1. AS A REACTION TO THE CHANGING POLITICAL SITUATION, AND IN ANTICIPATION OF THE 1996 SPRING SOWING, A STRONG CAMPAIGN HAS BEEN LAUNCHED IN THE RUSSIAN PRINT MEDIA (INCLUDING SELSKAYA ZHYZN, ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, AND OTHER NEWSPAPERS) IN FAVOR OF MASSIVE FEDERAL SUPPORT FOR AGRICULTURE, INCLUDING IMMEDIATE FINANCING OF THE SPRING SOWING CAMPAIGN. ONE OF THE STRONGEST ARGUMENTS USED IN OF THIS APPROACH IS THE RAPID INCREASE IN IMPORTS OF FOOD PRODUCTS TO THE RF.
2. PRESS ARTICLES HAVE REPEATEDLY REPORTED ON THE FOLLOWING THEMES:
-- EVERY THREE MONTHS RUSSIA PAYS FOR IMPORTED FOOD PRODUCTS A SUM EQUAL TO
ITS YEARLY FEDERAL BUDGET OUTLAYS TO AGRICULTURE;
-- RUSSIAN CONSUMPTION OF IMPORTED FOOD PRODUCTS EXCEEDS 40 PERCENT OF TOTAL
CONSUMPTION, WHILE ALL COUNTRIES IN THE WORLD CONSIDER 30 PERCENT TO BE A
LEVEL SERIOUSLY AND IRREVERSIBLY DAMAGING TO THE NATIONAL FOOD SECURITY OF
THE COUNTRY.
-- IN ADDITION, ALL BIG INDUSTRIAL CENTERS DEPEND HEAVILY ON IMPORTED FOOD
PRODUCTS, WITH IMPORTS REPRESENTING 70-80 PERCENT OF TOTAL FOOD CONSUMPTION
OF THESE CITIES. SUCH DEPENDENCY OF ALL INDUSTRIAL CENTERS ON THE GOOD WILL
OF FOREIGN EXPORTERS HAS BECOME TOO SERIOUS;
-- THE QUALITY OF IMPORTED FOOD PRODUCTS IS LOW, AS EXPORTING COUNTRIES USUALLY
SELL TO RUSSIA THE PRODUCE THAT THEY DO NOT CONSUME THEMSELVES FOR DIETARY
OR SAFETY REASONS.
--AT THE SAME TIME DOMESTIC AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION HAS BEEN DECREASING AT
AN ACCELERATING RATE, AND DOMESTIC PRODUCERS ARE NOT ABLE TO SELL WHAT HAS
ALREADY BEEN PRODUCED AND STORED.
3. THE PRESS CONCLUDES THAT THE ONLY POSSIBLE SOLUTION TO THIS SITUATION IS: 1)MASSIVE FEDERAL SUPPORT TO THE DOMESTIC AGROINDUSTRIAL COMPLEX; AND, 2) PROTECTION OF THE DOMESTIC FOOD MARKET FROM THE INVASION OF IMPORTED PRODUCTS, KEEPING IMPORTS WITHIN THE LIMITS OF AMOUNTS AND TYPES OF PRODUCTS THAT CANNOT BE PRODUCED IN RUSSIA. PRESS REPORTS HAVE PROVIDED NO COMPARISONS OF THE PRICES AND THE COSTS OF PRODUCTION OF DOMESTIC AND IMPORTED.
4. THESE SOLUTIONS HAVE ALREADY BEEN SUGGESTED BY THE MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE AND THE MINISTRY OF ECONOMY IN A DOCUMENT "ON STABILIZATION OF AGROINDUSTRIAL COMPLEX IN 1996-2000", PROPOSED TO THE GOVERNMENT IN THE FALL OF 1995, WHICH CALLS FOR A RETURN TO HEAVILY SUBSIDIZED STATE SUPPORT OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION. ON FEBRUARY 6, THE PRESS REPORTS THAT DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND ACTING MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE ZAVERUKHA MET WITH PRESIDENT YELTSIN, AND, ACCORDING TO ZAVERUKHA, RECEIVED FULL SUPPORT FOR THE DECREE "ON STABILIZATION OF THE WORK OF THE AGROINDUSTRIAL COMPLEX OF THE RF IN 1996". THAT DECREE, WHICH HAD HAS BEEN UNDER DISCUSSION WITHIN THE GOR FOR THREE MONTHS, HAS BEEN APPROVED BY PRESIDENT YELTSIN AND QUICKLY SIGNED BY PRIME MINISTER CHERNOMYRDIN. ACCORDING TO ZAVERUKHA, THIS DECREE WILL PROVIDE SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEMS OF COMMODITY LOANS/CREDIT, LEASING, SUPPLY WITH FERTILIZER, AND SOME OTHER URGENT PROBLEMS OF RUSSIAN AGRICULTURE.
5. THE TEXT OF THE ABOVE DECREE HAS NOT BEEN
PUBLISHED. HOWEVER, LEFT UNSTATED IN PRESS REPORTS IS THAT THE GOR'S ABILITY
TO IMPLEMENT SUCH A PROGRAM IN 1996 IN THE AGRICULTURE SECTOR IS HEAVILY DEPENDENT
ON THE AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS, WHICH HAVE BEEN IN EXTREMELY SHORT SUPPLY TO
DATE.
6. THERE WERE ALSO PRESS REPORTS ON FEBRUARY 8 THAT DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER ZAVERYUKHA HAD TENDERED HIS RESIGNATION FROM THE GOVERNMENT BECAUSE OF THE DIRE SITUATION FACING AGRICULTURE, BUT THAT HIS RESIGNATION HAD NOT BEEN ACCEPTED BY PRESIDENT YELTSIN.