeting was held at MSC, attended by key MSC and NASA Hq. officials. The group reached three conclusions:
1. The LM-1 performance on the January 22 Apollo 5 mission had been excellent for all conditions of the flight, as executed, with the exception of minor anomalies.
2. The LM-2 flight objectives that were partially accomplished could be better accomplished by further ground testing or on subsequent manned missions. Further unmanned flight testing was not required for man-rating purposes.
3. A LM-2 flight was not required to man-rate the ascent engine injector.
It was also agreed that a decision should be made not to fly the LM-2 mission, with this decision reversible if further evaluation of data from the LM-1 flight indicated any problems. This decision would be reviewed at the February 6 Manned Space Flight Management Council Meeting and on March 6 at the LM-3 Design Certification Review. The final decision would not be made until March 6.
1968 Feb 8 - Decision to forego a second unmanned Apollo LM flight using LM-2
Grumman President L. J. Evans wrote ASPO Manager George M. Low stating his agreement with NASA's decision to forego a second unmanned LM flight using LM-2. (Grumman's new position - the company had earlier strongly urged such a second flight - was reached after discussions with Low and LM Manager G. H. Bolender at the end of January and after flight data was presented at the February 6 meeting of the OMSF Management Council.) Although the decision was not irreversible, being subject to further investigations by both contractor and customer, both sides now were geared for a manned flight on the next LM mission.
However, Evans cited several spacecraft functions not covered during the LM-1 flight that would have to be demonstrated before attempting a lunar mission, notably control by the primary navigation and guidance system of the descent propulsion system burn as well as control of stage separation and firing of the ascent propulsion system. To demonstrate these functions fully, he said, some modifications in mission plans for the next two manned flights might be necessary.
1968 May 25 - Effects of launch vehicle "pogo" vibrations - on Apollo spacecraft studied
ASPO Manager George M. Low informed Apollo Program Director Samuel C. Phillips of recent MSC work on the effects of launch vehicle-induced oscillations - i.e., "pogo" vibrations - on the spacecraft and its subsystems. MSC had made two key personnel assignments in this area:
1. Rolf W. Lanzkron managed all MSC activities in connection with the space vehicle dynamic integrity problem; and
2. astronaut Charles M. Duke coordinated all MSC's efforts with related work at MSFC.
Low also cited a number of decisions in the hardware and testing areas. He had decided to use CM 002B, SM 105, and LM-2 for pogo dynamics testing. Other ground test hardware included LTA-3 for manned drop tests and for additional structural verification tests, CM 102 to verify parachute-imposed loads on the spacecraft structure, and CMs 014 and 102 for additional structural tests at North American Rockwell. In deciding upon uses for these and other spacecraft hardware items, MSC had assigned first priority to the ground test program, second to another potential unmanned Saturn V flight, and third to the dual launch capability.
- During the Month 1968 - Alternative uses for the Apollo LM-2 vehicle recommended
NASA Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight George E. Mueller recommended to the Administrator several alternative uses for the LM-2 vehicle, since that spacecraft was no longer destined for flight. (The successful LM-1 flight during the Apollo 5 mission in January had obviated the need for a second such unmanned flight.) Mueller suggested that LM-2 be used for nondestructive tests and for documentary photography. Additional drop tests with the craft, he said, would enhance confidence in the strength of the LM to withstand the impact of landing on the moon, with all subsystems functioning. (The LM drop test program using Lunar Test Article 3, Mueller said, would verify the LM structure itself; however, LTA-3 contained no operational subsystems, wiring, or plumbing and therefore could not verify the total flight vehicle.) Among several other possible uses for the vehicle examined but rejected, Mueller cited modifying the craft into a manned configuration for Apollo or using it for an early Apollo Applications flight. LM-2 was unsuitable for both these alternatives, he stated, because of the extensive structural modifications needed to make it a flightworthy Apollo spacecraft - and the attendant disruption of vehicle flow within the Grumman production line - and because of the many fire-proofing changes that would be required. The launch vehicle (SA-206), LM adapter, and protective shroud were to be placed in storage for further Saturn tests if needed.
1968 Jul 11 - Changes in the Apollo LM vibration testing program
ASPO Manager Low informed Apollo Program Director Phillips of several changes in the LM vibration testing program. Before beginning the series of tests, he told Phillips, red line values were established on critical components that were not to be exceeded. However, because of the most recent test effort on LM-2, which resulted from the pogo problem experienced during the flight of Apollo 6, Low was forced to authorize vibration testing beyond the red line values initially set for the spacecraft. This action, in turn, forced an inspection and possible refurbishment of LM-2 to make it available for an unmanned flight, should such a second unmanned LM test mission be required. He then cited MSC's future plans for LM-2:
- For the planned drop tests with the vehicle, the upper decks would be inspected and repaired or replaced where necessary.
- Should a LM-2 flight become necessary, all of the descent stage upper decks would probably be replaced.
Phillips approved Low's action immediately. He urged Low to "continue to give priority to that work which is necessary for full and early resolution of the POGO and spacecraft structural dynamics questions."
- May 7-8 1969 - The fifth and final drop test of Apollo LM-2
The fifth and final drop test of LM-2 was made on May 7. The first four drop tests had been made to establish the proper functioning of all LM systems after a lunar landing. The fifth test was made to qualify the functioning of the pyrotechnics after landing. On May 8, the final test, physically separating the ascent stage, was conducted.

AS Mission	Vehicle Test Plan	Schedule Date
206	LEM-1	9-1-65
207	LEM-2	12-1-65
503	LEM-3	2-1-66
504	LEM-4	5-1-66
505	LEM-5	7-1-66
506	LEM-6	11-1-66

Chronology

1965 Aug 10 - Schedule dates set for detailed Apollo LEM test plans
ASPO forwarded to Grumman the following schedule dates which should be used for submission of detailed vehicle test plans:
AS Mission Vehicle Test Plan Schedule Date
206 LEM-1 9-1-65
207 LEM-2 12-1-65
503 LEM-3 2-1-66
504 LEM-4 5-1-66
505 LEM-5 7-1-66
506 LEM-6 11-1-66
When determination of LEM test articles to be used on Missions 501 and 502 had been finalized, test plan dates would be forwarded. Current dates for 501 and 502 detailed vehicle test plans were 8-15-65 and 11-1-65, respectively.
- December 30-January 6 1965 - Grumman and MSC reached agreement to continue with Freon for prelaunch cooling of Apollo LEM-1
Grumman and MSC reached agreement to continue with Freon for prelaunch cooling of LEM-1. By changing to a different Freon the additional heat sink capability was obtained with minor changes to flight hardware. The ground support equipment for supplying Freon had to be modified to increase the flow capability, but this was not expected to be difficult. Plans were to use the same prelaunch cooling capability for LEM-2 and LEM-3.
1966 Oct 12 - Apollo LM-1 not capable of manned flight
MSC Apollo Spacecraft Program Office Manager Joseph F. Shea reported that LM-1 would no longer be capable of both manned and unmanned flight and that it would be configured and checked out for unmanned flight only. In addition, LM-2 would no longer be capable of completely unmanned flight, but would be configured and checked out for partially manned flights, such as the planned AS-278A mission (with unmanned final depletion burn of the ascent stage) and AS-278B (with all main propulsions unmanned).
- April 20-26 1967 - Fire in the Bell Apollo LM ascent engine test facility
A fire broke out in the Bell Aerosystems Test Facility, Wheatfield, N.Y., at 2:30 a.m. April 20. Early analysis indicated the fire was started by overpressurization of the ascent engine's propellant- conditioning system, which caused the system relief valve to dump propellant into an overflow bucket. The bucket in turn overflowed and propellant spilled onto the floor, coming into contact with a highly oxidized steel grating. Contact was believed to have initiated combustion and subsequently an intense, short-duration fire.
The fire began in the test facility building near the altitude chamber and fuel tanks and spread to the inside of the altitude chamber. Among the effects of the fire on the program were
1. about four weeks' requirement to repair the LM ascent engine test facility,
2. tests delayed accordingly, and
3. delay of the acceptance test of the LM-2 ascent engine.
On April 26, a small localized fire occurred in Test Cell No. 3G at the Bell Aerosystems Test Center in Porter, N.Y. Preliminary reports indicated that a LM ascent engine bipropellant valve had been tested as a valve injector assembly but was not connected to an injector at the time of the fire. This valve was being purged with nitrogen on the fuel side and water on the oxidizer side in preparation for flushing. A very small quantity of fuel had spilled from the valve during hookup to the flush stand. When the water started to flush through the oxidizer side, a loose connector allowed oxidizer to come in contact with the spilled fuel and the fire resulted. No one was injured; damage was estimated at $250.
ASPO Manager George Low received a message from NASA Hq. May 3 expressing concern that the two fires within one week might be symptomatic of inadequate test procedures and personnel training, which could lead to a more serious accident. Headquarters requested results of the investigations and notice of corrective action taken to prevent future incidents.
1967 Jun 23 - Apollo LM-1 wiring harness not accepted for manned flight
Although the LM-1 wiring harness had been accepted by the Customer Acceptance Readiness Review Board it was not clear that the harness would also have been accepted for manned flight, ASPO Manager George M. Low told Apollo Systems Engineering Assistant Chief R. W. Williams. Low asked Williams to assign someone to prepare a plan of actions needed to ensure that the harnesses in LM-2 and subsequent vehicles would be acceptable.
1967 Jul 25 - Apollo LM-2 options
MSC Director of Flight Operations Christopher C. Kraft, Jr., raised questions about lunar module number 2: Would it be possible for LM-2 to be a combined manned and unmanned vehicle; that is, have the capability to make an unmanned burn first and then be manned for additional activities? Would additional batteries in the LM provide greater flexibility for earth-orbital missions? Mission flexibility would be worthwhile only if it allowed deletion of a subsequent mission, at least on paper.
1967 Sep 26 - Flammability Test Review Board for Apollo LM M-6
The Flammability Test Review Board met at MSC to determine if the M-6 vehicle (a full-scale mockup of the LM cabin interior) was ready for test and that the ignition points, configuration, instrumentation, and test facility were acceptable for verifying the fire safety of LTA-8 and LM-2 vehicles. The Board agreed that the M-6 did accurately and adequately simulate the LTA-8 and the LM-2 and established that the M-6 mockup was ready for testing. The Board was composed of Robert R. Gilruth, Chairman; Carroll H. Bolender; Aleck C. Bond; Maxime A. Faget; Christopher C. Kraft, Jr.; Donald K. Slayton; A. Duane Catterson, all of MSC; E. Z. Gray of Grumman; and G. H. Stoner of Boeing, a nonvoting observer.
1967 Oct 2 - Apollo LM-2 and LM-3 flight alternatives
Apollo Program Director Samuel C. Phillips, NASA Hq., reaffirmed that the following was the best course of action to follow with LM-2 and LM-3 : "Decide now to configure LM-2 for its unmanned contingency mission and reassign LM-3 to join with CSM 103 for a manned CSM-LM mission. In the event the LM-2 unmanned contingency mission is not required, LM-2 could be reworked to manned configuration and cycled back into the GAEC (Grumman) line for later delivery. On this basis, LM-2 could be delivered in unmanned configuration in late January 1968, or immediately after the Apollo 5 flight, and could be flown on AS-206 about 3½ months after delivery; i.e., in May 1968. The outlook for LM-3 indicates an April 1968 delivery which appears to be compatible with the expected delivery date of CSM 103."
- Week Ending December 1 1967 - Apollo LM testing meeting
A meeting on LM testing was held at Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corp., with Robert R. Gilruth and George M. Low, MSC; George Hage, OMSF; Hilliard Paige, General Electric Co.; and George Stoner, Boeing Co., in addition to Grumman personnel. After NASA reviewed the LM vibration environment and previous acceptance test decisions, Grumman recommended that complete vehicle vibration testing with externally mounted acoustic horns should be continued beyond LM-2; that wider use of thermovacuum testing at the component level be considered; and that the LM designated for the lunar landing mission be subjected to complete thermovacuum tests either at MSC or KSC.
MSC concluded that
1. for schedule purposes it would plan to continue complete vehicle acoustic testing after LM-2; however, implementation of this decision would depend on the results of the LM-2 testing;
2. MSC would reexamine the application of more widespread thermal testing at the component level; and
3. the Grumman proposal to subject the LM designated for the lunar mission to more testing than earlier manned flights was unacceptable. Past experience had shown that earlier vehicles should always have more testing than later ones.
1967 Dec 22 - First fire-in-the-hole Apollo LM test
The first fire-in-the-hole test was successfully completed at the White Sands Test Facility (WSTF). The vehicle test configuration was that of LM-2 and the test cell pressure immediately before the test was equivalent to a 68,850-meter altitude. All test objectives were satisfied and video tapes of TV monitors were acquired. Test firing duration was 650 milliseconds with zero stage separation.
1968 Jan 26 - Apollo LM-2 flight and requirement meeting
A LM-2 flight and requirement meeting was held at MSC, attended by key MSC and NASA Hq. officials. The group reached three conclusions:
1. The LM-1 performance on the January 22 Apollo 5 mission had been excellent for all conditions of the flight, as executed, with the exception of minor anomalies.
2. The LM-2 flight objectives that were partially accomplished could be better accomplished by further ground testing or on subsequent manned missions. Further unmanned flight testing was not required for man-rating purposes.
3. A LM-2 flight was not required to man-rate the ascent engine injector.
It was also agreed that a decision should be made not to fly the LM-2 mission, with this decision reversible if further evaluation of data from the LM-1 flight indicated any problems. This decision would be reviewed at the February 6 Manned Space Flight Management Council Meeting and on March 6 at the LM-3 Design Certification Review. The final decision would not be made until March 6.
1968 Feb 8 - Decision to forego a second unmanned Apollo LM flight using LM-2
Grumman President L. J. Evans wrote ASPO Manager George M. Low stating his agreement with NASA's decision to forego a second unmanned LM flight using LM-2. (Grumman's new position - the company had earlier strongly urged such a second flight - was reached after discussions with Low and LM Manager G. H. Bolender at the end of January and after flight data was presented at the February 6 meeting of the OMSF Management Council.) Although the decision was not irreversible, being subject to further investigations by both contractor and customer, both sides now were geared for a manned flight on the next LM mission.
However, Evans cited several spacecraft functions not covered during the LM-1 flight that would have to be demonstrated before attempting a lunar mission, notably control by the primary navigation and guidance system of the descent propulsion system burn as well as control of stage separation and firing of the ascent propulsion system. To demonstrate these functions fully, he said, some modifications in mission plans for the next two manned flights might be necessary.
1968 May 25 - Effects of launch vehicle "pogo" vibrations - on Apollo spacecraft studied
ASPO Manager George M. Low informed Apollo Program Director Samuel C. Phillips of recent MSC work on the effects of launch vehicle-induced oscillations - i.e., "pogo" vibrations - on the spacecraft and its subsystems. MSC had made two key personnel assignments in this area:
1. Rolf W. Lanzkron managed all MSC activities in connection with the space vehicle dynamic integrity problem; and
2. astronaut Charles M. Duke coordinated all MSC's efforts with related work at MSFC.
Low also cited a number of decisions in the hardware and testing areas. He had decided to use CM 002B, SM 105, and LM-2 for pogo dynamics testing. Other ground test hardware included LTA-3 for manned drop tests and for additional structural verification tests, CM 102 to verify parachute-imposed loads on the spacecraft structure, and CMs 014 and 102 for additional structural tests at North American Rockwell. In deciding upon uses for these and other spacecraft hardware items, MSC had assigned first priority to the ground test program, second to another potential unmanned Saturn V flight, and third to the dual launch capability.
- During the Month 1968 - Alternative uses for the Apollo LM-2 vehicle recommended
NASA Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight George E. Mueller recommended to the Administrator several alternative uses for the LM-2 vehicle, since that spacecraft was no longer destined for flight. (The successful LM-1 flight during the Apollo 5 mission in January had obviated the need for a second such unmanned flight.) Mueller suggested that LM-2 be used for nondestructive tests and for documentary photography. Additional drop tests with the craft, he said, would enhance confidence in the strength of the LM to withstand the impact of landing on the moon, with all subsystems functioning. (The LM drop test program using Lunar Test Article 3, Mueller said, would verify the LM structure itself; however, LTA-3 contained no operational subsystems, wiring, or plumbing and therefore could not verify the total flight vehicle.) Among several other possible uses for the vehicle examined but rejected, Mueller cited modifying the craft into a manned configuration for Apollo or using it for an early Apollo Applications flight. LM-2 was unsuitable for both these alternatives, he stated, because of the extensive structural modifications needed to make it a flightworthy Apollo spacecraft - and the attendant disruption of vehicle flow within the Grumman production line - and because of the many fire-proofing changes that would be required. The launch vehicle (SA-206), LM adapter, and protective shroud were to be placed in storage for further Saturn tests if needed.
1968 Jul 11 - Changes in the Apollo LM vibration testing program
ASPO Manager Low informed Apollo Program Director Phillips of several changes in the LM vibration testing program. Before beginning the series of tests, he told Phillips, red line values were established on critical components that were not to be exceeded. However, because of the most recent test effort on LM-2, which resulted from the pogo problem experienced during the flight of Apollo 6, Low was forced to authorize vibration testing beyond the red line values initially set for the spacecraft. This action, in turn, forced an inspection and possible refurbishment of LM-2 to make it available for an unmanned flight, should such a second unmanned LM test mission be required. He then cited MSC's future plans for LM-2:
- For the planned drop tests with the vehicle, the upper decks would be inspected and repaired or replaced where necessary.
- Should a LM-2 flight become necessary, all of the descent stage upper decks would probably be replaced.
Phillips approved Low's action immediately. He urged Low to "continue to give priority to that work which is necessary for full and early resolution of the POGO and spacecraft structural dynamics questions."
- May 7-8 1969 - The fifth and final drop test of Apollo LM-2
The fifth and final drop test of LM-2 was made on May 7. The first four drop tests had been made to establish the proper functioning of all LM systems after a lunar landing. The fifth test was made to qualify the functioning of the pyrotechnics after landing. On May 8, the final test, physically separating the ascent stage, was conducted.

AS Mission	Vehicle Test Plan	Schedule Date
206	LEM-1	9-1-65
207	LEM-2	12-1-65
503	LEM-3	2-1-66
504	LEM-4	5-1-66
505	LEM-5	7-1-66
506	LEM-6	11-1-66

Chronology

1965 Aug 10 - Schedule dates set for detailed Apollo LEM test plans
ASPO forwarded to Grumman the following schedule dates which should be used for submission of detailed vehicle test plans:
AS Mission Vehicle Test Plan Schedule Date
206 LEM-1 9-1-65
207 LEM-2 12-1-65
503 LEM-3 2-1-66
504 LEM-4 5-1-66
505 LEM-5 7-1-66
506 LEM-6 11-1-66
When determination of LEM test articles to be used on Missions 501 and 502 had been finalized, test plan dates would be forwarded. Current dates for 501 and 502 detailed vehicle test plans were 8-15-65 and 11-1-65, respectively.
- December 30-January 6 1965 - Grumman and MSC reached agreement to continue with Freon for prelaunch cooling of Apollo LEM-1
Grumman and MSC reached agreement to continue with Freon for prelaunch cooling of LEM-1. By changing to a different Freon the additional heat sink capability was obtained with minor changes to flight hardware. The ground support equipment for supplying Freon had to be modified to increase the flow capability, but this was not expected to be difficult. Plans were to use the same prelaunch cooling capability for LEM-2 and LEM-3.
1966 Oct 12 - Apollo LM-1 not capable of manned flight
MSC Apollo Spacecraft Program Office Manager Joseph F. Shea reported that LM-1 would no longer be capable of both manned and unmanned flight and that it would be configured and checked out for unmanned flight only. In addition, LM-2 would no longer be capable of completely unmanned flight, but would be configured and checked out for partially manned flights, such as the planned AS-278A mission (with unmanned final depletion burn of the ascent stage) and AS-278B (with all main propulsions unmanned).
- April 20-26 1967 - Fire in the Bell Apollo LM ascent engine test facility
A fire broke out in the Bell Aerosystems Test Facility, Wheatfield, N.Y., at 2:30 a.m. April 20. Early analysis indicated the fire was started by overpressurization of the ascent engine's propellant- conditioning system, which caused the system relief valve to dump propellant into an overflow bucket. The bucket in turn overflowed and propellant spilled onto the floor, coming into contact with a highly oxidized steel grating. Contact was believed to have initiated combustion and subsequently an intense, short-duration fire.
The fire began in the test facility building near the altitude chamber and fuel tanks and spread to the inside of the altitude chamber. Among the effects of the fire on the program were
1. about four weeks' requirement to repair the LM ascent engine test facility,
2. tests delayed accordingly, and
3. delay of the acceptance test of the LM-2 ascent engine.
On April 26, a small localized fire occurred in Test Cell No. 3G at the Bell Aerosystems Test Center in Porter, N.Y. Preliminary reports indicated that a LM ascent engine bipropellant valve had been tested as a valve injector assembly but was not connected to an injector at the time of the fire. This valve was being purged with nitrogen on the fuel side and water on the oxidizer side in preparation for flushing. A very small quantity of fuel had spilled from the valve during hookup to the flush stand. When the water started to flush through the oxidizer side, a loose connector allowed oxidizer to come in contact with the spilled fuel and the fire resulted. No one was injured; damage was estimated at $250.
ASPO Manager George Low received a message from NASA Hq. May 3 expressing concern that the two fires within one week might be symptomatic of inadequate test procedures and personnel training, which could lead to a more serious accident. Headquarters requested results of the investigations and notice of corrective action taken to prevent future incidents.
1967 Jun 23 - Apollo LM-1 wiring harness not accepted for manned flight
Although the LM-1 wiring harness had been accepted by the Customer Acceptance Readiness Review Board it was not clear that the harness would also have been accepted for manned flight, ASPO Manager George M. Low told Apollo Systems Engineering Assistant Chief R. W. Williams. Low asked Williams to assign someone to prepare a plan of actions needed to ensure that the harnesses in LM-2 and subsequent vehicles would be acceptable.
1967 Jul 25 - Apollo LM-2 options
MSC Director of Flight Operations Christopher C. Kraft, Jr., raised questions about lunar module number 2: Would it be possible for LM-2 to be a combined manned and unmanned vehicle; that is, have the capability to make an unmanned burn first and then be manned for additional activities? Would additional batteries in the LM provide greater flexibility for earth-orbital missions? Mission flexibility would be worthwhile only if it allowed deletion of a subsequent mission, at least on paper.
1967 Sep 26 - Flammability Test Review Board for Apollo LM M-6
The Flammability Test Review Board met at MSC to determine if the M-6 vehicle (a full-scale mockup of the LM cabin interior) was ready for test and that the ignition points, configuration, instrumentation, and test facility were acceptable for verifying the fire safety of LTA-8 and LM-2 vehicles. The Board agreed that the M-6 did accurately and adequately simulate the LTA-8 and the LM-2 and established that the M-6 mockup was ready for testing. The Board was composed of Robert R. Gilruth, Chairman; Carroll H. Bolender; Aleck C. Bond; Maxime A. Faget; Christopher C. Kraft, Jr.; Donald K. Slayton; A. Duane Catterson, all of MSC; E. Z. Gray of Grumman; and G. H. Stoner of Boeing, a nonvoting observer.
1967 Oct 2 - Apollo LM-2 and LM-3 flight alternatives
Apollo Program Director Samuel C. Phillips, NASA Hq., reaffirmed that the following was the best course of action to follow with LM-2 and LM-3 : "Decide now to configure LM-2 for its unmanned contingency mission and reassign LM-3 to join with CSM 103 for a manned CSM-LM mission. In the event the LM-2 unmanned contingency mission is not required, LM-2 could be reworked to manned configuration and cycled back into the GAEC (Grumman) line for later delivery. On this basis, LM-2 could be delivered in unmanned configuration in late January 1968, or immediately after the Apollo 5 flight, and could be flown on AS-206 about 3½ months after delivery; i.e., in May 1968. The outlook for LM-3 indicates an April 1968 delivery which appears to be compatible with the expected delivery date of CSM 103."
- Week Ending December 1 1967 - Apollo LM testing meeting
A meeting on LM testing was held at Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corp., with Robert R. Gilruth and George M. Low, MSC; George Hage, OMSF; Hilliard Paige, General Electric Co.; and George Stoner, Boeing Co., in addition to Grumman personnel. After NASA reviewed the LM vibration environment and previous acceptance test decisions, Grumman recommended that complete vehicle vibration testing with externally mounted acoustic horns should be continued beyond LM-2; that wider use of thermovacuum testing at the component level be considered; and that the LM designated for the lunar landing mission be subjected to complete thermovacuum tests either at MSC or KSC.
MSC concluded that
1. for schedule purposes it would plan to continue complete vehicle acoustic testing after LM-2; however, implementation of this decision would depend on the results of the LM-2 testing;
2. MSC would reexamine the application of more widespread thermal testing at the component level; and
3. the Grumman proposal to subject the LM designated for the lunar mission to more testing than earlier manned flights was unacceptable. Past experience had shown that earlier vehicles should always have more testing than later ones.
1967 Dec 22 - First fire-in-the-hole Apollo LM test
The first fire-in-the-hole test was successfully completed at the White Sands Test Facility (WSTF). The vehicle test configuration was that of LM-2 and the test cell pressure immediately before the test was equivalent to a 68,850-meter altitude. All test objectives were satisfied and video tapes of TV monitors were acquired. Test firing duration was 650 milliseconds with zero stage separation.
1968 Jan 26 - Apollo LM-2 flight and requirement meeting
A LM-2 flight and requirement meeting was held at MSC, attended by key MSC and NASA Hq. officials. The group reached three conclusions:
1. The LM-1 performance on the January 22 Apollo 5 mission had been excellent for all conditions of the flight, as executed, with the exception of minor anomalies.
2. The LM-2 flight objectives that were partially accomplished could be better accomplished by further ground testing or on subsequent manned missions. Further unmanned flight testing was not required for man-rating purposes.
3. A LM-2 flight was not required to man-rate the ascent engine injector.
It was also agreed that a decision should be made not to fly the LM-2 mission, with this decision reversible if further evaluation of data from the LM-1 flight indicated any problems. This decision would be reviewed at the February 6 Manned Space Flight Management Council Meeting and on March 6 at the LM-3 Design Certification Review. The final decision would not be made until March 6.
1968 Feb 8 - Decision to forego a second unmanned Apollo LM flight using LM-2
Grumman President L. J. Evans wrote ASPO Manager George M. Low stating his agreement with NASA's decision to forego a second unmanned LM flight using LM-2. (Grumman's new position - the company had earlier strongly urged such a second flight - was reached after discussions with Low and LM Manager G. H. Bolender at the end of January and after flight data was presented at the February 6 meeting of the OMSF Management Council.) Although the decision was not irreversible, being subject to further investigations by both contractor and customer, both sides now were geared for a manned flight on the next LM mission.
However, Evans cited several spacecraft functions not covered during the LM-1 flight that would have to be demonstrated before attempting a lunar mission, notably control by the primary navigation and guidance system of the descent propulsion system burn as well as control of stage separation and firing of the ascent propulsion system. To demonstrate these functions fully, he said, some modifications in mission plans for the next two manned flights might be necessary.
1968 May 25 - Effects of launch vehicle "pogo" vibrations - on Apollo spacecraft studied
ASPO Manager George M. Low informed Apollo Program Director Samuel C. Phillips of recent MSC work on the effects of launch vehicle-induced oscillations - i.e., "pogo" vibrations - on the spacecraft and its subsystems. MSC had made two key personnel assignments in this area:
1. Rolf W. Lanzkron managed all MSC activities in connection with the space vehicle dynamic integrity problem; and
2. astronaut Charles M. Duke coordinated all MSC's efforts with related work at MSFC.
Low also cited a number of decisions in the hardware and testing areas. He had decided to use CM 002B, SM 105, and LM-2 for pogo dynamics testing. Other ground test hardware included LTA-3 for manned drop tests and for additional structural verification tests, CM 102 to verify parachute-imposed loads on the spacecraft structure, and CMs 014 and 102 for additional structural tests at North American Rockwell. In deciding upon uses for these and other spacecraft hardware items, MSC had assigned first priority to the ground test program, second to another potential unmanned Saturn V flight, and third to the dual launch capability.
- During the Month 1968 - Alternative uses for the Apollo LM-2 vehicle recommended
NASA Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight George E. Mueller recommended to the Administrator several alternative uses for the LM-2 vehicle, since that spacecraft was no longer destined for flight. (The successful LM-1 flight during the Apollo 5 mission in January had obviated the need for a second such unmanned flight.) Mueller suggested that LM-2 be used for nondestructive tests and for documentary photography. Additional drop tests with the craft, he said, would enhance confidence in the strength of the LM to withstand the impact of landing on the moon, with all subsystems functioning. (The LM drop test program using Lunar Test Article 3, Mueller said, would verify the LM structure itself; however, LTA-3 contained no operational subsystems, wiring, or plumbing and therefore could not verify the total flight vehicle.) Among several other possible uses for the vehicle examined but rejected, Mueller cited modifying the craft into a manned configuration for Apollo or using it for an early Apollo Applications flight. LM-2 was unsuitable for both these alternatives, he stated, because of the extensive structural modifications needed to make it a flightworthy Apollo spacecraft - and the attendant disruption of vehicle flow within the Grumman production line - and because of the many fire-proofing changes that would be required. The launch vehicle (SA-206), LM adapter, and protective shroud were to be placed in storage for further Saturn tests if needed.
1968 Jul 11 - Changes in the Apollo LM vibration testing program
ASPO Manager Low informed Apollo Program Director Phillips of several changes in the LM vibration testing program. Before beginning the series of tests, he told Phillips, red line values were established on critical components that were not to be exceeded. However, because of the most recent test effort on LM-2, which resulted from the pogo problem experienced during the flight of Apollo 6, Low was forced to authorize vibration testing beyond the red line values initially set for the spacecraft. This action, in turn, forced an inspection and possible refurbishment of LM-2 to make it available for an unmanned flight, should such a second unmanned LM test mission be required. He then cited MSC's future plans for LM-2:
- For the planned drop tests with the vehicle, the upper decks would be inspected and repaired or replaced where necessary.
- Should a LM-2 flight become necessary, all of the descent stage upper decks would probably be replaced.
Phillips approved Low's action immediately. He urged Low to "continue to give priority to that work which is necessary for full and early resolution of the POGO and spacecraft structural dynamics questions."
- May 7-8 1969 - The fifth and final drop test of Apollo LM-2
The fifth and final drop test of LM-2 was made on May 7. The first four drop tests had been made to establish the proper functioning of all LM systems after a lunar landing. The fifth test was made to qualify the functioning of the pyrotechnics after landing. On May 8, the final test, physically separating the ascent stage, was conducted.

AS Mission	Vehicle Test Plan	Schedule Date
206	LEM-1	9-1-65
207	LEM-2	12-1-65
503	LEM-3	2-1-66
504	LEM-4	5-1-66
505	LEM-5	7-1-66
506	LEM-6	11-1-66

Apollo 207A Chronology

1965 Aug 10 - Schedule dates set for detailed Apollo LEM test plans
ASPO forwarded to Grumman the following schedule dates which should be used for submission of detailed vehicle test plans:
AS Mission Vehicle Test Plan Schedule Date
206 LEM-1 9-1-65
207 LEM-2 12-1-65
503 LEM-3 2-1-66
504 LEM-4 5-1-66
505 LEM-5 7-1-66
506 LEM-6 11-1-66
When determination of LEM test articles to be used on Missions 501 and 502 had been finalized, test plan dates would be forwarded. Current dates for 501 and 502 detailed vehicle test plans were 8-15-65 and 11-1-65, respectively.
- 1965 December 30-January 6 - Grumman and MSC reached agreement to continue with Freon for prelaunch cooling of Apollo LEM-1
Grumman and MSC reached agreement to continue with Freon for prelaunch cooling of LEM-1. By changing to a different Freon the additional heat sink capability was obtained with minor changes to flight hardware. The ground support equipment for supplying Freon had to be modified to increase the flow capability, but this was not expected to be difficult. Plans were to use the same prelaunch cooling capability for LEM-2 and LEM-3.
1966 Oct 12 - Apollo LM-1 not capable of manned flight
MSC Apollo Spacecraft Program Office Manager Joseph F. Shea reported that LM-1 would no longer be capable of both manned and unmanned flight and that it would be configured and checked out for unmanned flight only. In addition, LM-2 would no longer be capable of completely unmanned flight, but would be configured and checked out for partially manned flights, such as the planned AS-278A mission (with unmanned final depletion burn of the ascent stage) and AS-278B (with all main propulsions unmanned).
- 1967 April 20-26 - Fire in the Bell Apollo LM ascent engine test facility
A fire broke out in the Bell Aerosystems Test Facility, Wheatfield, N.Y., at 2:30 a.m. April 20. Early analysis indicated the fire was started by overpressurization of the ascent engine's propellant- conditioning system, which caused the system relief valve to dump propellant into an overflow bucket. The bucket in turn overflowed and propellant spilled onto the floor, coming into contact with a highly oxidized steel grating. Contact was believed to have initiated combustion and subsequently an intense, short-duration fire.
The fire began in the test facility building near the altitude chamber and fuel tanks and spread to the inside of the altitude chamber. Among the effects of the fire on the program were
1. about four weeks' requirement to repair the LM ascent engine test facility,
2. tests delayed accordingly, and
3. delay of the acceptance test of the LM-2 ascent engine.
On April 26, a small localized fire occurred in Test Cell No. 3G at the Bell Aerosystems Test Center in Porter, N.Y. Preliminary reports indicated that a LM ascent engine bipropellant valve had been tested as a valve injector assembly but was not connected to an injector at the time of the fire. This valve was being purged with nitrogen on the fuel side and water on the oxidizer side in preparation for flushing. A very small quantity of fuel had spilled from the valve during hookup to the flush stand. When the water started to flush through the oxidizer side, a loose connector allowed oxidizer to come in contact with the spilled fuel and the fire resulted. No one was injured; damage was estimated at $250.
ASPO Manager George Low received a message from NASA Hq. May 3 expressing concern that the two fires within one week might be symptomatic of inadequate test procedures and personnel training, which could lead to a more serious accident. Headquarters requested results of the investigations and notice of corrective action taken to prevent future incidents.
1967 Jun 23 - Apollo LM-1 wiring harness not accepted for manned flight
Although the LM-1 wiring harness had been accepted by the Customer Acceptance Readiness Review Board it was not clear that the harness would also have been accepted for manned flight, ASPO Manager George M. Low told Apollo Systems Engineering Assistant Chief R. W. Williams. Low asked Williams to assign someone to prepare a plan of actions needed to ensure that the harnesses in LM-2 and subsequent vehicles would be acceptable.
1967 Jul 25 - Apollo LM-2 options
MSC Director of Flight Operations Christopher C. Kraft, Jr., raised questions about lunar module number 2: Would it be possible for LM-2 to be a combined manned and unmanned vehicle; that is, have the capability to make an unmanned burn first and then be manned for additional activities? Would additional batteries in the LM provide greater flexibility for earth-orbital missions? Mission flexibility would be worthwhile only if it allowed deletion of a subsequent mission, at least on paper.
1967 Sep 26 - Flammability Test Review Board for Apollo LM M-6
The Flammability Test Review Board met at MSC to determine if the M-6 vehicle (a full-scale mockup of the LM cabin interior) was ready for test and that the ignition points, configuration, instrumentation, and test facility were acceptable for verifying the fire safety of LTA-8 and LM-2 vehicles. The Board agreed that the M-6 did accurately and adequately simulate the LTA-8 and the LM-2 and established that the M-6 mockup was ready for testing. The Board was composed of Robert R. Gilruth, Chairman; Carroll H. Bolender; Aleck C. Bond; Maxime A. Faget; Christopher C. Kraft, Jr.; Donald K. Slayton; A. Duane Catterson, all of MSC; E. Z. Gray of Grumman; and G. H. Stoner of Boeing, a nonvoting observer.
1967 Oct 2 - Apollo LM-2 and LM-3 flight alternatives
Apollo Program Director Samuel C. Phillips, NASA Hq., reaffirmed that the following was the best course of action to follow with LM-2 and LM-3 : "Decide now to configure LM-2 for its unmanned contingency mission and reassign LM-3 to join with CSM 103 for a manned CSM-LM mission. In the event the LM-2 unmanned contingency mission is not required, LM-2 could be reworked to manned configuration and cycled back into the GAEC (Grumman) line for later delivery. On this basis, LM-2 could be delivered in unmanned configuration in late January 1968, or immediately after the Apollo 5 flight, and could be flown on AS-206 about 3½ months after delivery; i.e., in May 1968. The outlook for LM-3 indicates an April 1968 delivery which appears to be compatible with the expected delivery date of CSM 103."
- 1967 Week Ending December 1 - Apollo LM testing meeting
A meeting on LM testing was held at Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corp., with Robert R. Gilruth and George M. Low, MSC; George Hage, OMSF; Hilliard Paige, General Electric Co.; and George Stoner, Boeing Co., in addition to Grumman personnel. After NASA reviewed the LM vibration environment and previous acceptance test decisions, Grumman recommended that complete vehicle vibration testing with externally mounted acoustic horns should be continued beyond LM-2; that wider use of thermovacuum testing at the component level be considered; and that the LM designated for the lunar landing mission be subjected to complete thermovacuum tests either at MSC or KSC.
MSC concluded that
1. for schedule purposes it would plan to continue complete vehicle acoustic testing after LM-2; however, implementation of this decision would depend on the results of the LM-2 testing;
2. MSC would reexamine the application of more widespread thermal testing at the component level; and
3. the Grumman proposal to subject the LM designated for the lunar mission to more testing than earlier manned flights was unacceptable. Past experience had shown that earlier vehicles should always have more testing than later ones.
1967 Dec 22 - First fire-in-the-hole Apollo LM test
The first fire-in-the-hole test was successfully completed at the White Sands Test Facility (WSTF). The vehicle test configuration was that of LM-2 and the test cell pressure immediately before the test was equivalent to a 68,850-meter altitude. All test objectives were satisfied and video tapes of TV monitors were acquired. Test firing duration was 650 milliseconds with zero stage separation.
1968 Jan 26 - Apollo LM-2 flight and requirement meeting
A LM-2 flight and requirement meeting was held at MSC, attended by key MSC and NASA Hq. officials. The group reached three conclusions:
1. The LM-1 performance on the January 22 Apollo 5 mission had been excellent for all conditions of the flight, as executed, with the exception of minor anomalies.
2. The LM-2 flight objectives that were partially accomplished could be better accomplished by further ground testing or on subsequent manned missions. Further unmanned flight testing was not required for man-rating purposes.
3. A LM-2 flight was not required to man-rate the ascent engine injector.
It was also agreed that a decision should be made not to fly the LM-2 mission, with this decision reversible if further evaluation of data from the LM-1 flight indicated any problems. This decision would be reviewed at the February 6 Manned Space Flight Management Council Meeting and on March 6 at the LM-3 Design Certification Review. The final decision would not be made until March 6.
1968 Feb 8 - Decision to forego a second unmanned Apollo LM flight using LM-2
Grumman President L. J. Evans wrote ASPO Manager George M. Low stating his agreement with NASA's decision to forego a second unmanned LM flight using LM-2. (Grumman's new position - the company had earlier strongly urged such a second flight - was reached after discussions with Low and LM Manager G. H. Bolender at the end of January and after flight data was presented at the February 6 meeting of the OMSF Management Council.) Although the decision was not irreversible, being subject to further investigations by both contractor and customer, both sides now were geared for a manned flight on the next LM mission.
However, Evans cited several spacecraft functions not covered during the LM-1 flight that would have to be demonstrated before attempting a lunar mission, notably control by the primary navigation and guidance system of the descent propulsion system burn as well as control of stage separation and firing of the ascent propulsion system. To demonstrate these functions fully, he said, some modifications in mission plans for the next two manned flights might be necessary.
1968 May 25 - Effects of launch vehicle "pogo" vibrations - on Apollo spacecraft studied
ASPO Manager George M. Low informed Apollo Program Director Samuel C. Phillips of recent MSC work on the effects of launch vehicle-induced oscillations - i.e., "pogo" vibrations - on the spacecraft and its subsystems. MSC had made two key personnel assignments in this area:
1. Rolf W. Lanzkron managed all MSC activities in connection with the space vehicle dynamic integrity problem; and
2. astronaut Charles M. Duke coordinated all MSC's efforts with related work at MSFC.
Low also cited a number of decisions in the hardware and testing areas. He had decided to use CM 002B, SM 105, and LM-2 for pogo dynamics testing. Other ground test hardware included LTA-3 for manned drop tests and for additional structural verification tests, CM 102 to verify parachute-imposed loads on the spacecraft structure, and CMs 014 and 102 for additional structural tests at North American Rockwell. In deciding upon uses for these and other spacecraft hardware items, MSC had assigned first priority to the ground test program, second to another potential unmanned Saturn V flight, and third to the dual launch capability.
- 1968 May - Alternative uses for the Apollo LM-2 vehicle recommended
NASA Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight George E. Mueller recommended to the Administrator several alternative uses for the LM-2 vehicle, since that spacecraft was no longer destined for flight. (The successful LM-1 flight during the Apollo 5 mission in January had obviated the need for a second such unmanned flight.) Mueller suggested that LM-2 be used for nondestructive tests and for documentary photography. Additional drop tests with the craft, he said, would enhance confidence in the strength of the LM to withstand the impact of landing on the moon, with all subsystems functioning. (The LM drop test program using Lunar Test Article 3, Mueller said, would verify the LM structure itself; however, LTA-3 contained no operational subsystems, wiring, or plumbing and therefore could not verify the total flight vehicle.) Among several other possible uses for the vehicle examined but rejected, Mueller cited modifying the craft into a manned configuration for Apollo or using it for an early Apollo Applications flight. LM-2 was unsuitable for both these alternatives, he stated, because of the extensive structural modifications needed to make it a flightworthy Apollo spacecraft - and the attendant disruption of vehicle flow within the Grumman production line - and because of the many fire-proofing changes that would be required. The launch vehicle (SA-206), LM adapter, and protective shroud were to be placed in storage for further Saturn tests if needed.
1968 Jul 11 - Changes in the Apollo LM vibration testing program
ASPO Manager Low informed Apollo Program Director Phillips of several changes in the LM vibration testing program. Before beginning the series of tests, he told Phillips, red line values were established on critical components that were not to be exceeded. However, because of the most recent test effort on LM-2, which resulted from the pogo problem experienced during the flight of Apollo 6, Low was forced to authorize vibration testing beyond the red line values initially set for the spacecraft. This action, in turn, forced an inspection and possible refurbishment of LM-2 to make it available for an unmanned flight, should such a second unmanned LM test mission be required. He then cited MSC's future plans for LM-2:
- For the planned drop tests with the vehicle, the upper decks would be inspected and repaired or replaced where necessary.
- Should a LM-2 flight become necessary, all of the descent stage upper decks would probably be replaced.
Phillips approved Low's action immediately. He urged Low to "continue to give priority to that work which is necessary for full and early resolution of the POGO and spacecraft structural dynamics questions."
- 1969 May 7-8 - The fifth and final drop test of Apollo LM-2
The fifth and final drop test of LM-2 was made on May 7. The first four drop tests had been made to establish the proper functioning of all LM systems after a lunar landing. The fifth test was made to qualify the functioning of the pyrotechnics after landing. On May 8, the final test, physically separating the ascent stage, was conducted.

AS Mission	Vehicle Test Plan	Schedule Date
206	LEM-1	9-1-65
207	LEM-2	12-1-65
503	LEM-3	2-1-66
504	LEM-4	5-1-66
505	LEM-5	7-1-66
506	LEM-6	11-1-66

Apollo 207A Chronology

1965 Aug 10 - Schedule dates set for detailed Apollo LEM test plans
ASPO forwarded to Grumman the following schedule dates which should be used for submission of detailed vehicle test plans:
AS Mission Vehicle Test Plan Schedule Date
206 LEM-1 9-1-65
207 LEM-2 12-1-65
503 LEM-3 2-1-66
504 LEM-4 5-1-66
505 LEM-5 7-1-66
506 LEM-6 11-1-66
When determination of LEM test articles to be used on Missions 501 and 502 had been finalized, test plan dates would be forwarded. Current dates for 501 and 502 detailed vehicle test plans were 8-15-65 and 11-1-65, respectively.
- 1965 December 30-January 6 - Grumman and MSC reached agreement to continue with Freon for prelaunch cooling of Apollo LEM-1
Grumman and MSC reached agreement to continue with Freon for prelaunch cooling of LEM-1. By changing to a different Freon the additional heat sink capability was obtained with minor changes to flight hardware. The ground support equipment for supplying Freon had to be modified to increase the flow capability, but this was not expected to be difficult. Plans were to use the same prelaunch cooling capability for LEM-2 and LEM-3.
1966 Oct 12 - Apollo LM-1 not capable of manned flight
MSC Apollo Spacecraft Program Office Manager Joseph F. Shea reported that LM-1 would no longer be capable of both manned and unmanned flight and that it would be configured and checked out for unmanned flight only. In addition, LM-2 would no longer be capable of completely unmanned flight, but would be configured and checked out for partially manned flights, such as the planned AS-278A mission (with unmanned final depletion burn of the ascent stage) and AS-278B (with all main propulsions unmanned).
- 1967 April 20-26 - Fire in the Bell Apollo LM ascent engine test facility
A fire broke out in the Bell Aerosystems Test Facility, Wheatfield, N.Y., at 2:30 a.m. April 20. Early analysis indicated the fire was started by overpressurization of the ascent engine's propellant- conditioning system, which caused the system relief valve to dump propellant into an overflow bucket. The bucket in turn overflowed and propellant spilled onto the floor, coming into contact with a highly oxidized steel grating. Contact was believed to have initiated combustion and subsequently an intense, short-duration fire.
The fire began in the test facility building near the altitude chamber and fuel tanks and spread to the inside of the altitude chamber. Among the effects of the fire on the program were
1. about four weeks' requirement to repair the LM ascent engine test facility,
2. tests delayed accordingly, and
3. delay of the acceptance test of the LM-2 ascent engine.
On April 26, a small localized fire occurred in Test Cell No. 3G at the Bell Aerosystems Test Center in Porter, N.Y. Preliminary reports indicated that a LM ascent engine bipropellant valve had been tested as a valve injector assembly but was not connected to an injector at the time of the fire. This valve was being purged with nitrogen on the fuel side and water on the oxidizer side in preparation for flushing. A very small quantity of fuel had spilled from the valve during hookup to the flush stand. When the water started to flush through the oxidizer side, a loose connector allowed oxidizer to come in contact with the spilled fuel and the fire resulted. No one was injured; damage was estimated at $250.
ASPO Manager George Low received a message from NASA Hq. May 3 expressing concern that the two fires within one week might be symptomatic of inadequate test procedures and personnel training, which could lead to a more serious accident. Headquarters requested results of the investigations and notice of corrective action taken to prevent future incidents.
1967 Jun 23 - Apollo LM-1 wiring harness not accepted for manned flight
Although the LM-1 wiring harness had been accepted by the Customer Acceptance Readiness Review Board it was not clear that the harness would also have been accepted for manned flight, ASPO Manager George M. Low told Apollo Systems Engineering Assistant Chief R. W. Williams. Low asked Williams to assign someone to prepare a plan of actions needed to ensure that the harnesses in LM-2 and subsequent vehicles would be acceptable.
1967 Jul 25 - Apollo LM-2 options
MSC Director of Flight Operations Christopher C. Kraft, Jr., raised questions about lunar module number 2: Would it be possible for LM-2 to be a combined manned and unmanned vehicle; that is, have the capability to make an unmanned burn first and then be manned for additional activities? Would additional batteries in the LM provide greater flexibility for earth-orbital missions? Mission flexibility would be worthwhile only if it allowed deletion of a subsequent mission, at least on paper.
1967 Sep 26 - Flammability Test Review Board for Apollo LM M-6
The Flammability Test Review Board met at MSC to determine if the M-6 vehicle (a full-scale mockup of the LM cabin interior) was ready for test and that the ignition points, configuration, instrumentation, and test facility were acceptable for verifying the fire safety of LTA-8 and LM-2 vehicles. The Board agreed that the M-6 did accurately and adequately simulate the LTA-8 and the LM-2 and established that the M-6 mockup was ready for testing. The Board was composed of Robert R. Gilruth, Chairman; Carroll H. Bolender; Aleck C. Bond; Maxime A. Faget; Christopher C. Kraft, Jr.; Donald K. Slayton; A. Duane Catterson, all of MSC; E. Z. Gray of Grumman; and G. H. Stoner of Boeing, a nonvoting observer.
1967 Oct 2 - Apollo LM-2 and LM-3 flight alternatives
Apollo Program Director Samuel C. Phillips, NASA Hq., reaffirmed that the following was the best course of action to follow with LM-2 and LM-3 : "Decide now to configure LM-2 for its unmanned contingency mission and reassign LM-3 to join with CSM 103 for a manned CSM-LM mission. In the event the LM-2 unmanned contingency mission is not required, LM-2 could be reworked to manned configuration and cycled back into the GAEC (Grumman) line for later delivery. On this basis, LM-2 could be delivered in unmanned configuration in late January 1968, or immediately after the Apollo 5 flight, and could be flown on AS-206 about 3½ months after delivery; i.e., in May 1968. The outlook for LM-3 indicates an April 1968 delivery which appears to be compatible with the expected delivery date of CSM 103."
- 1967 Week Ending December 1 - Apollo LM testing meeting
A meeting on LM testing was held at Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corp., with Robert R. Gilruth and George M. Low, MSC; George Hage, OMSF; Hilliard Paige, General Electric Co.; and George Stoner, Boeing Co., in addition to Grumman personnel. After NASA reviewed the LM vibration environment and previous acceptance test decisions, Grumman recommended that complete vehicle vibration testing with externally mounted acoustic horns should be continued beyond LM-2; that wider use of thermovacuum testing at the component level be considered; and that the LM designated for the lunar landing mission be subjected to complete thermovacuum tests either at MSC or KSC.
MSC concluded that
1. for schedule purposes it would plan to continue complete vehicle acoustic testing after LM-2; however, implementation of this decision would depend on the results of the LM-2 testing;
2. MSC would reexamine the application of more widespread thermal testing at the component level; and
3. the Grumman proposal to subject the LM designated for the lunar mission to more testing than earlier manned flights was unacceptable. Past experience had shown that earlier vehicles should always have more testing than later ones.
1967 Dec 22 - First fire-in-the-hole Apollo LM test
The first fire-in-the-hole test was successfully completed at the White Sands Test Facility (WSTF). The vehicle test configuration was that of LM-2 and the test cell pressure immediately before the test was equivalent to a 68,850-meter altitude. All test objectives were satisfied and video tapes of TV monitors were acquired. Test firing duration was 650 milliseconds with zero stage separation.
1968 Jan 26 - Apollo LM-2 flight and requirement meeting
A LM-2 flight and requirement meeting was held at MSC, attended by key MSC and NASA Hq. officials. The group reached three conclusions:
1. The LM-1 performance on the January 22 Apollo 5 mission had been excellent for all conditions of the flight, as executed, with the exception of minor anomalies.
2. The LM-2 flight objectives that were partially accomplished could be better accomplished by further ground testing or on subsequent manned missions. Further unmanned flight testing was not required for man-rating purposes.
3. A LM-2 flight was not required to man-rate the ascent engine injector.
It was also agreed that a decision should be made not to fly the LM-2 mission, with this decision reversible if further evaluation of data from the LM-1 flight indicated any problems. This decision would be reviewed at the February 6 Manned Space Flight Management Council Meeting and on March 6 at the LM-3 Design Certification Review. The final decision would not be made until March 6.
1968 Feb 8 - Decision to forego a second unmanned Apollo LM flight using LM-2
Grumman President L. J. Evans wrote ASPO Manager George M. Low stating his agreement with NASA's decision to forego a second unmanned LM flight using LM-2. (Grumman's new position - the company had earlier strongly urged such a second flight - was reached after discussions with Low and LM Manager G. H. Bolender at the end of January and after flight data was presented at the February 6 meeting of the OMSF Management Council.) Although the decision was not irreversible, being subject to further investigations by both contractor and customer, both sides now were geared for a manned flight on the next LM mission.
However, Evans cited several spacecraft functions not covered during the LM-1 flight that would have to be demonstrated before attempting a lunar mission, notably control by the primary navigation and guidance system of the descent propulsion system burn as well as control of stage separation and firing of the ascent propulsion system. To demonstrate these functions fully, he said, some modifications in mission plans for the next two manned flights might be necessary.
1968 May 25 - Effects of launch vehicle "pogo" vibrations - on Apollo spacecraft studied
ASPO Manager George M. Low informed Apollo Program Director Samuel C. Phillips of recent MSC work on the effects of launch vehicle-induced oscillations - i.e., "pogo" vibrations - on the spacecraft and its subsystems. MSC had made two key personnel assignments in this area:
1. Rolf W. Lanzkron managed all MSC activities in connection with the space vehicle dynamic integrity problem; and
2. astronaut Charles M. Duke coordinated all MSC's efforts with related work at MSFC.
Low also cited a number of decisions in the hardware and testing areas. He had decided to use CM 002B, SM 105, and LM-2 for pogo dynamics testing. Other ground test hardware included LTA-3 for manned drop tests and for additional structural verification tests, CM 102 to verify parachute-imposed loads on the spacecraft structure, and CMs 014 and 102 for additional structural tests at North American Rockwell. In deciding upon uses for these and other spacecraft hardware items, MSC had assigned first priority to the ground test program, second to another potential unmanned Saturn V flight, and third to the dual launch capability.
- 1968 May - Alternative uses for the Apollo LM-2 vehicle recommended
NASA Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight George E. Mueller recommended to the Administrator several alternative uses for the LM-2 vehicle, since that spacecraft was no longer destined for flight. (The successful LM-1 flight during the Apollo 5 mission in January had obviated the need for a second such unmanned flight.) Mueller suggested that LM-2 be used for nondestructive tests and for documentary photography. Additional drop tests with the craft, he said, would enhance confidence in the strength of the LM to withstand the impact of landing on the moon, with all subsystems functioning. (The LM drop test program using Lunar Test Article 3, Mueller said, would verify the LM structure itself; however, LTA-3 contained no operational subsystems, wiring, or plumbing and therefore could not verify the total flight vehicle.) Among several other possible uses for the vehicle examined but rejected, Mueller cited modifying the craft into a manned configuration for Apollo or using it for an early Apollo Applications flight. LM-2 was unsuitable for both these alternatives, he stated, because of the extensive structural modifications needed to make it a flightworthy Apollo spacecraft - and the attendant disruption of vehicle flow within the Grumman production line - and because of the many fire-proofing changes that would be required. The launch vehicle (SA-206), LM adapter, and protective shroud were to be placed in storage for further Saturn tests if needed.
1968 Jul 11 - Changes in the Apollo LM vibration testing program
ASPO Manager Low informed Apollo Program Director Phillips of several changes in the LM vibration testing program. Before beginning the series of tests, he told Phillips, red line values were established on critical components that were not to be exceeded. However, because of the most recent test effort on LM-2, which resulted from the pogo problem experienced during the flight of Apollo 6, Low was forced to authorize vibration testing beyond the red line values initially set for the spacecraft. This action, in turn, forced an inspection and possible refurbishment of LM-2 to make it available for an unmanned flight, should such a second unmanned LM test mission be required. He then cited MSC's future plans for LM-2:
- For the planned drop tests with the vehicle, the upper decks would be inspected and repaired or replaced where necessary.
- Should a LM-2 flight become necessary, all of the descent stage upper decks would probably be replaced.
Phillips approved Low's action immediately. He urged Low to "continue to give priority to that work which is necessary for full and early resolution of the POGO and spacecraft structural dynamics questions."
- 1969 May 7-8 - The fifth and final drop test of Apollo LM-2
The fifth and final drop test of LM-2 was made on May 7. The first four drop tests had been made to establish the proper functioning of all LM systems after a lunar landing. The fifth test was made to qualify the functioning of the pyrotechnics after landing. On May 8, the final test, physically separating the ascent stage, was conducted.

AS Mission	Vehicle Test Plan	Schedule Date
206	LEM-1	9-1-65
207	LEM-2	12-1-65
503	LEM-3	2-1-66
504	LEM-4	5-1-66
505	LEM-5	7-1-66
506	LEM-6	11-1-66

Apollo 207A Chronology

1965 Aug 10 - Schedule dates set for detailed Apollo LEM test plans
ASPO forwarded to Grumman the following schedule dates which should be used for submission of detailed vehicle test plans:
AS Mission Vehicle Test Plan Schedule Date
206 LEM-1 9-1-65
207 LEM-2 12-1-65
503 LEM-3 2-1-66
504 LEM-4 5-1-66
505 LEM-5 7-1-66
506 LEM-6 11-1-66
When determination of LEM test articles to be used on Missions 501 and 502 had been finalized, test plan dates would be forwarded. Current dates for 501 and 502 detailed vehicle test plans were 8-15-65 and 11-1-65, respectively.
- 1965 December 30-January 6 - Grumman and MSC reached agreement to continue with Freon for prelaunch cooling of Apollo LEM-1
Grumman and MSC reached agreement to continue with Freon for prelaunch cooling of LEM-1. By changing to a different Freon the additional heat sink capability was obtained with minor changes to flight hardware. The ground support equipment for supplying Freon had to be modified to increase the flow capability, but this was not expected to be difficult. Plans were to use the same prelaunch cooling capability for LEM-2 and LEM-3.
1966 Oct 12 - Apollo LM-1 not capable of manned flight
MSC Apollo Spacecraft Program Office Manager Joseph F. Shea reported that LM-1 would no longer be capable of both manned and unmanned flight and that it would be configured and checked out for unmanned flight only. In addition, LM-2 would no longer be capable of completely unmanned flight, but would be configured and checked out for partially manned flights, such as the planned AS-278A mission (with unmanned final depletion burn of the ascent stage) and AS-278B (with all main propulsions unmanned).
- 1967 April 20-26 - Fire in the Bell Apollo LM ascent engine test facility
A fire broke out in the Bell Aerosystems Test Facility, Wheatfield, N.Y., at 2:30 a.m. April 20. Early analysis indicated the fire was started by overpressurization of the ascent engine's propellant- conditioning system, which caused the system relief valve to dump propellant into an overflow bucket. The bucket in turn overflowed and propellant spilled onto the floor, coming into contact with a highly oxidized steel grating. Contact was believed to have initiated combustion and subsequently an intense, short-duration fire.
The fire began in the test facility building near the altitude chamber and fuel tanks and spread to the inside of the altitude chamber. Among the effects of the fire on the program were
1. about four weeks' requirement to repair the LM ascent engine test facility,
2. tests delayed accordingly, and
3. delay of the acceptance test of the LM-2 ascent engine.
On April 26, a small localized fire occurred in Test Cell No. 3G at the Bell Aerosystems Test Center in Porter, N.Y. Preliminary reports indicated that a LM ascent engine bipropellant valve had been tested as a valve injector assembly but was not connected to an injector at the time of the fire. This valve was being purged with nitrogen on the fuel side and water on the oxidizer side in preparation for flushing. A very small quantity of fuel had spilled from the valve during hookup to the flush stand. When the water started to flush through the oxidizer side, a loose connector allowed oxidizer to come in contact with the spilled fuel and the fire resulted. No one was injured; damage was estimated at $250.
ASPO Manager George Low received a message from NASA Hq. May 3 expressing concern that the two fires within one week might be symptomatic of inadequate test procedures and personnel training, which could lead to a more serious accident. Headquarters requested results of the investigations and notice of corrective action taken to prevent future incidents.
1967 Jun 23 - Apollo LM-1 wiring harness not accepted for manned flight
Although the LM-1 wiring harness had been accepted by the Customer Acceptance Readiness Review Board it was not clear that the harness would also have been accepted for manned flight, ASPO Manager George M. Low told Apollo Systems Engineering Assistant Chief R. W. Williams. Low asked Williams to assign someone to prepare a plan of actions needed to ensure that the harnesses in LM-2 and subsequent vehicles would be acceptable.
1967 Jul 25 - Apollo LM-2 options
MSC Director of Flight Operations Christopher C. Kraft, Jr., raised questions about lunar module number 2: Would it be possible for LM-2 to be a combined manned and unmanned vehicle; that is, have the capability to make an unmanned burn first and then be manned for additional activities? Would additional batteries in the LM provide greater flexibility for earth-orbital missions? Mission flexibility would be worthwhile only if it allowed deletion of a subsequent mission, at least on paper.
1967 Sep 26 - Flammability Test Review Board for Apollo LM M-6
The Flammability Test Review Board met at MSC to determine if the M-6 vehicle (a full-scale mockup of the LM cabin interior) was ready for test and that the ignition points, configuration, instrumentation, and test facility were acceptable for verifying the fire safety of LTA-8 and LM-2 vehicles. The Board agreed that the M-6 did accurately and adequately simulate the LTA-8 and the LM-2 and established that the M-6 mockup was ready for testing. The Board was composed of Robert R. Gilruth, Chairman; Carroll H. Bolender; Aleck C. Bond; Maxime A. Faget; Christopher C. Kraft, Jr.; Donald K. Slayton; A. Duane Catterson, all of MSC; E. Z. Gray of Grumman; and G. H. Stoner of Boeing, a nonvoting observer.
1967 Oct 2 - Apollo LM-2 and LM-3 flight alternatives
Apollo Program Director Samuel C. Phillips, NASA Hq., reaffirmed that the following was the best course of action to follow with LM-2 and LM-3 : "Decide now to configure LM-2 for its unmanned contingency mission and reassign LM-3 to join with CSM 103 for a manned CSM-LM mission. In the event the LM-2 unmanned contingency mission is not required, LM-2 could be reworked to manned configuration and cycled back into the GAEC (Grumman) line for later delivery. On this basis, LM-2 could be delivered in unmanned configuration in late January 1968, or immediately after the Apollo 5 flight, and could be flown on AS-206 about 3½ months after delivery; i.e., in May 1968. The outlook for LM-3 indicates an April 1968 delivery which appears to be compatible with the expected delivery date of CSM 103."
- 1967 Week Ending December 1 - Apollo LM testing meeting
A meeting on LM testing was held at Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corp., with Robert R. Gilruth and George M. Low, MSC; George Hage, OMSF; Hilliard Paige, General Electric Co.; and George Stoner, Boeing Co., in addition to Grumman personnel. After NASA reviewed the LM vibration environment and previous acceptance test decisions, Grumman recommended that complete vehicle vibration testing with externally mounted acoustic horns should be continued beyond LM-2; that wider use of thermovacuum testing at the component level be considered; and that the LM designated for the lunar landing mission be subjected to complete thermovacuum tests either at MSC or KSC.
MSC concluded that
1. for schedule purposes it would plan to continue complete vehicle acoustic testing after LM-2; however, implementation of this decision would depend on the results of the LM-2 testing;
2. MSC would reexamine the application of more widespread thermal testing at the component level; and
3. the Grumman proposal to subject the LM designated for the lunar mission to more testing than earlier manned flights was unacceptable. Past experience had shown that earlier vehicles should always have more testing than later ones.
1967 Dec 22 - First fire-in-the-hole Apollo LM test
The first fire-in-the-hole test was successfully completed at the White Sands Test Facility (WSTF). The vehicle test configuration was that of LM-2 and the test cell pressure immediately before the test was equivalent to a 68,850-meter altitude. All test objectives were satisfied and video tapes of TV monitors were acquired. Test firing duration was 650 milliseconds with zero stage separation.
1968 Jan 26 - Apollo LM-2 flight and requirement meeting
A LM-2 flight and requirement meeting was held at MSC, attended by key MSC and NASA Hq. officials. The group reached three conclusions:
1. The LM-1 performance on the January 22 Apollo 5 mission had been excellent for all conditions of the flight, as executed, with the exception of minor anomalies.
2. The LM-2 flight objectives that were partially accomplished could be better accomplished by further ground testing or on subsequent manned missions. Further unmanned flight testing was not required for man-rating purposes.
3. A LM-2 flight was not required to man-rate the ascent engine injector.
It was also agreed that a decision should be made not to fly the LM-2 mission, with this decision reversible if further evaluation of data from the LM-1 flight indicated any problems. This decision would be reviewed at the February 6 Manned Space Flight Management Council Meeting and on March 6 at the LM-3 Design Certification Review. The final decision would not be made until March 6.
1968 Feb 8 - Decision to forego a second unmanned Apollo LM flight using LM-2
Grumman President L. J. Evans wrote ASPO Manager George M. Low stating his agreement with NASA's decision to forego a second unmanned LM flight using LM-2. (Grumman's new position - the company had earlier strongly urged such a second flight - was reached after discussions with Low and LM Manager G. H. Bolender at the end of January and after flight data was presented at the February 6 meeting of the OMSF Management Council.) Although the decision was not irreversible, being subject to further investigations by both contractor and customer, both sides now were geared for a manned flight on the next LM mission.
However, Evans cited several spacecraft functions not covered during the LM-1 flight that would have to be demonstrated before attempting a lunar mission, notably control by the primary navigation and guidance system of the descent propulsion system burn as well as control of stage separation and firing of the ascent propulsion system. To demonstrate these functions fully, he said, some modifications in mission plans for the next two manned flights might be necessary.
1968 May 25 - Effects of launch vehicle "pogo" vibrations - on Apollo spacecraft studied
ASPO Manager George M. Low informed Apollo Program Director Samuel C. Phillips of recent MSC work on the effects of launch vehicle-induced oscillations - i.e., "pogo" vibrations - on the spacecraft and its subsystems. MSC had made two key personnel assignments in this area:
1. Rolf W. Lanzkron managed all MSC activities in connection with the space vehicle dynamic integrity problem; and
2. astronaut Charles M. Duke coordinated all MSC's efforts with related work at MSFC.
Low also cited a number of decisions in the hardware and testing areas. He had decided to use CM 002B, SM 105, and LM-2 for pogo dynamics testing. Other ground test hardware included LTA-3 for manned drop tests and for additional structural verification tests, CM 102 to verify parachute-imposed loads on the spacecraft structure, and CMs 014 and 102 for additional structural tests at North American Rockwell. In deciding upon uses for these and other spacecraft hardware items, MSC had assigned first priority to the ground test program, second to another potential unmanned Saturn V flight, and third to the dual launch capability.
- 1968 May - Alternative uses for the Apollo LM-2 vehicle recommended
NASA Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight George E. Mueller recommended to the Administrator several alternative uses for the LM-2 vehicle, since that spacecraft was no longer destined for flight. (The successful LM-1 flight during the Apollo 5 mission in January had obviated the need for a second such unmanned flight.) Mueller suggested that LM-2 be used for nondestructive tests and for documentary photography. Additional drop tests with the craft, he said, would enhance confidence in the strength of the LM to withstand the impact of landing on the moon, with all subsystems functioning. (The LM drop test program using Lunar Test Article 3, Mueller said, would verify the LM structure itself; however, LTA-3 contained no operational subsystems, wiring, or plumbing and therefore could not verify the total flight vehicle.) Among several other possible uses for the vehicle examined but rejected, Mueller cited modifying the craft into a manned configuration for Apollo or using it for an early Apollo Applications flight. LM-2 was unsuitable for both these alternatives, he stated, because of the extensive structural modifications needed to make it a flightworthy Apollo spacecraft - and the attendant disruption of vehicle flow within the Grumman production line - and because of the many fire-proofing changes that would be required. The launch vehicle (SA-206), LM adapter, and protective shroud were to be placed in storage for further Saturn tests if needed.
1968 Jul 11 - Changes in the Apollo LM vibration testing program
ASPO Manager Low informed Apollo Program Director Phillips of several changes in the LM vibration testing program. Before beginning the series of tests, he told Phillips, red line values were established on critical components that were not to be exceeded. However, because of the most recent test effort on LM-2, which resulted from the pogo problem experienced during the flight of Apollo 6, Low was forced to authorize vibration testing beyond the red line values initially set for the spacecraft. This action, in turn, forced an inspection and possible refurbishment of LM-2 to make it available for an unmanned flight, should such a second unmanned LM test mission be required. He then cited MSC's future plans for LM-2:
- For the planned drop tests with the vehicle, the upper decks would be inspected and repaired or replaced where necessary.
- Should a LM-2 flight become necessary, all of the descent stage upper decks would probably be replaced.
Phillips approved Low's action immediately. He urged Low to "continue to give priority to that work which is necessary for full and early resolution of the POGO and spacecraft structural dynamics questions."
- 1969 May 7-8 - The fifth and final drop test of Apollo LM-2
The fifth and final drop test of LM-2 was made on May 7. The first four drop tests had been made to establish the proper functioning of all LM systems after a lunar landing. The fifth test was made to qualify the functioning of the pyrotechnics after landing. On May 8, the final test, physically separating the ascent stage, was conducted.