RUSSIA: COUNTRY COMMERCIAL GUIDE


VII. INVESTMENT CLIMATE

Openness to Foreign Investment

While the policy of the Russian government is to encourage foreign investment, it has had difficulties in creating a stable and attractive investment climate. Economic and political uncertainty serve as disincentives to companies looking for investment opportunities. Although there are no significant legal barriers to doing business in Russia, the absence of sufficiently developed civil, commercial and criminal codes is a major constraint. In addition, a confusing tax system, and a rise in violent "mafia" instigated crime have become a problem for foreign (and Russian) business. Bureaucratic requirements can be confusing and burdensome to investors and bureaucratic discretion may be capricious in awarding tenders or development rights to companies. Ownership of real property is still being legislated, and violations of intellectual property are serious and on the rise. A deteriorated infrastructure adds to the difficulties of doing business -- telephones, roads and transport are all of poor quality. Corruption in commercial transactions has become a major issue in the last several years.

Despite the problems detailed in this report, most U.S. companies in Russia believe that opportunities justify the risks, uncertainties and considerable bureaucratic obstacles. Few established foreign companies are leaving and many continue to demonstrate an interest in Russia's rich geological and human resources, world-class high-technology and vast potential market.

Russia enacted an investment law in 1991 which defines the permissible forms of foreign investments as well as the rights and obligations of the government and investors. Also in force are laws on enterprises, on joint stock companies and on the privatization of national assets, as well as various presidential decrees. In 1994 the government was preparing for review by the legislature draft laws on concessions, free enterprise zones, production sharing (for oil exploitation) and a revision of the 1991 investment code.

The 1991 Investment Code defines foreign investors as foreign legal entities, citizens, states or international bodies. Foreign investments may be made in all kinds of property (including intellectual), or placed in entrepreneurial projects and other activities to derive profit. Investments may be in the form of wholly-owned companies, joint ventures, portfolio investment or in (limited) rights to use land or other natural resources.

Russian foreign investment regulations regarding permissible activities, prior authorization and notification requirements are confusing and contradictory. The Ministry of Finance, local authorities and/or various central government bodies all register foreign investments. Prior approval is required for investment in new enterprises using assets of existing Russian enterprises, foreign investment in defense industries (which may be prohibited in some cases), investment in the exploitation of natural resources, all investments over 50 million rubles, investment ventures in which the foreign share exceeds50 percent, or investment to take over incomplete housing and construction projects. Additional registration requirements exist for investments exceeding 100 million rubles. Projects of foreign enterprises may also be subject to expert examination for ecological considerations or where a large-scale construction or modernization is envisaged.

The 1991 Investment Code guarantees foreign investors rights not less favorable than those of Russian investors.

The Russian post voucher (cash) privatization program adopted by presidential decree in July of 1994 explicitly grants foreign investors the right to participate in auctions and tenders and to purchase shares in privatized firms, although the Ministry of Finance must be informed of such action. Some restrictions do apply. For example, the federal government can limit foreign access to enterprises in strategic sectors such as defense, the energy sector, mining and minerals, transportation and communications. However, the federal government plans to exempt entirely a list of firms engaged in the sale or production of "strategic commodities and products" from further privatization at least for the remainder of 1995. Federal State Property Committee (GKI) Chairman Belyayev has repeatedly stated that foreign investors will play a key role in cash privatization and that they will be given national treatment. Belyayev recently said that foreigners purchased 10 percent of all shares offered during the first (voucher) phase of privatization in Russia and that a higher level of foreign participation is desirable in the cash phase. GKI reports that although Russian law does not yet allow foreigners to own land, foreign investors can take majority ownership in enterprises which own land. The first such example has recently taken place in St. Petersburg. As to municipal and oblast level enterprises, the local state property committees and administrations have substantial autonomy and foreign investors will need to work closely with such authorities.

Traditionally, all research and development in Russia was financed by the government and occurred in government-owned or controlled institutes and organizations. The entire system is now in a state of transition. The government is providing considerably less funding for research that in the past and individual institutions are actively soliciting international participation in research projects (although some of the projects in which American firms have begun active cooperation still receive significant Russian government funding). The legal basis for such cooperation is not yet firmly established, however, and the rights and obligations of all private parties (foreign or Russian) participating in government sponsored or subsidized research and development are spelled out in the specific contract and agreements reached by the parties involved.

Russian law offers few incentives to foreign investors. Those set out in the 1991 investment law, including certain tax benefits, have never been implemented, or have been largely eliminated or superseded by subsequent laws and decrees.

Russia is well along in reforming its foreign trade regime in line with market standards. Very few non-tariff elements remain. The country has applied for accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), has submitted a memorandum of foreign trade regime, and is preparing for the first meeting of its working group scheduled in 1995.

Russia has raised import tariffs in several stages beginning from zero when the Soviet Union collapsed. In July 1994 import duties were raised across the board, increasing the average weighted tariff to 11 percent from 7-8 percent, with some duties reaching 50 percent. In March 1995, by presidential decree, these rates were revised to raise the floor (except for a reduced list of zero-duty goods) to five percent and lower the ceiling (except for a few luxury goods) to 30 percent; this raised the average weighted tariff further to 15-16 percent. A 1995 presidential decree provided for reducing or waiving import duties for investment projects of USD 100 million or more of which at least USD 10 million is direct foreign investment.

Inherited Soviet-era qualitative restrictions on imports were initially limited to security and health requirements, but Russia's July 1993 customer protection law stipulated official certification (by GOSSTANDART) of imported products for conformity to Russian technical, safety, health and quality standards. Requirements are still evolving, and are based on a combination of international (mostly European Union) and Russian standards. U.S. companies have complained of costly procedures and arbitrary certification requirements. A joint Russian-U.S. communique of December 1993 pledges cooperation on improving and simplifying certification, testing and quality assurance. Russia is establishing reciprocal standardization with the U.S. and with other countries and is reciprocally accepting foreign certification by accredited institutions. Import licenses are required on the normal range of dangerous and harmful materials and goods.

The U.S. Government has imposed antidumping duties on Russian ferrosilicon (June 1993), titanium sponge (August 1992), and urea (June 1992). Investigations are underway concerning alleged dumping of Russian pure magnesium, ferrovanadium and nitrided vanadium. Antidumping duties imposed on Russian uranium in 1992 were suspended in 1993 in exchange for a matched sales agreement.

Banking operations in Russia by foreigners, though improved, remain problematic. A November 1993 presidential decree imposed a two-year moratorium on foreign bank operations with Russian residents. This decree conflicted with a September 1993 decree sheltering foreign investors from adverse legal changes for three years and violated the principle of nonretroactivity of law since it applied to foreign banks licensed in october 1993. A June 1994 decree eased the November 1993 restrictions for existing European banks and an April 1995 decree lifted the restrictions on the two existing American banks. A pending Duma bill "On Banks and Banking Activity" contains a statute that extends until January 1, 1996, a moratorium on foreign banks' dealing with Russian residents, and introduces the policy of reciprocity for any foreign bank seeking to obtain an operating license.

The banking bill also allows Russian authorities to set limits on the total amount of foreign banking capital as a percentage of overall banking capital. Currently, that limit stands at 12 percent, and the capital of all operating foreign banks is considerably below this figure. The Russian insurance industry is also lobbying for protection. Increasingly, foreign insurance companies may follow the example of a major American insurance firm, which entered the market via a 50/50 joint venture with a large Russian bank. Measures to limit foreign attorneys not licensed in Russia from providing legal counsel on Russian laws have had little effect on the foreign law firms, which continue to rely largely on foreign lawyers.

Major changes have occurred in the oil and gas sector during the past 12 months. In October 1994, seven foreign joint ventures obtained oil export tax exemptions for three years for the purpose of capital recoupment. An additional seven joint ventures received exemptions in February 1995 on similar terms, while another group of companies hopes to have its request approved by the end of June 1995. The benefit to the companies, however, may prove ephemeral, as the government has announced that it will eliminate the export tax altogether by the end of 1995, replacing it with an excise tax on production to which exemptions may not apply. In the meantime, the export tax has been reduced from 30 to 23 ecus, with another decrease to 20 ecus expected in June 1995.

In February 1995 President Yeltsin signed into law a bill amending the 1992 sub-surface resources law. The amendments make it easier to obtain and transfer oil and gas production and exploration licenses, and substitute more modest royalties for the 10 percent mineral replacement tax. In June 1995, the Duma passed legislation which would allow foreign oil companies to enter into production sharing contracts rather than rely exclusively on existing joint venture provisions in the foreign investment law; this legislation awaited the approval of the Federation Council and the President at the time this report was written.

Another important development was the elimination of oil export quotas in January 1995. Producers are now allowed to export their oil without prior approval from the Ministry of Foreign Relations. Nevertheless, their ability to do so remains subject to their allocation of access rights to the oil pipeline system by the Ministry of Fuel and Energy and the state-owned pipeline company Transneft. Under current rules, this means that roughly one-third of a company's production is given access to pipelines serving hard currency export markets. Those established joint ventures which qualified for oil export tax exemptions have been given priority access to the pipeline system for the entirety of their production.

Conversion and Transfer Policies

Russia has a unified exchange rate which floats, based on a daily Moscow Interbank Currency Exchange auction where the Central Bank intervenes to smooth fluctuations. In practice the Central Bank exerts considerable influence on the rate as it collects and resells most of Russia's export earnings.

The ruble is fully convertible within Russia and CIS countries which remain in the ruble zone. There are currently no restrictions on profit repatriation. In January 1994 commercial banks became responsible for monitoring the repatriation of export earnings.

Foreign and domestic companies may acquire, hold and sell foreign exchange freely, though hard currency cash transactions for goods and services within Russia are prohibited. Russian enterprises are required to convert 50 percent of foreign currency earnings into rubles by selling such currency on either the currency market or to the Central Bank of Russia.

Without special permission it is illegal for Russian companies or citizens to maintain a bank account outside of Russia for purposes other than operating expenses. Licenses are required for offshore accounts and can be difficult to obtain. Non-residents can open individual and commercial ruble accounts for servicing import/export operations (referred to as "T-accounts") and for investment (referred to as "I-accounts"). However, ruble balances in T-accounts many not be converted back to U.S. dollars.

Expropriation and Compensation

The 1991 Investment Code prohibits the nationalization of foreign investments except following legislative action and where deemed to be in the national interest. Such nationalizations may be appealed to the courts of the Russian federation, and are to be paid with prompt, adequate and effective compensation.

While the domestic political situation remains ambiguous, the current central leadership is unlikely to nationalize foreign investment or engage in expropriation. However, local government interference in several cases appears tantamount to expropriation; arbitration or legal proceedings are pending in some of these cases.

Dispute Settlement

Russia has a body of conflicting, overlapping and rapidly changing laws, decrees and regulations which has resulted in an ad hoc and unpredictable approach to doing business. Independent dispute resolution in Russia is difficult to obtain; the judicial system is poorly developed. Regional and local courts are not accustomed to adjudicating either commercial or international matters, and they (as well as courts in Moscow) are often subject to political pressure.

Most western attorneys still refer their western clients who have investment or trade disputes in Russia to international arbitration in Stockholm or to courts abroad. However, a foreign arbitration award can only be enforced in Russia if there is a reciprocal treaty between Russia and the country where the order was made, or, if no such treaty exists, if a Russian court reviews the procedures which led to the granting of the award and agrees that it was properly made and can be enforced.

It is therefore worth considering the alternatives available in Russia. One choice is the Arbitration Court of the Russian Federation, which is part of the court system. It has special procedures for seizure of property before trial, so property cannot be disposed of before the court has heard the claim, as well as for the enforcement of financial awards through the banks. Additionally, the International Commercial Arbitration Court at the Russian Chamber of Commerce and Industry will hear claims if both parties agree to refer disputes there. Applications can be made by parties to foreign trade agreements and by companies with foreign investments.

The weakness in the system is the lack of differentiation in outcomes. All awards and orders are enforced by the officials of the district court whose procedures have not been modernized to take account of changes in business. There is hope that a draft law on enforcement will result in more effective litigation.

Russia is a member of the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes and accepts binding international arbitration.

Performance Requirements

Performance requirements are not imposed by Russian law, and are not widely included as part of private contracts. However, they have appeared in the agreements of large multinational companies investing in natural resources.

Investors are not required to disclose proprietary information to the Russian government as part of the regulatory process.

Right to Private Ownership and Establishment

Both foreign and domestic legal entities may establish, purchase and dispose of businesses in Russia. Investment in those sectors, affecting the national security (insurance, banking, natural resources) may be limited.

Protection of Property Rights

The constitution and a presidential decree issued in 1993 give Russian citizens general rights to own, inherit, lease, mortgage, and sell real property; however,legislative gaps and ambiguities impede the general exercise of these rights. Russia does not yet have a land code to regulate land use and ownership. Thus far, Russian law and practice appear to restrict or prohibit foreigners from owning real estate. The presidential decree of 1993 gave joint ventures with foreign participants the right to own real property, and a privatization decree issued last summer permitted foreign owners of privatized companies to receive title to enterprise land; however, such rights have not been codified and legislation regulating land use currently being considered by the Duma would likely prohibit foreigners from owning land. The rights of Russian citizens to own and sell residential, recreational, and garden plots is clearly established with over 40 million properties of this type under private ownership. However, uncertainty about more general rights to land title and mineral rights will persist until the Duma adopts clear and comprehensive legislation to regulate land use and ownership.

In 1992-93 Russia enacted laws strengthening the protection of patents, trademarks and appellations of origins, and copyright of semiconductors, computer programs, literary, artistic and scientific works, and audio/visual recordings.

The Patent Law, which accords with the norms of the World Intellectual Property Organization, includes a grace period, procedures for deferred examination, protection for chemical and pharmaceutical products, and national treatment for foreign patent holders. Inventions are protected for 20 years, industrial designs for 10 years, and utility models for five years. One must wait four years before applying for a compulsory license. The Law on Trademarks and Appellation of Origins introduces for the first time in Russia protection of appellation of origins and provides for automatic recognition of Soviet trademarks upon presentation of the Soviet certificate of registration.

The Law on Copyright and Neighboring Rights, enacted in August 1993, protects all forms of artistic creation, including audio/visual recordings and computer programs as literary works for the lifetime of the author plus 50 years and is compatible with the Bern Convention. The September 1992 Law on Topography of Integrated Microcircuits, which also protects computer programs, protects semiconductor topographies for 10 years from the date of registration.

Russia has acceded to the Universal Copyright Convention, the Paris Convention, the Bern Convention, the Patent Cooperation Treaty, the Geneva Phonogram Convention, and the Madrid Agreement. Under the U.S.-Russian Bilateral Investment Treaty (not yet ratified by the Russian side) Russia has undertaken to protect investors' intellectual property rights. The U.S.-Russia Bilateral Trade Agreement mandates protection of the normal range of literary, scientific and artistic works through legislation and enforcement.

While the Russian government has successfully passed good laws on protection of intellectual property, enforcement of those laws has been a low priority. Russian authorities are engaged in a comprehensive revision of the Russian criminal and civil codes, including sections pertaining to intellectual property rights which would provide strengthened penalties, the establishment of specialized courts, particularly a patent court, with trained and experienced judges and attorneys, and trained police and customs officers. Until these measures become reality, however, there is widespread marketing of pirated U.S. (and other) video-cassettes, recordings, books, computer software, clothes and toys. Losses to manufacturers, authors and others are estimated to be in the hundreds of millions of dollars.

The Russian Intellectual Property Agency, established in 1992 with direct accountability to the Russian president, was given responsibility to develop and coordinate state intellectual property policy, promote copyright protection, and collect and distribute royalties. It was replaced in October 1993 by the revived Russian Authors Organization (RAO), asemi-of ficial agency combining supervisory functions with advocacy of authors' commercial interests. Rospatent is the official body responsible for registration and protection of patents and trademarks.

Regulatory System: Laws and Procedures

The legal system in Russia is in a state of flux, with various parts of government struggling to create new laws on a broad array of topics. In this environment negotiations and contracts for commercial transactions are complex and protracted. Russia has implemented only part of its new commercial code and investors must carefully research all aspects of Russian law to ensure that each contract conforms with Russian law and embodies the basic provisions of the new, and where still valid, old codes. Contracts must likewise seek to protect the foreign partner against contingencies which often arise. Keeping up with legislative changes and presidential decrees is a daunting task. Uneven implementation of laws creates further complications; various officials, branches of government and jurisdictions interpret and apply regulations with little consistency and the decisions of one may be overruled or contested by another. In addition, while a foreign investor may win a favorable decision from a Russian court, enforcement of judgments is problematic.

Legal requirements may be less burdensome than reaching final agreement with local political and economic authorities; registration can be a lengthy, bureaucratic process, particularly where natural resources or defense production are involved. Corruption is widespread and the fears of some Russian officials that foreigners will purchase Russian assets at below-market rates can impede bureaucratic approval.

The Russian government is in the process of establishing a procurement regime. So far that regime consists of a single law passed in December 1994 and several implementing regulations currently in preparation. Russian officials have sought to make the law compatible with WTO standards and note that it does not prevent market access by foreign enterprises. However, it also gives preference to domestic suppliers and allows the federal government to dictate supply in certain cases. Officials also say that Russia is considering signing the WTO procurement code as part of WTO accession.

A major complaint of foreign business is the tax system, in particular the number of taxes, the stability of the system, transparency and due process. Russia imposes numerous taxes including profits, excess wage, dividend,withholding, payroll, road use, property, VAT, import and export tariffs, excise and local taxes. These taxes may total more than a company's profit - proving a very real disincentive to both Russian and foreign businesses. In addition to high rates, taxes have been changed frequently and radically, often with no warning and sometimes with retroactive effect. Businesses are unable to rely on a particular tax regime and may suddenly find themselves unable to make a profit. Finally, businesses complain about the lack of due process -tax penalties are high and do not distinguish between inadvertent and criminal errors and the appeals process is cumbersome. The Duma is beginning to address these problems. It passed a new profits bill, signed into law, which repeals the excess wage tax beginning January 1, 1996. In mid-1995 the Duma was deliberating changes to the basic tax law to address the due process, stability and transparency problems. Finally, the Finance Ministry in 1995 was drafting a basic tax code which should be introduced into the Duma in the fall of 1995 and take effect in 1997.

Efficient Capital Markets and Portfolio Investment

Although undervalued Russian companies are attractive for outside and domestic investors, significant problems currently inhibit the full development of the market. Barriers to portfolio investment include an uncertain tax structure, licensing requirements for investment by non-residents, and the uncertain shape of the political landscape in the next year. In the spring of 1995, a little-known federal service for currency and export control revived an obscure 1992 measure requiring licenses for hard currency foreign portfolio investment. Another major problem area is undeveloped market infrastructure, which complicates the settlement and clearing of trades. Shareholder rights violations also negatively affect the investment climate and depress the market for shares of Russia's privatized enterprises. Corporate governance in general is a major issue, as enterprise directors regularly disregard the rights and interests of outside investors. A joint-stock companies bill was drafted in 1994 and the Duma approved it in the first reading in June 1995.

Nevertheless, major portfolio investors are eyeing the Russian market with anticipation. A Federal Commission on Securities and Capital Markets was created in November 1994 to oversee market regulation. In May 1995, the Duma passed a long-awaited bill on the securities market; the bill may be signed into law by President Yeltsin by mid-summer 1995. Investors are also encouraged by the recent establishment of western-style registrars and custody services, and the entry into the Russian market of major western market players.

Political Violence

The political climate in Moscow is currently stable but unpredictable over the medium to long term. After the violent political confrontation of late 1993, politics have returned to the floor of the legislature and the offices of government. Political demonstrations remain modest in size and generally peaceful. Although the February 1994 amnesty of the leaders of the October 1993 violence in Moscow reintroduced into the political system a number of forceful individuals, for the most part they have sought to achieve their agendas through peaceful means. The war in Chechnya, which began in December 1994, raised fears of terrorism by the Chechen diaspora, especially in Moscow. By mid-1995 there had been one such incident, the taking of a thousand Russian hostages in the southern town of Budyonnovsk.

Crime has become one of the most frequently cited concerns of foreign (and Russian) business, particularly those involved with large amounts of cash and goods. While organized crime is not new to Russia, recent years have seen an increase in the range and frequency of criminal activity. Unfortunately, legal and judicial reforms have not kept pace with criminal advances. Much crime is tied to commercial activity, with one half of all entrepreneurs in a recent survey reporting that they must pay kickbacks and protection to stay in business. Failure to make these payments can be fatal and may generally prove a disincentive to the creation of new businesses. President Yeltsin and his government acknowledge that crime and corruption are major problems and have asked the Duma to speed adoption of needed legislation. Meanwhile, Prime Minister Chernomyrdin announced that the government will spend two trillion rubles to fight crime in 1994-95, and adopt tougher measures against official corruption.

BITs

Russia inherited from the Soviet Union Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) with Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg, Great Britain, Germany, Italy, Spain, Canada, the People's Republic of China, Korea, the Netherlands, Finland, France, and Switzerland. In 1995 Russia itself was in various stages of negotiation with Bulgaria, Greece, Denmark, Cuba, Poland, Romania, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and the United States. The U.S.-Russia BIT has been ratified by the U.S. Senate but still awaits Russian Duma ratification to enter into force.

OPIC and Other Investment Insurance Programs

In an agreement ratified at the June 1992 Summit, the U.S. Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) was authorized to provide loans, loan guarantees and investment insurance against political risks to U.S. companies investing in Russia. OPIC generally insures against three political risks: expropriation, political violence and currency inconvertibility. In 1994 OPIC did not provide inconvertibility insurance in Russia, although in mid-1995 it announced that it was beginning to offer such coverage on a limited basis. In 1994, to meet the demands of larger projects in Russia (and worldwide), OPIC doubled the amount of insurance and quadrupled the amount of finance support - to USD 200 million in each case - it can commit to an individual project. Through March 1995, OPIC had committed over USD 2.2 billion in finance and insurance to 41 projects in Russia. Total investment into these projects should reach USD 3.4 billion. In December 1994, OPIC also committed to provide up to USD 500 million to support defense conversion projects.

Russia is a member of the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA).

Labor

The Russian labor market continues to undergo a slow and painful transition. The majority of Russia's workforce is suited to the needs of the Soviet-era command economy and ill-suited to needs of an emerging market economy. Unemployment continues to grow steadily, reaching 7.7 percent of the workforce in early 1995. In addition, another five percent of the workforce are underemployed, forced to work short weeks, or on extended furloughs. There is a large supply of skilled workers in most Russian industries, but the demand for their skills is falling rapidly. Employment is growing rapidly in banking, insurance and other business services.

Labor-management relations in Russia are strained. Economic restructuring has caused rising anxiety and unrest among Russian workers, and trade unions are generally weak and ineffective. Most of the "official" labor unions, formerly the Communist trade unions, operate in a subservient role to enterprise management, in much the same way they did in Soviet times. Workers have little confidence in trade unions and most feel powerless to challenge management. The independent unions are much more effective at the enterprise level, but because they represent a small percentage of total workers their national clout is very small.

The Russian government generally adheres to ILO conventions protecting worker rights, but enforcement is inadequate. Perhaps the most troubling worker issue in present day Russia is the abysmal state of worker safety. Employers have generally reduced spending on safety equipment and government enforcement of safety regulations is very poor.

Foreign Trade Zones/Free Ports

Russia has legislation from both the Soviet era and since 1991 creating foreign economic zones. Unfortunately, the laws and their implementation have led to a disorganized and poorly functioning regime, with only two zones officially created - in Kaliningrad and Nakhodka. The Russian government and the Duma have been working for some time on new legislation to regularize and regulate free economic zones; it is not clear when the new law will be passed.

Capital Outflow Policy

Without permission it is illegal for a Russian legal entity or citizen to maintain a bank account outside of Russia for more than operating expenses; licenses are required for offshore accounts and can be difficult to obtain. Little legitimate outward investment is occurring; most capital outflow is the result of simple capital flight rather than a growth in criminal transactions.

Capital flight is a significant problem, with an estimated USD 40-50 billion having left the country in recent years; including some USD 17 billion in 1994. The only true method to curb capital flight will be to stabilize the Russian economy, reduce inflation and make it a more attractive environment in which to invest.


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