Article from Le Monde Diplomatique

New Message	Reply	About this list	Date view	Thread view	Subject view	Author view	Other groups

Subject: Article from Le Monde Diplomatique
From: Vicken Cheterian (vicken@mail-box.ch)
Date: Fri May 28 1999 - 00:55:06 EDT

Next message: Bruno De Cordier: "Shakhrimardan, Sokh and Vorukh"
Previous message: Daniel Waugh: "Re: Political Islam in Ferghana"

Dear friends,

I had this article in the May 99 issue of Le Monde Diplomatique, and I
thought it would be of interest to you.

Best regards,
Vicken

FERGHANA, THE DIVIDED HEART OF CENTRAL ASIA

Vicken Cheterian

The Valley of Ferghana, is a fertile piece of land in the heart of
otherwise austere Central Asia. Surrounded by mountain ranges, the
Valley is protected from the harsh deserts and dry steps towards the
north and the west, while in its south ri<html>
ses the Pamir chain, with 
several summits above 7,000 meters. With its surface of 22 thousand sq 
km, Ferghana is the home to 9 million people, roughly a fifth of the 
population of the entire Central Asia. Traditionally, Ferghana has been 
a center of regional politics and religious traditions, where the 
influence of Islam continued to be felt even under the Soviet rule. Next 
to its importance, Ferghana is a zone of high risk: it is divided 
between three states with numerous enclaves causing border problems, it 
is home to ethnic tensions, disputes over water and land division, drug 
and arms trade, and political dissidence - the very last of which took 
the form of militant Islam known here as "Wahabism". 
 
     In Kokand one can still visit the surviving parts
of the Khan's palace, 
next to which stands a Yakovlev plane, as if to contrast the 
"backwardness" of the past Khanate with the promises of Soviet 
modernism. Here, in 1918, a congress declared the "Muslim Provincial 
Government of Autonomous Turkestan", which was put down by the 
pro-Soviet forces. Yet, the town is a living example of the limits of 
Soviet influence: In the bazaar, most sellers had difficulties 
understanding Russian, and the few ethnic Russians still in the Valley 
have taken over local customs. The Soviet authorities divided
Ferghana  
to hinder the emergence of a unified regional identity. Their politics 
seems to be continuing by the newly independent republics, who seem to 
fear, and therefore repress, indigenous political movements outside 
their control. 
 
     Ferghana is a strangely constructed piece of
puzzle, with borders that 
hinder the natural process of exchange and communication within the 
Valley. It is predominantly Uzbek, most of its surface belonging to 
Uzbekistan, and even the Leninabad province of Tajikistan or Osh and 
Jelalabad provinces of Kyrgyzstan have large ethnic Uzbek populations. 
Yet, the railroad or highway connections between Tashkent to the three 
Uzbek provinces of Ferghana passes through Leninabad in northern 
Tajikistan. The land-routes between Khojent and Tajik capital Dushanbe 
crosses through Samarkand - a mainly Tajik urban center in Uzbekistan. 
Otherwise, the direct routes between Dushanbe and Khojent (the second 
city in Tajikistan) have to cross two mountain passes with an altitude 
superior to 3,000 meters, closed by snow in winter months. The only rail 
link between Osh and Bishkek (the second major Kyrgyz town and the 
capital) is a 32 hours ride through Tashkent... 
 
     In November 1998, reading the newspapers in the
Uzbek capital would 
have raised no suspicion that a war had erupted at three hours drive, in 
northern Tajikistan. Only a footnote informed that railway connections 
to Khojent were suspended indefinitely and the border between Uzbekistan 
and Tajikistan were closed. Since the beginning of the war in Tajikistan 
in 1992, the northern Leninabad province was spared from violence, 
separated from the rest of Tajikistan by two mountain chains and a 
distinct Leninabadi identity. Yet, on 3 November, several hundred rebel 
troops of ex-colonel Makhmud Khudoyberdiev penetrated strategic 
positions in Khojent and occupied its airport. They were supported by 
ex-prime minister and strongman in Khojent Abdulmalik Abdullodzhanov. 
Loyal troops were sent to the scene, crossing Uzbek territories, and a 
week long heavy fighting left 300 dead and more wounded, and the rebel 
leaders took the flight. "We did not expect such events in the
north" 
said Tajiddin Mardonov, Tajik ambassador in Tashkent, "it was like 
stabbing in the back. We learnt our lesson". 
 
     The November events raise a number of questions.
How could 
Khudoyberdiev cross his stronghold in south-western Tajikistan to arrive 
at Khojent? It is difficult to transport a thousand armed men 
undetected. At what level of the Uzbek government did they have 
collaborators? And, in case the operation was planned on a high level in 
Tashkent, why did they permit Tajik governmental troops cross Uzbek 
territories and go and crush the rebellion? "We have proof that Uzbek
 
President Islam Karimov completely supports the organizer of the Tajik 
mutiny, former Prime Minister Abdumalik Abdullodzhanov. By organising 
coups and helping rebels, the Uzbek leadership wants to take the whole 
of Tajikistan under its control," declared the president of Tajikistan
 
Imomali Rakhmonov.  Tajik sources underline that among the rebel
troops 
there were Afghan fighters from the forces of General Dostum, as yet 
another proof of the involvement of Tashkent... 
 
     In Uzbek towns, one can often read on the walls
slogans about the 
greatness of the Uzbek state, decorated with portraits of Timurlang and 
president Karimov. Tashkent, which has self-declared ambitions to play a 
hegemonistic role in Central Asia, is unhappy with the way politics is 
run in Dushanbe. The peace agreement between the government and the 
United Tajik Opposition (UTO), gives 30% of state posts to the mainly 
Islamist UTO - the enemy number one for Uzbek authorities. Tashkent is 
also dissatisfied to see its ethnic kin in Khojent marginalized from the 
political process in Dushanbe. Although the Leninabad region is the 
richest economic province in Tajikistan, it lacks the tools to influence 
the power sharing negotiations, since it did not take part in the war 
and therefore does not have military leverage. 
 
     The Khojent clashes also introduced the specter of
ethnic conflict once 
again to Ferghana. Khodoyberdiev tried to portray himself as the 
protector of the interests of the Uzbek minority in Tajikistan. In the 
early years of the decade, many feared that with the disintegration of 
the Soviet authorities Ferghana will explode into a series of conflicts 
similar to what happened in the Caucasus.  In May 1989 riots erupted
in 
Kokand and in other towns against Meskhet Turks, and in few days 
hundreds were killed and thousands lost their homes. The Meskhet Turks 
were among the "punished peoples" deported from their land of
origin in 
southern Georgia by Stalin after the Second World War for no obvious 
reason, and never permitted to return. In 1990, another wave of violence 
exploded in Osh and Uzgen in southern Kyrgyzstan, between Uzbeks and 
Kyrgyz, claiming hundreds of victims in few days. There is little 
convincing explanation for the ethnic violence, or why it did not 
degenerate into series of inter-ethnic wars. "The conflicts were
caused 
by provocation of the KGB, which was trying to gain time by creating 
disputes among Muslim peoples," said Ergashbey Kushmatov, a lawyer and
 
former deputy in Kokand. But Ismail Dadajanov, the leader of the Birlik 
party in the city of Ferghana had a different observation: "The
Meskhets 
were equally at fault. They lived in compact regions... and they did not 
respect the Uzbeks. There were incidents of raping Uzbek girls. They 
came here hungry and they became fat and rich. Tension existed for 
years. If it was the work of the KGB, they knew how to choose..." 
 
     In the last two years the local authorities have
identified Islamic 
movements, here called "Wahabies", to be the real de stabilizing
force. 
Namangan, one of the major towns in the Valley, is  the home of
Islamic 
tradition, and the stronghold of "Wahabism". "Namangan was
the only town 
in the Soviet Union where one did not find a bottle of vodka even on a 
marriage table," said Makhamadali Karabaev, who is the head of 
Namangan's Committee of Human Rights. In December 1997, a number of high 
ranking officials and police officers were assassinated, in mysterious 
circumstances. While the authorities accused the "Wahabis",
foreign 
observers have noted that the murders could be the work of Mafia 
groups... A heavy-handed crackdown followed, arresting up to several 
thousand people, and until now courts in Uzbekisan are sentencing 
"Wahabis" to spend years in prison.  The authorities also
put an end to 
the construction of mosques, by introducing a law in May 1998 demanding 
the re-registration of all religious institutions. "Before the new law
 
904 registered mosques existed, and with those without registration the 
number reached over a thousand. Now, only 93 mosques are registered in 
the Ferghana Valley," said  Karabaev, "in my mahalla
(neighborhood) five 
mosques existed before, and the five are closed now..." 
 
     On 16 February, six bombs rocked Tashkent, one of
them at the entrance 
of the parliament, minutes before the arrival of Islam Karimov, leaving 
16 dead and 130 wounded. The authorities consider the explosions an 
assassination attempt against the life of the president, and accused 
Islamic forces for the crime. The Uzbek TV broadcast the pictures of a 
man and his wife wanted for the bomb attacks, who are originally from 
Namangan, in Ferghana. According to Russian human rights activist Vitaly 
Ponomaryev, over 200 people were arrested following the attacks. Some of 
those arrested were from the Erk Party, a secular opposition movement. 
 
     Many foreign observers think that the Uzbek
president has chosen 
"Wahabism" as a convenient enemy. It justifies the authoritarian
drive 
of the regime, while confronting a minor danger. Many observers continue 
to consider the greater danger in Central Asia to be inter-ethnic 
conflicts. Yet, regimes think first about the stability of their power, 
and not necessarily about the stability of their societies. And Uzbek 
elite does fear Islam. The Taliban victories in the last years has 
changed the political orientation in Tashkent, from seeking alliance 
with the US-Pakistan, to turning back to a Moscow-led CIS alliance, 
against the danger of the Taliban. Ethnic conflicts could be 
destructive, but nationalist formations in Central Asia did not show a 
great mobilizing force, and therefore do not pose as a serious threat to 
the elites in power. On the other hand, Islam could be an alternative 
against the amalgam of Soviet-nationalist nature of the current elites, 
and put the legitimacy of the current states under question. "I know
one 
hundred persons by name and family name, who left the Valley to join 
Islamic forces in Tajikistan and Afghanistan," said a person close to
 
the Islamic activists, who did not want his name published, "and the 
total number could be up to one thousand". 
 
     At the eastern edge of the Uzbek part of the
Valley is Andijan, where 
one finds the symbol of the economic achievements of independent 
Uzbekistan, the Daewoo car factory. This South Korean investment 
produces nearly all the passenger cars sold in the protected Uzbek 
market, at state-fixed prices. Uzbekistan is one of the few post-Soviet 
republics that did not apply massive privatization, and the state 
structures are preserved to a large degree. The state not only controls 
imports, but also provides subsidies to basic services (food, 
electricity, transport, etc.). Another advantage is that Uzbek workers 
receive their salaries, unlike their Russian or Kazakh counterparts. The 
"Uzbek economic model", developed in a series of books signed by
the 
president of Uzbekistan, has attracted attention with the evident 
failure of the "reforms" following the crush of the Russian
ruble. 
According to this model, reforms are introduced "gradually" in 
Uzbekistan, to guarantee stability and attract foreign investments. 
 
     Yet, even this "model" seems to be
facing problems.  Foreign 
investments are down, and even the few established have serious problems 
linked with the heavy Uzbek bureaucracy, and the unbearable corruption 
in the country. Companies with only a government delivered license can 
convert the Uzbek sum to US dollars. Otherwise, they have to follow the 
official price of 127 sums/$, while in the black market a dollar fetched 
375 sums (January 1999)... The Uzbek state could continue subsidies 
mainly because it monopolizes two exports, cotton (roughly 47% of 
exports) and gold (16% of exports). The fall of world gold prices, and 
the fall for the second consecutive year of cotton production could be 
the start of serious economic difficulties in the most populous country 
in Central Asia. What happened in Uzbekistan is that the government did 
not privatize state property, as in most of the 15 union republics, it 
simply tried to keep what it inherited from the USSR. The question 
remains whether a Soviet-style system is viable in a single country, for 
example in Uzbekistan... 
 
     No natural barrier separates Andijan from Osh, the
second major city of 
Kyrgyzstan. Osh receives visitors with the proud claim of 3,000 year of 
history, which will be celebrated in the year 2,000. In the streets, one 
often hears conversation in Russian, vodka can be easily bought from 
every kiosk, while the population is a mixture of  Uzbek, Kyrgyz and 
Russian. Coming from the Uzbek side, Osh gives the impression of 
breathing fresh air. Here, people can express their ideas freely, 
criticize the reformist policies of president Askar Akayev without fear 
from police intervention. A local movement of non governmental 
organizations (NGOs) is active in trying to address local problems, and 
Osh has attracted international organizations with programs to develop 
civil society in the region. The parliamentarian Bakyt Beshimov is 
preparing a pilot project of the UN Ferghana Valley Development 
Programme, which aims to address the sources of social and economic 
tensions in the Valley. "The population growth in Ferghana is faster 
than elsewhere in Central Asia, already high according to world 
standards. This will bring additional tensions on natural resources like 
water and land, and could lead to political violence," he said. 
 
     In October 1998, a referendum in Kyrgyzstan passed
a law on land 
privatization - the first such step in Central Asia.  Absamat
Masaliev, 
who was the Kyrgyz Communist Party chief from 1985-1991, declared to the 
media that the majority of the Kyrgyz oppose land privatization and that 
it was imposed on Kyrgyzstan by international monetary institutions, as 
a price to pay for World Trade Organization membership.  In the
Ferghana 
part of Kyrgyzstan, privatization of land could trigger competition 
between ethnic Uzbeks and Kyrgyz. Although no massive acts of violence 
was recorded since 1990, tension does persist, and today the region's 
population is heavily armed. Competition over land and water could cause 
inter-ethnic clashes or inter-state conflicts. 
 
     To drive from Osh to Jelalabad, two cities within
Kyrgyzstan, one has 
to enter twice Uzbek enclaves, that means eight times customs control. 
Next to the main road there is an Uzbek military base established in the 
last years. The Kyrgyz did not miss the message, the Uzbek base is a 
clear threat against them. Uzbek forces which are the strongest in the 
region could intervene in case of clashes between them and the Uzbeks of 
Osh or Jelalabad... Other interpretations also exist about the 
stationement of a military base at such an advanced position: to go up 
and control the keys of the Toktogul dam, up in the Ferghana mountain 
chain. Kyrgyzstan receives natural gas from Uzbekistan, for which it has 
no hard currency to pay. In February, Uzbekistan once again shut down 
the flow of gas to Kyrgyzstan, for the mounting debt of over $3
million.  
In return, Kyrgyz leaders have demanded payment for the water that runs 
down from Kyrgyz mountains to irrigate cotton fields in Uzbekistan. 
Bishkek has demanded $5 million for infrastructure maintenance, but 
Uzbekistan has rejected any discussion about the matter... 
 
     Water sharing poisons relations in villages at the
south-western end of 
Kyrgyzstan. Raya Kadyrova is an NGO activist from Bishkek, recently made 
a trip to assess the situation in the Batken region. "The  Kyrgyz
 
villagers accuse the Tajiks who live in a nearby enclave for the water 
shortages. While most of the pipes are on Kyrgyz land, the taps are on 
the Tajik side." The shortage of land in the Tajik enclave has caused
 
some of them to built houses illegally on Kyrgyz land. Refugees escaping 
the war in Tajikistan added to their numbers. This movement was received 
by fear and anger by the Kyrgyz population, who consider any water 
shortage as Tajik plot to force them leave their land in order to occupy 
their villages. "In the south of Kyrgyzstan you don't have to identify
a 
conflict region. Every single village is a potential conflict spot,"
she 
concluded. 
 
     Osh has emerged as a knot for drug trade.
"Following the break-up of 
the USSR, the 1200 km Tajik-Afghan frontier turned into a
green-border," 
said Alexander Zelichenko from the Kyrgyz anti-drug police. 
Initially, 
opium was transferred from Afghanistan to the mountainous Tajik state of 
Gorno-Badakhshan into Osh, from where it was transported to Russia and 
Europe. Now, since a year, police has increasingly detected heroin, and 
the land routes has become more diversified, where most drugs now 
transit the Afghan-Turkmen border. "Initially the heroin laboratories
 
were on the Pakistani-Afghani border region, while in the last two years 
they were transferred to northern Afghanistan," Zelichenko added. Drug
 
trafficking is taking worrying dimensions in conditions of economic 
collapse in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. According to Zelichenko, a 
kilogram of heroin costs $1,500 on Afghan-Tajik border, $5,000 in Osh, 
and $20,000 in Almaty. Drug trafficking is increasingly corrupting 
fragile state structures. In Kyrgyzstan a police officer is paid $40 a 
month... Drug trafficking can help finance or even spark new conflicts. 
In Tajikistan and Afghanistan, cash-starving warlords use opium and 
heroin as a currency unit, to pay for their food, fuel, and even 
armament. Zelichenko is worried by signs that drugs started flowing 
eastwards from Afghanistan. "In case an overlap takes place between
drug 
trafficking and Uyghur ethnic rebellion, it could cause a major problem 
in Xinjiang" he said. 
 
     From Osh to Bishkek by car is ten to twelve hours
drive through high 
mountains, splendid views of lakes and rivers, to reach the valley of 
Chuy where the capital Bishkek is situated. The trip shows how much 
Kyrgyzstan is, in a way, two countries, one situated in Ferghana and 
looking towards Uzbekistan and resembling to it, and the other one 
facing towards the heavily Russified Kazakhstan. And in between there 
are piles of stone, mountains  inaccessible during several winter 
months. Looking back to Ferghana, one cannot but think how obvious the 
dangers for this vital Valley is, and there is an increasing 
consciousness on the side of international organizations towards the 
necessity of intervening before deep routed malaise laeds to explosions 
of violance. In case "conflict prevention" could produce any
practical 
results, it can be verified in the Ferghana Valley. But how can a 
conflict preventing project be designed to apply at the same time in 
open but chaotic Kyrgyzstan, authoritarian and suspicious Uzbekistan, 
and war-torn Tajikistan all at the same time?

Next message: Bruno De Cordier: "Shakhrimardan, Sokh and Vorukh"
Previous message: Daniel Waugh: "Re: Political Islam in Ferghana"

New Message	Reply	About this list	Date view	Thread view	Subject view	Author view	Other groups

This archive was generated by hypermail 2a22 : Sat May 29 1999 - 07:34:14 EDT