CURRENT CRISIS AND MIGRATIONS IN THE FORMER USSR
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NATO ECONOMIC Colloqium,
30 June, 1 and 2 July 1993,
Brussels
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS IN COOPERATION PARTNER COUNTRIES
FROM A SECTORAL PERSPECTIVE
EVOLUTION DE LA SITUATION ECONOMIQUE DANS LES PAYS
PARTENAIRES DE LA COOPERATION DU POINT DE VUE SECTORIEL
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PANEL II
Economic Aspects of Demographic
Developments, Ethnic Tensions, Migration
Chair: Guillaume Parmentier, Assistant Director,
NATO Office of Information and Press
Panelists: Lajos Hothy
Panelists: Piotr Korcelli
Panelists: Oleg Shamshur
Panelists: Jonas Widgren
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CURRENT CRISIS AND MIGRATIONS IN THE FORMER USSR
Oleg Shamshur
I. Introduction
Contemporary migratory movements on the territory of the
Former Soviet Union (FSU) have been developing against the
background of the deepening economic and socio-political
crisis embracing - with varying intensity - all of the
Soviet successor states.
The migration "landscape" in this turbulent mega-area has
been undoubtedly dominated by increasing out-flow of
ethnic Russians and - in more general terms -
"Russian-speaking" population. These largely umbrella
definitions refer to the predominantly Slavic component of
an ethnically diverse, migrant at some stage of its recent
history, non-indigenous population. Its main common
denominator is the usage of the Russian language,
alongside more profound cultural dissimilarities with the
native, or titular, population of the newly emergent
states and - in the majority of cases - distinctive social
and demographic characteristics.
Numerical estimates of this major migratory movement fall
within the range between 400,000-500,000 (according to
official sources)(1) and two million persons on the
territory of Russia, the latter only quoted by independent
experts, who attribute this discrepancy to the fact that
government agencies take into account only registered
refugees.(2) It should be noted on this occasion that
objective analysis of the migration situation in the
FSU calls for differentiation between "refugees", "forced
migrants" and "regular" migrants, depending on
circumstances surrounding their out-movement, although the
actual "line" separating these categories of migrants in
the post-Soviet milieu is frequently very subtle.
An approximate idea of the prospective scope of the
"Russian-speaking" migration can be derived from a number
of sociological surveys. One of them, conducted among
ethnic Russians in the former Soviet republics in
January-May 1992, showed that 57% of respondents were
pessimistic about their future, 26.5% of them expressed
firm determination to leave the countries of their current
residence, whereas a mere 8.6% were equally determined to
stay.(3) Russian experts assess the current repatriation
potential as that of 800,000, two to three or four to six
million persons (minimal, intermediate or maximum
scenarios).(4)
Contrary to the common belief that the reasons for highly
intensified population movements in the FSU are nearly
self-evident, a more sophisticated analysis produces a
really multi-dimensional picture.
Alongside some basic similarities, including widespread
feelings of insecurity and persistent ethno-cultural
detachment of the greater part of the non-indigenous
population, migration patterns on the terrain of the FSU
have essential regional peculiarities. They have been
recently revealed by the study commissioned by Rand
covering both Russian, and mixed Russian, families
residing outside their homeland: their migration
intentions, for instance, varied to a considerable degree
- from 81% of all surveyed in Dushanbe (Tajikistan) to 14%
in Vilnius (Lithuania).(5) Regional differentiation
reflects INTER ALIA existence of differing "push models"
which have arisen in the principal areas of out-migration.
Escalating political instability, accompanied by outbreaks
of violence and inter-ethnic strife, appeared to be the
major migration generating force in Central Asia and the
Caucasus, as compared to the Baltic states where ethnic
tensions are concentrated in the domain of legal rights.
Ultimate migration decisions are, however, dependent upon
the inter-play of various factors, proving the complex
nature of the post-Soviet ethnic conflicts. The
multi-ethnic structure of practically all emergent civil
societies, coupled with the backfiring ethnic animosities
forcefully kept latent for so long, adds ethnic overtones
to almost all internal and inter-state conflicts. On the
other,hand, the ethnic factor PER SE generates critical
situations in different spheres of social life. Thus,
social, political and ethnic conflicts become closely
intertwined and interconnected, with no rigid boundaries
between them: they effectively influence and transform
each other.(6)
Within the general set of migration-forming factors the
impact of the socio-economic component seems to be
non-linear, as substantially the same factors can foster
or deter migration depending on the circumstances. High
social status of the "non-indigenous" professional, for
example, creates a migration dilemma: being more confident
of their qualifications and expertise, they might be prone
to move out, while their access to prestigious and
basically good paying jobs in the country of current
residence would keep them in place. Further deterioration
of economic indicators, both in donor and receiving
countries of the FSU, will exacerbate the situation,
promoting "spilling" of the FSU population exchanges over
its boundaries.(7)
Precarious economic circumstances, reinforced by internal
and external pressures, could raise the "temperature" of
inter-ethnic relations even in those parts of the FSU
which have been known for the relatively peaceful
developments in the field. This is the case of Ukraine,
where multivariant assessment of the situation should take
into account extant tensions, fueled by resentment on the
part of the ethnic Russian community over the loss of its
imperial status or the desire of certain public figures to
speed up ukrainization. The plausibility of the
confrontational scenario has been signalled by the recent
activization of political forces calling for a new
"reunification" with Russia or formation of a quasi-state
entity in the east of Ukraine. Aggravation of the
inter-ethnic situation would inevitably impact migratory
movements, not only in Ukraine with its largest Russian
diaspora in the world, but also in Russia which has a 4.4
million-strong ethnic Ukrainian population.(8) Potentially
this course of events - apart from causing immense human
suffering - would be detrimental to the economies of these
states, as both ethnic groups make up a noticeable part of
the skilled workforce and professionals in their "host"
countries (Ukrainian nationals, for example, are well
represented in the Russian oil and gas fields and gold
mining sector). The earlier exodus of the Slavic workers
and professionals caused a virtual shut-down of production
lines in some areas of Central Asia.
Following the worst scenario, a chain-reaction of
migration exchanges could produce new versions of the
notorious "ethnic cleansing", which actually happened long
before the Yugoslavian strife in the course of the
Armenian-Azeri conflict, when exchanges of refugees
between the two states totalled nearly 500,000 people. We
consider it essential to make this last remark because
continued, or even accelerated, "pressing out" of the
non-titular population can be expected to adversely
affect inter-ethnic relations in the "home states" to
which its constituent groups originally belonged.
Fugitives bringing with them their grievances, newly
acquired or reinforced animosities, might contribute to
the creation of a socio-psychological environment
conducive to a backlash aimed at "alien" ethnic groups,
comparable to the effect on French society of the "pieds
noirs".
This possibility goes far beyond purely theoretical
assumptions, in view of the incapability of the newly
independent states to tackle effectively repatriation
problems in a period of raging economic crisis. The
arrival of approximately two million Russian servicemen
and members of their families from Germany, Poland and the
Baltic states within a few years will add complexity to
this problem.(9)
The long-term prognosis of migratory movements within the
post-Soviet geo-political space envisages concentration of
the nations within their ethnic territories (state
entities). The number of Slavs in the former Soviet
republics could be expected to decrease by 15-30% by the
year 2016 (the ethnic Russian population outside Russia
could constitute 18-20 million people, as compared to 23.5
million in 1989). This, in spite of the general trend of
out-migration of the Central Asian and Caucasian peoples,
being caused by high birth rates and surplus of
low-skilled labour resources, which could grow from 5.7
(1989) up to eight to nine million people (2016).(10) This
highlights an instrumental role in achieving at least some
degree of regularization of population movements in the
FSU to be played by a common market in the area, based -
like its West European predecessor - on the free flow of
capital and labour resources. It has entered, however,
only the formative stage, with rather uncertain chances
for success.
II. Main Reasons For and Against Migration
Economic considerations have become increasingly important
in shaping migration flows directed outside the boundaries
of the FSU. On the contrary, ethnically motivated
migration is gradually losing its relative weight,
although the emigration of ethnic minorities having
external national homelands can be expected to continue.
Contrary to the "cold war" period, the scope of this
movement is likely to diminish numerically due to the
generally decreasing ratio (and even absolute numbers) of
these ethnic minorities within the populations of the
Soviet successor states. Shrinking ethnic migration
accounts for the sharp drop in emigration from the FSU
since the peak year of 1990 (from 103,700 to 88,600 in
1991 and 86,000 in 1992 - Russia; from 95,600 to 60,436 in
1991 and 44,161 in 1992 - Ukraine),(11) which came, as a
surprise to many observers. In the long-term perspective
ethnic emigration should become a component of the greater
migratory flow. The latter is only now taking shape,
following long-overdue emigration reform. The actual
dimensions and composition of this movement are yet to be
seen. It is safe to presume, however, that it will be
driven by primarily socio-economic reasons.
This assumption is supported by the results of the opinion
poll conducted in Ukraine by scholars from the Research
Institute of the Ministry of Economy, in 1993. It revealed
the following hierarchy of main "push" factors:
dissatisfaction with material living conditions (75.5% of
respondents), impossibility to realize one's abilities to
full extent (34.4%), concern for the future of children
(22.1%), unstable political situation (17.0%), ecological
reasons (5.6%), national discrimination (3.8%).(12)
Frustration with the economic situation was also
identified as a principal concern of 73% and 71% of
potential migrants in Russia and Ukraine, respectively, by
the study conducted by the International Organisation for
Migration.(13)
These results can hardly be termed as surprising under the
conditions of the deteriorating performance of the FSU_s
economies (GNP and industrial production of the CIS
member-states decreased by 27% and 25%, respectively,
compared to 1989), double-digit inflation, living
standards hitting the bottom and creating enormous
societal strain.
This grim picture is inevitably complemented by the advent
of unemployment virtually non-existent - in its "classic"
form - in the centrally-planned economic system. Present
unemployment figures are quite far from being alarming by
Western standards: according to the Federal Employment
Service of Russia, the number of officially registered
unemployed reached the 1.070 million mark in the first
half of 1993,(14) while the corresponding figure for
Ukraine in September 1993, reported by the sources within
the Cabinet of Ministers, was about 160,000.(15) It could
be, however, safely presumed that these figures would
increase in the process of restructuring of the
post-Soviet economies. Not surprisingly the most adversely
affected categories of labour force now are the employees
of the military enterprises undergoing conversion and
those in the process of privatization, as well as
graduates. The situation is aggravated by the
psychological unpreparedness of the population to face
nascent market realities and low, so far, efficiency of
the government employment agencies. Nevertheless,
unemployment is likely to influence migratory processes
mostly on the level of migration intentions and creation
of the corresponding psychological environment. With the
exception of experts in military production, the
unemployed would hardly attract the attention of foreign
employers outside the "black market" of the labour force.
The ecological crisis constitutes another significant
migration-forming factor in the FSU. The aftermath of
Chernobyl is the core of the problem: according to some
recent estimates 22.8 million people reside in the areas
polluted by radio-active elements in Ukraine, Belarus and
Russia.(16) Extreme economic difficulties, virtual absence
of a housing market and seemingly diminished international
commitment leave little hope for organized transplantation
of the population directly affected by the disaster (in
Ukraine the programme of resettlement had to be reduced
twice) or for improved health care and environmental
conditions for those in need. Moreover Chernobyl is only a
part of the comprehensive technological crisis in the FSU
which has turned into ecological disaster areas 17 regions
of Russia and the greater part of main industrial centres
in Ukraine and other successor states. Feelings of
desperation experienced by their residents could easily be
transformed into migration flows directed to safer havens
in the FSU or abroad.
The actual scope and character of post-Soviet emigration
at its present stage cannot be realistically (though
inevitably tentatively) appraised without relating obvious
"push" factors to deterrents of this process - both
of internal, and external nature. Internal "check" factors
comprise relatively low individual mobility in the FSU,
the social and psychological complexity of the process of
taking the eventual decision to migrate, insufficiency of
professional and language qualifications of the bulk of
the potential migrants, and finally, lack of the
appropriate infrastructure providing migrants with
adequate services.
External deterrents include restrictive immigration
policies of the host countries, especially conspicuous in
Europe, objective limits of their absorptive capacities,
unfavourable long-term developments on the labour market
oriented towards mobilizing domestic supply(17) and
leaving few niches for potential migrants from the FSU,
mostly on the fringes of the labour market - either in
occupations demanding high skills, or in menial, low-paid
jobs.
III. Conclusion: Prognosis
Taking into consideration all interacting factors we would
presume that modern migration from the FSU, unless
affected by emergencies or accelerated deterioration of
the current socio-economic trends, would develop along the
following lines:
- THE VOLUME OF LEGAL LONG-TERM MIGRATION would not
greatly increase, largely corresponding to the average
migration rates of the European countries. The migration
pool of the successor states of the European part of the
former USSR will be limited, due to negative demographic
developments;
- THE STRUCTURE OF THIS MIGRATION FLOW would be dominated
by professionals and highly skilled workers with fairly
good chances to fit modern labour markets in the West and
in new eastern industrial countries;
- INTENSIVE SHORT-TERM MIGRATIONS to the neighbouring
countries in Europe and Asia, entailing a considerable
amount of illegal employment, could be expected to
continue, although they can also suffer from the
tightening of European border controls and fluctuations of
economic situation.
The years 1993 and 1994 are to become the crucial years
for the cause of reforms in the former USSR. Resolution of
the internal crisis in its successor states would also
determine general trends and already salient regional
specifics of the migration situation.
Notes
1. Summary of World Broadcasts, 5 October 1992, SU/1503
B/7.
2. Kennan Institute of Advanced Russian Studies, Meeting
Report, Vol. 7, N10.
3. Sillaste G., Russians in the near foreign lands in:
Sotsiologicheskiye issledovaniya, N12, 1992, pp. 46-47.
4. Komsomolskaya, Pravda, 4 June 1993; Migration of the
Russian Population to Russia, Moscow, 1992, p. 10.
5. Vitkovskaya G., Russians in the newly independent
ex-Soviet republics: migratory behaviour, Moscow, 1993,
pp. 22-23.
6. Tishkov V., On the nature of ethnic conflict in:
Svobodnaya mysl, N4, 1993, p. 5.
7. Vitkovskaya G., Op. cit., p. 33.
8. Narodne Gospodarstvo Ukrayinskoyi RSR u 1990 rotsi,
Kiev, 1991, p. 33.
9. Polyakov A., Labour emigration from the former USSR -
challenge for the European labour markets and
cooperation. Paper presented for the European Labour
Market conference, Glasgow, 1992, p. 3.
10. Topilin A., Influence of migration on ethno-national
structure in: Sotsiologicheskiye issledovaniya, N7,
1992, pp. 31-43.
11. Conference of European Statisticians, Geneva, February
1993, Working paper N5; Communication of the Ministry
of Internal Affairs of Ukraine.
12. Shlepakov A., Malinovska O., Pinchuk O., Emigration of
the population of Ukraine: socio-economic aspects and
possible consequences, Kiev, 1993, p. 5-6.
13. International Organisation for Migration. Profiles and
motives of potential migrants, Geneva, 1993, p.178.
14. Argumenty i fakty, N25, June 1993.
15. Ukrinform communication, 29 September 1993.
16. Omelyanets N., Torbin V., Medical consequences of the
accident at Chernobyl NEP. Information bulletin, Kiev,
1991.
17. Salt J., The future of international labour migration
in: International Migration Review, 1993
(forthcoming).
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First edition 1993
ISBN 92-845-0079-6
This is the latest in a series bringing together papers
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Economics Directorate and Office of Information and Press
on economic issues in the former USSR and Central and
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