RUSSIA: COUNTRY COMMERCIAL GUIDE


II. ECONOMIC TRENDS AND OUTLOOK

Major Trends and Outlook

On March 10, 1995, the Government and Central Bank of Russia announced a bold economic stabilization program for 1995 -- a major breakthrough on Russia's path to economic reform. Russia's economic team, headed by First Deputy Prime Minister Chubays and supported by the President and Prime Minister, worked for months with the IMF and the Parliament to put together an economic policy agenda consisting of a tight budget, restrictive monetary policy, and trade and energy sector liberalization. The government's stabilization program formed the basis for a $6.5 billion standby credit from the IMF, scheduled for monthly disbursement through 1995 and the early part of 1996.

After four years of large annual declines in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and industrial production, the Russian economy is showing signs of stabilizing in 1995. Real GDP dropped 15 percent in 1994 over 1993, but has slowed its decline considerably in the early part of 1995. Real industrial output, while continuing to decline in annual average terms (down 21 percent in 1994 over 1993), stopped falling from the summer of 1994, and certain sectors show signs of recovery for the first time since the beginning of market reforms. Official statistics indicate steady growth in trade and services, sectors that were admittedly underdeveloped under the centrally planned economy of the former Soviet Union. By mid-year 1995, services grew to comprise 50 percent of GDP, while manufacturing shrunk in GDP terms to less than 44 percent.

Unemployment has risen steadily over the past few years, from nearly zero to 7.5 percent of the workforce in June 1995. In certain depressed regions and sectors, unemployment is much higher, in contrast to the very low unemployment rate in Moscow. Experts estimate that another 7 percent of the workforce is currently underemployed -- on unlimited unpaid furlough or working only part time. Studies indicate that many of the underemployed are content to keep their wage positions in order to receive the social benefits provided by the enterprise, while supplementing their income by growing food at home or working in the informal economy. Because most of Russia's large industrial enterprises continue to employ too many workers, experts expect unemployment to continue to increase steadily. Average wages reached 385,000 rubles per month in April 1995 (about $75 a month at the end-April exchange rate). Real average wages (adjusted for inflation) continued their general decline in 1994 and early 1995. (In the first four months of 1995 real average wages posted a 29 percent decline over the same period in 1994.) In contrast, real average income increased significantly in 1994 -- another indication that many Russians earned extra income outside of their regular jobs -- before falling off somewhat in early 1995. (In the first four months of 1995, real average income declined 8 percent over the same period in 1994.)

Inflation has been falling since the beginning of 1995, in line with the government's commitment to non-inflationary financing of the federal deficit. Annual inflation (CPI) ran at 303 percent in 1994, down substantially from the almost 900 percent annual inflation registered in 1993. Average monthly inflation in 1995 has fallen from a peak of 18 percent in January to just under 8 percent in May, and experts expect the trend to continue through the end of the year.

The ruble abruptly broke the predictable but slow decline which marked the first eight months of 1994 with a 22 percent one-day drop against the dollar on October 11, also called "Black Tuesday". Within 48 hours the ruble regained its pre-fall level of approximately 3,000 rubles to the dollar. Repercussions from Black Tuesday were harsh and Central Bank Chairman Gerashchenko, Deputy Prime Minister Shokhin, Acting Finance Minister Dubinin and the head of the Federal Service for Currency and Export Control were all eventually removed from their posts. Official inquiries found that lax credit policy, combined with poor management of currency intervention by the Central Bank, contributed to the ruble's fall. In 1995, after three months of steady decline in line with inflation, the ruble stabilized in mid-April in a narrow band around 5,000 rubles to the dollar and appreciated 10 percent as of the print date of this publication in mid-June 1995.

Interest rates, both the Central Bank's official discount rate and 3-month interbank market rates, fell for the first nine months of 1994, but rose abruptly in response to the ruble's fall on Black Tuesday. Respectively, these rates ended 1994 at 200 and 174 percent (in simple annual terms). In April 1995, the Central Bank lowered the discount rate five percentage points to 195 percent, while 3-month interbank market rates have fallen dramatically, and as of mid-June they were just under 95 percent.

Principal Growth Sectors

Overall Russian industrial production, after experiencing a free fall for the past four years, is showing signs of having bottomed out. Consensus data indicate that Russia's real seasonally adjusted industrial production has enjoyed relative stabilization in the ten months leading up to June 1995. At the sectoral level, clear winners and losers are emerging, but the overall picture suggests that the continuing downturn in the textile, consumer goods, and state defense sectors is more than balanced by output increases in the chemical, non-ferrous metal, machine building, construction and other sectors.

By far the largest growth area in 1994 came in the chemical/petrochemical and non-ferrous metals industries, each of which have benefitted from strong global demand and relative price advantage. Soda ash output grew by nearly 19 percent, mineral fertilizer output by 16 percent, sulfuric acid output by 12 percent, and synthetic ammonia output by 2 percent in the fourth quarter of 1994 over 1993. Among non-ferrous metals, magnesium and magnesium alloys posted modest gains in 1994, and nickel skyrocketed - up 46 percent in the fourth quarter of 1994 over the same period in 1993.

Between the big winners and big losers are a group of industries that show some tentative signs of strengthening. The timber and wood processing industry was hit hard by the transition to a market economy, registering an initial drop (from January 1990 to June 1994) of 70 percent - but is showing signs of limited recovery, with commercial pulp posting a 10 percent increase in output in the fourth quarter of 1994 over fourth quarter 1993. (The timber industry as a whole still suffers from the high transportation costs associated with bringing product from forest to market.) While the food processing industry as a whole is still in decline, vegetable oil production posted a slight increase in the fourth quarter of 1994 over the same period of 1993, mostly due to strong domestic demand. It is possible as well that growth in the food processing industry is taking place in smaller privatized businesses (local bakeries, etc.,) which are more difficult for the official statistics agency to capture. Ferrous metal production is still in decline overall, but losses in the domestic market have been nearly balanced by strong world demand. This is noticeable in pig iron, which posted a 1.6 percent gain in the fourth quarter 1994 output over fourth quarter 1993, and rolled metal, output of which largely stabilized in the latter half of 1994 relative to 1993. Likewise, the machine building sector showed early signs of recovery in the second half of 1994, with tractor production up slightly in the fourth quarter of 1994 over the same period in 1993.

However, trends in the industrial sector tell only part of the story in Russia. The retail/wholesale trade and service sectors, which together made up more than half of GDP in 1994 are thriving. Small independent trading establishments have emerged (usually in the form of kiosks) all over Russia's major cities, selling a variety of domestically produced and imported goods. Likewise, the service sector, long underdeveloped under the Soviet system, is burgeoning, especially in the major metropolitan areas. Along with the introduction of major western accounting and legal firms to Russia's corporate make up are small service providers, who with informal traders make up the bulk of the cash or "gray" economy.

Government Role in the Economy

Privatization has made great strides in Russia. According to the government, as a result of small-scale, voucher and post-voucher (cash) privatization, over 110,000 enterprises have been privatized in whole or in part. More than 80 percent of Russia's industrial workers are now working in privatized firms. The start of the central government's portion of the (cash) privatization program, under which the government will sell many of its retained holdings in privatized firms as well as the most of the enterprises which have not yet been privatized, has been delayed repeatedly. However, this program has made substantial progress in some of Russia's regions, including sale of the land on which they are situated to privatized firms, a major innovation President Yeltsin included in his July 1994 decree on cash privatization.

In addition, the Federal Bankruptcy Agency (FBA) has begun to implement President Yeltsin's decision of May 1994 to declare insolvent state firms bankrupt. The FBA completed the first reorganization and sale of an insolvent state firm in November 1994. The FBA is processing perhaps 300 administrative actions against insolvent state firms as well as having initiated another 300 actions in Russia's commercial courts. Although it is too soon to judge how sweeping the FBA's actions against the over 2,000 state firms it has found to be insolvent, this process is clearly gaining momentum.

Roughly 85 percent of wholesale and retail prices were liberalized by the end of 1992. Together with a virtually unrestricted import regime, price liberalization ended shortages of consumer goods through much of Russia. A few prices remain regulated by the government, among them rail transport and housing. Energy prices remained controlled at the wholesale level, with domestic prices substantially below international levels.

Balance of Payments Situation

Russia's current account (after rescheduling) registered a surplus for the second year in a row in 1994, though the level was much lower at USD 1.4 billion. The 1994 surplus reflected a USD 12.3 billion merchandise trade surplus, offset by a USD 10.9 billion deficit in non-merchandise trade. Total trade expanded by 9 percent over 1993 to USD 83.7 billion, after contracting slightly in 1993 over 1992. Russia's non-merchandise trade deficit increased sharply in 1994 over 1993, led by an increase in the net services deficit to USD 6.8 billion. In 1994, Russia sustained a capital account deficit in excess of USD 20 billion for the second year in a row, including USD 14 billion in principal payments. Net international reserves (NIR) of the Russian monetary authorities ended the year down USD 1.8 billion at USD 4 billion, having peaked in the second quarter at USD 8 billion and then fallen as the ruble came under pressure in the third and fourth quarters. Gold reserves also fell by USD 500 million to USD 2.6 billion by year end.

Capital flight continues to plague the Russian economy, although official data suggest that the rate of capital flight has slowed somewhat since its peak in 1992. Opinions vary greatly, but a realistic assessment would place capital flight at close to USD 17 billion in 1994, and would note that little of this is related to criminal activity, but represents a legitimate desire for safe havens abroad for foreign exchange earnings.

The U.S. and Russia signed a $900 million bilateral debt rescheduling agreement on October 25, 1994, formally putting into effect the Paris Club rescheduling accord reached the previous June with Russia's official creditors. In it, the Paris Club agreed to reschedule 7 billion dollars in official debt owed by Russia in 1994, thus easing its repayment burden. In June 1995, the Paris Club reached agreement with the Russian government to reschedule 6.3 billion dollars in Russian debt payments due this year and to hold talks with Moscow on rescheduling Russian debts inherited from the former Soviet Union. The London Club of commercial bank creditors is expected to reach agreement with the Russian government in mid-1995, and $500 million in payments have been already put into trust.

Infrastructure Situation

Although Russia boasts of an extensive transportation infrastructure built during the Communist era, its communications infrastructure leaves much to be desired. During the Communist era, Russia invested heavily in buildingtransportation infrastructure:roads, railways, airports, and ports. During later years, the government had difficulty maintaining many of those facilities. In the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russia lost a number of key ports, which has led to overcrowding at the St. Petersburg port. Some western companies are finding it easier to ship goods to Helsinki and then transport them into Russia by truck. In addition, SeaLand Service operates a container service out of the Far East port of Vostochniy to Moscow, with onward links to Western Europe. Russian Far East ports (Vladivostok, Vostochniy, Nakhodka, and others) now handle more than a third of all cargo and are particularly important for imports/exports to Siberia and the Russian Far East.


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