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RFE/RL NEWSLINE

RFE/RL NEWSLINE Vol. 2, No. 143 Part I, 28 July 1998


___________________________________________________________
RFE/RL NEWSLINE Vol. 2, No. 143 Part I, 28 July 1998

A daily report of developments in Eastern and Southeastern
Europe, Russia, the Caucasus and Central Asia prepared by
the staff of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.

This is Part I, a compilation of news concerning Russia,
Transcaucasia and Central Asia. Part II covers Central,
Eastern, and Southeastern Europe and is distributed
simultaneously as a second document. Back issues of RFE/RL
Newsline and the OMRI Daily Digest are online at RFE/RL's
Web site: http://www.rferl.org/newsline

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Headlines, Part I

* FOUR RUSSIAN POLITICIANS CALL FOR NEW CHECHEN POLICY

* KIRIENKO SAYS FSB TO FOCUS ON ECONOMIC SECURITY

* GEORGIAN AMBASSADOR TO MOSCOW OFFERED POST OF STATE
MINISTER

End Note: NO PROGRESS ON CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION WITHOUT
FIXED BORDER
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

RUSSIA

FOUR RUSSIAN POLITICIANS CALL FOR NEW CHECHEN POLICY. In a
statement addressed to the Russian government on issued on
27 July, former Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin,
CIS Executive Secretary Boris Berezovskii, Krasnoyarsk Krai
Governor Aleksandr Lebed and Tatarstan President Mintimer
Shaimiev expressed their alarm at the deteriorating
situation in Chechnya and the North Caucasus in general. The
four urged the Russian government "immediately to adopt and
implement a position on the region that is clear to
[Russian] society." In April, acting Russian Nationalities
Minister Vyacheslav Mikhailov unveiled Russia's new draft
program on the North Caucasus, which was criticized as
inadequate by several North Caucasian leaders, including
Ingush President Ruslan Aushev. Berezovskii complained in
early July that Russia still lacks a comprehensive North
Caucasus policy. "Nezavisimaya gazeta," which Berezovskii
funds, has interpreted the statement as evidence of a
possible pre-election coalition. LF

RUSSIAN-SOUTH KOREAN SPY SCANDAL HAS "RUN ITS COURSE."
Russian Foreign Minister Yevgenii Primakov met again with
his South Korean counterpart, Park Chung soo, on 28 July in
Manila, ITAR-TASS reported. Primakov said after the meeting
that the series of expulsions of Russian and South Korean
diplomats can be considered to have "run its course."
Primakov also said he had invited Park and the South Korean
minister of foreign trade to visit Moscow and that the
invitation "was gratefully accepted." The previous evening,
Primakov met with U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine
Albright. The two gave a press conference before that
meeting, at which Primakov said the planned summit between
Presidents Boris Yeltsin and Bill Clinton in Moscow this
September is already "programmed for success." He added
"that doesn't mean the leaders of the two countries will
find solutions to every problem..., but it will allow
development of relations between Russia and the United
States." BP

U.S. NEWSPAPER ALLEGES RUSSIAN ACTIVITY IN AFGHANISTAN. An
article in the 27 July issue of "The New York Times" claims
that Russia is secretly engaged in the "new Afghan war" but
that "the Russians are after oil, as well as protection of
their border." Its engagement is part of a larger Russian
strategy to reassert influence over Central Asia, according
to the newspaper. The article argues that Russia is working
together with Iran in supporting the alliance fighting the
Taliban religious movement, which currently controls some 80
percent of Afghanistan. It also quotes Ahmed Shah Masoud, a
key commander in the anti-Taliban alliance, as admitting
that he receives most of his equipment from the Russian
mafia, not the Russian government. Interfax on 28 July
quoted sources in the Russian Foreign Ministry as saying
"these assertions are absolutely untrue" and that "Russia
strictly adheres to its position of noninterference in
Afghanistan's internal affairs." BP

KIRIENKO SAYS FSB TO FOCUS ON ECONOMIC SECURITY... Prime
Minister Sergei Kirienko says that under its new director,
Vladimir Putin, the "most important" task of the Federal
Security Service (FSB) will be to ensure Russia's economic
security, Russian news agencies reported on 27 July.
Introducing Putin to top FSB staff, Kirienko praised the
work of Putin's predecessor, Nikolai Kovalev, but said
"conditions are changing, people are changing." An unnamed
source in the government apparatus told Russian news
agencies that Putin's appointment signifies "enhancement of
the [FSB's] status." The source said "the fact that the new
FSB chief used to serve as the first deputy head of the
presidential administration demonstrates the attention paid
by the Russian leadership to the problems of the service."
LB

...BUT NEWSPAPERS LINK APPOINTMENT TO POLITICAL CONCERNS.
"Tribuna" on 28 July argued that the decision to appoint
Putin as FSB director suggests that the Kremlin wanted a
more loyal figure for that position. "Nezavisimaya gazeta"
speculated the same day that the decision to replace Kovalev
with Putin was taken for purely political rather than
"professional" reasons. The newspaper pointed out that
Unified Energy System head Anatolii Chubais has been a
"patron" of Putin (see "RFE/RL Newsline," 27 July 1998).
"Kommersant-Daily" on 28 July cast doubt on Putin's
political skills, saying he did a poor job organizing the
1995 parliamentary campaign as head of the St. Petersburg
branch of the Our Home Is Russia movement. The newspaper
also charged that Putin contributed to former St. Petersburg
Mayor Anatolii Sobchak's June 1996 election loss. LB

DEFENSE INDUSTRY IN DIRE STRAITS. Owing to strained budget
resources, the government has reduced the number of
enterprises fulfilling the state defense order from roughly
1,700 in 1997 to 1,000 in 1998, according to the Deputy
Economics Minister Vladimir Salo, ITAR-TASS reported on 24
July. At the League for Aid to the Defense Industry's 24
July meeting, President Anatolii Dolgolaptev blasted the
government for driving defense enterprises into bankruptcy
and said that under the Civil Code, the league will try to
force the government to pay unfulfilled defense contracts,
"Nezavisimaya gazeta" reported. Dolgolaptev said that
government conversion projects have completely failed, and
restructuring of the defense complex has not gotten under
way. The 1998 defense order was delayed by four months (see
"RFE/RL Newsline," 8 July 1998). Meanwhile, recently
appointed Industry and Trade Minister Yurii Maslyukov, who
seeks authority to oversee the defense industry, did not
attend the league's 24 July meeting, "Segodnya" noted. BT

OFFICIAL CRITICIZES U.S. OVER URANIUM DEAL. The U.S. is
failing to fulfill its agreement to buy diluted uranium from
dismantled Russian nuclear weapons, according to Aleksei
Grigoriev, deputy director of the uranium export agency
Tekhsnabeksport and the official in charge of the program.
Under a $12 billion agreement signed in 1993, the U.S.
agreed to help Russia convert and export to the U.S. 500
tons of uranium over 20 years, Reuters reported on 27 July.
According to Grigoriev, the U.S. has been paying for only
enriched uranium, and not the "natural" component, as was
stipulated in the 1993 agreement. The U.S. government
recently privatized the corporation in charge of treating
uranium for use as fuel in nuclear reactors. Atomic Energy
Minister Yevgenii Adamov said this threatens the U.S.'s
further participation in the program and will flood the
world uranium market, hurting Russian uranium sales, ITAR-
TASS reported on 24 July. BT

OUR HOME IS RUSSIA WANTS TO OVERRIDE VETO ON OIL EXCISE
DUTIES. Aleksandr Shokhin, leader of the Our Home Is Russia
faction in the State Duma, says his faction will seek to
override the presidential veto of a law that would more than
halve excise duties on oil, ITAR-TASS reported on 27 July.
Yeltsin rejected that law because the parliament did not
approve other measures that would have increased budget
revenues. Shokhin claimed that the Our Home Is Russia
faction, not the government, proposed the law, adding that
it is crucial for Russia to help stimulate exports now.
Commenting on the recent appeal to Yeltsin and the
government by several oil companies, Shokhin said that
"perhaps [the companies] spoke out too emotionally and too
sharply concerning the president's veto, but in essence we
share their view" (see "RFE/RL Newsline," 22 and 23 July
1998). LB

SAMARA GOVERNOR TO CHALLENGE GOVERNMENT ACTIONS. Konstantin
Titov, the governor of Samara Oblast and chairman of the
Federation Council Budget Committee, says he will ask the
Constitutional Court to assess the legality of some recent
government measures to boost budget revenues, "Kommersant-
Daily" reported on 28 July. Titov believes the government
usurped functions of the legislature when it unilaterally
increased individual contributions to the Pension Fund and
shortened the list of goods subject to a reduced rate of
value-added tax (see "RFE/RL Newsline," 20 and 22 July
1998). The Samara Oblast administration is preparing legal
documents that will be sent to the Constitutional Court in
the next few days. LB

HIKE IN CUSTOMS DUTIES TO AFFECT IMPORTS AGREED EARLIER. The
recent government directive raising customs duties will
affect goods brought to Russia after 15 August regardless of
when import contracts have been signed, sources in the State
Customs Committee told Russian news agencies on 24 July. In
order to increase revenues, the government has levied an
additional 3 percent charge on most imports (see "RFE/RL
Newsline," 20 July 1998). Previous rules allowed imports to
be taxed at whatever rate was in effect when the contract
for the shipment was signed, according to ITAR-TASS. LB

IMPEACHMENT COMMISSION CONSIDERS TREASON CHARGE. The State
Duma's impeachment commission on 27 July held hearings on
the first of five possible charges against the president,
RFE/RL's Moscow bureau reported. Duma Legislation Committee
Chairman Anatolii Lukyanov and Duma Security Committee
Chairman Viktor Ilyukhin, both prominent members of the
Communist faction, summarized the first charge against
Yeltsin. They said he committed treason in December 1991,
when he (as then president of the RSFSR) and leaders of the
Ukrainian and Belarusian republics signed the Belavezha
accords on dissolving the USSR. Among other things, Ilyukhin
said Yeltsin and the other signatories lacked the authority
to break up the USSR and ignored the will of the Soviet
people, as expressed in a March 1991 referendum. (Although
six Soviet republics boycotted that referendum, some 80
percent of the electorate in the remaining republics
participated, of whom 76 percent voted in favor of
preserving the USSR.) Presidential representatives did not
turn up for the hearings. The impeachment commission
postponed further consideration of the charge until 17
August. LB

LUZHKOV SUPPORTERS FORM NEW COALITION. Political groups
supporting Moscow Mayor Yurii Luzhkov have met behind closed
doors to form a new electoral alliance, "Kommersant-Daily"
reported on 28 July. The bloc, to be called Unity, will
organize nationwide protests this fall before turning its
attention to the State Duma elections scheduled for December
1999. It will then support Luzhkov in the 2000 presidential
election. The mayor is not "advertising" his connection to
the alliance, "Kommersant-Daily" said, but organizers have
coordinated their actions with him. The Unity alliance will
include Kursk Oblast Governor Aleksandr Rutskoi and his
Derzhava movement, Duma deputy Andrei Nikolaev and his Union
of Labor and Popular Power, Duma deputy Dmitrii Rogozin and
his Congress of Russian Communities, and Duma Deputy Speaker
Sergei Baburin and his Russian All-National Union. LB

LEBED DOES NOT RULE OUT PRESIDENTIAL BID IN 2000.
Krasnoyarsk Krai Governor Lebed told ITAR-TASS on 27 July
that if the political and economic situation in Russia
deteriorates, he may run for president in 2000. Earlier this
year, Lebed repeatedly said he will not run for president
until after he has sorted out the economic problems of
Krasnoyarsk Krai, a task that could take several years.
Lebed finished third in the 1996 presidential election with
15 percent of the vote. Meanwhile, Lebed's Honor and
Motherland movement is to hold a congress in Krasnoyarsk on
30 and 31 July. Lebed told ITAR-TASS that the movement will
focus on the 1999 parliamentary elections. Lebed ran for the
Duma in 1995 on the ticket of the Congress of Russian
Communities, which did worse than analysts expected and won
only five seats in the Duma. LB

HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSIONER, PROSECUTOR AGREE TO COOPERATE.
Oleg Mironov, Russia's human rights commissioner, and
Prosecutor-General Yurii Skuratov on 24 July signed a
cooperation agreement, Russian news agencies reported. They
promised to work together to fight human rights violations
committed against prison inmates, citizens involved in
criminal investigations, and workers (including the chronic
wage arrears problem). Human rights watchdogs in Russia and
abroad have repeatedly denounced conditions in Russian
prisons and pre-trial detention centers, and Skuratov has
called on the Interior Ministry to take more steps to
improve the situation. (The prison system is to be
transferred to the jurisdiction of the Justice Ministry
later this year.) The Prosecutor-General's Office and
Mironov's staff also agreed to conduct joint actions to
check on possible violations of citizens' rights in the
regions. LB

CULTURAL TV CHANNEL BEGINS TO RUN ADVERTISING. The
television network Kultura, which is a division of the fully
state-owned All-Russian State Television and Radio Company
(VGTRK), ran advertising for the first time on 27 July. The
network has an exclusive arrangement with the Japanese firm
Sony and will show two commercials for Sony products each
afternoon. When Yeltsin ordered the creation of Kultura last
year, he promised that the network would focus on cultural
and educational programming and would not run advertising.
However, from the beginning some observers expressed
skepticism that Kultura could survive for long without
either advertising or some form of corporate sponsorship
(see "RFE/RL Newsline," 4 November 1997). "Kommersant-Daily"
on 28 July quoted VGTRK Chairman Mikhail Shvydkoi as saying
that "we would be happy if domestic producers or bankers
helped the channel, but the first and only company that
offered Kultura serious help turned out to be Sony." LB

MINERS PROTEST IN CHELYABINSK, SAKHALIN. Some 300 coal
miners near Chelyabinsk, Chelyabinsk Oblast, blockaded the
Trans-Siberian Railroad on 28 July for the second
consecutive day to protest non-payment of wages, Russian
news agencies reported. The Railroad Ministry warned that
Chelyabinsk's defense facilities and metallurgical plants
will be severely affected by the blockade, ITAR-TASS
reported on 27 July. Meanwhile, more than 50 miners in
Sakhalin Oblast are blocking coal supplies by rail and road
to the region's main power station for the fourth
consecutive day; as a result, there have been power cuts
among local residences and some businesses. The protesters
demand the plant pay them 50 million rubles ($8 million) for
delivered coal, while the plant's management argues that
they are owed 80 million rubles from consumers that rely on
the federal budget. Meanwhile, Kemerovo Oblast Governor Aman
Tuleev on 27 July failed to convince coal miners to lift the
23-day blockade of the Novokuznetsk-Tashtagol railroad in
Osinniki. BT

TRANSCAUCASUS AND CENTRAL ASIA

GEORGIAN AMBASSADOR TO MOSCOW OFFERED POST OF STATE
MINISTER. Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze has asked
Vazha Lortkipanidze to succeed Niko Lekishvili, who resigned
as minister of state on 26 July, Caucasus Press reported on
28 July. Lortkipanidze, 48, has asked for two days to decide
whether to accept that post. He began his political career
in the Georgian Komsomol, serving as first secretary from
1983-1986, when Shevardnadze was Georgian Communist Party
first secretary. He then served as first secretary of the
Kalinin (Tbilisi) Raion Party Committee of the Georgian
Communist Party. After Shevardnadze returned to Georgia in
March 1992, Lortkipanidze served first as deputy prime
minister and then as head of the head of state's
administration. He was named ambassador to Russia in early
1995. LF

MOST GEORGIAN MINISTERS RESIGN. Almost the entire cabinet of
ministers submitted their resignations on 27 July, with the
exception of Agriculture Minister Bakur Gulua and
Communications Minister Pridon Indjia, Caucasus Press
reported the following day. Indjia is under attack for
allegedly misappropriating a $4 million credit. Reuters
reported on 27 July that the defense, national security, and
interior ministers would be exempt from the cabinet
reshuffle. LF

RUSSIAN PEACEKEEPERS AGAIN FALL VICTIM TO LAND MINE. An
armored personnel carrier belonging to the Russian
peacekeeping contingent deployed in Abkhazia under CIS
auspices was blown up by a land mine on 27 July in
Abkhazia's Gali Raion. Abkhaz Deputy Interior Minister
Konstantin Adleiba told Interfax that two Russian servicemen
had been killed and three injured in the explosion, but a
Russian military spokesman said that three peacekeepers were
injured, one of whom subsequently died. Zurab Samushia, head
of the "White Legion" Georgian guerrilla organization,
disclaimed any responsibility for mining roads in Gali,
Interfax reported. A spokesman for the Georgian National
Security Minister, which the Russian Foreign Ministry has
accused of abetting the White Legion, similarly denied that
Georgia was to blame for the incident. LF

TRUBNIKOV IN YEREVAN. Russian Foreign Intelligence Service
Director Vyacheslav Trubnikov held talks in Yerevan on 27
July with Armenian President Robert Kocharian and National
Security and Interior Minister Serzh Sarkisian, Russian
agencies reported. The presidential press service told
RFE/RL's Yerevan bureau that it has no information on
Trubnikov's itinerary or the agenda of his talks with
Kocharian, but Interfax quoted a counselor at the Russian
embassy in Yerevan as saying that they discussed cooperation
in combating drug trafficking and organized crime. LF

RUSSIAN JOURNALISTS EXPELLED FROM TAJIKISTAN. NTV's Yelena
Masyuk has been declared "persona non grata" by the Tajik
authorities in Tajikistan, Interfax and ITAR-TASS reported
on 27 July. The head of the Tajik Foreign Ministry's
Information Department, Igor Sattarov, said Masyuk's reports
were damaging to the country's leadership and the peace
process. Sattarov singled out a recent NTV report on Tajik-
Uzbek relations, which Sattarov said was aimed at "breaking
up the fraternal ties between the two countries."
"Kommersant-Daily" reported on 28 July that Masyuk had
engaged in other activities that displeased the Tajik
government, such as traveling to the site where four UN
employees were murdered on 20 July without informing the
authorities of her plans. According to Russian daily, if
Masyuk were to apologize, Dushanbe would be "prepared to
forgive." But "if NTV blows this issue out of proportion,"
the Tajik authorities will close down the NTV office in
Dushanbe. BP

KAZAKH OIL WORKERS APPEAL TO PRESIDENT. Kazakhstan's Union
of Oil and Gas Workers has sent a letter to President
Nursultan Nazarbayev urging that he seek to stabilize the
situation in the Mangistau oil field, Interfax reported on
27 July. Workers there say that they have not been paid
since May and that this is the third consecutive year in
which payments have been delayed. Some have been requested
by the management to take three months' leave, while others
have been laid off. Prime Minister Nurlan Balgimbayev said
last week that falling oil prices on world markets have
already led Kazakhstan into a "pre-crisis" situation.
President Nazarbayev is unlikely to respond to the letter
until mid-August, when he returns from vacation in
Switzerland, where he is writing a book. BP

MAJOR INCREASE IN HEROIN BUSTS IN KYRGYZSTAN. So far this
year, law enforcement agencies in Kyrgyzstan have
confiscated more than 24 kilograms of heroin, compared with
4.5 kilograms for all of 1997, Interfax reported on 26 July.
The Kyrgyz Interior Ministry blames the large increase on
new laboratories in northeastern Afghanistan. Previously,
most narcotics confiscated were raw opium, but those
laboratories are now producing the finished product. A
special government commission concluded that only 5 percent
of the heroin transiting Kyrgyzstan is intercepted by law
enforcement agencies. BP

END NOTE

NO PROGRESS ON CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION WITHOUT FIXED BORDER

by Wim van Meurs and Iris Kempe

	Negotiations on an Estonian-Russian border treaty
began in 1994, three years after then RSFSR President Boris
Yeltsin recognized Estonian independence. Both the Estonian
and the Russian parties have changed their positions and
amended their arguments since then. In early 1996, some
progress was made on the maritime border, but the 1920 Tartu
Peace Treaty remained a stumbling block to the land
frontier. Estonia insisted on the validity of that treaty
without--as Estonian diplomats claimed--any "territorial
strings" attached. Moscow, for its part, rejected that
stance and linked the signing of the treaty to the treatment
of the Russian minority in Estonia.
	Estonian Prime Minister Mart Siimann finally opted for
a treaty containing no reference to Tartu, but in early
1998, the Russian side pushed for negotiations to be
reopened. Several inconclusive meetings followed, and talks
are scheduled to continue after the summer recess.
	Under the Tartu treaty, Soviet Russia recognized
Estonian independence and accepted a border demarcation
somewhat east of the frontier between the former tsarist
provinces. In the north, Narva had joined Estonia by
referendum in late 1917, and the treaty added several
villages on the left bank of the Narva River. In the south,
the region around Petseri, previously part of Pskov Oblast,
was incorporated into the Estonian state. When Stalin
occupied Estonia in fall 1944, he restored the tsarist
border, this time as a demarcation between the Estonian SSR
and Leningrad Oblast to the north and Pskov Oblast to the
south.
	Evidently, the current conflict is about national
symbols rather than minor Russian-inhabited territories
(totaling 2,322 square kilometers)--above all, the
continuity of the Estonian nation-state within its 1920
borders. No nationalist conservative politician in Tallinn
expects Russia to cede any piece of Russian territory, which
in any case would only increase the size of the Russian
minority in Estonia. Nevertheless, with the perception of
statehood continuity acting as such a potent legitimizing
symbol in contemporary Estonian politics, Siimann's decision
to formally cede territories was surprising, more so than
conservative politicians' insistence on historical rights.
	The consequences of the delay in signing the Estonian-
Russian border treaty are threefold. First, the conflict has
a European dimension. It was definitely no coincidence that
Siimann made his compromise on the eve of the NATO and EU
enlargement decisions. And Russian Foreign Minister Yevgenii
Primakov's recent demand that Estonia guarantee that Tartu
will not be mentioned in connection with the Estonian
parliament's ratification of the treaty can be understood
only as an attempt to mobilize national conservative forces
within Estonia against the treaty. With parliamentary
elections due in Estonia next spring, more of the same can
be expected from Moscow.
	While keeping its relations with Estonia in a state of
limbo, Moscow overlooks negative consequences at the local
and regional levels. Surprisingly, the same applies to
Tallinn: the Estonian government, for example, seems to
worry more about the Setu, an Estonian-speaking, Russian-
Orthodox minority in the Petseri region, than about the
socio-economic situation in the backward Estonian border
regions: In 1997, the government allocated a total of 60
million kroons (some $4 million) for regional policies and
no less than 10 million kroons for the Setu community across
the border.
	Second, there are also economic and administrative
consequences at the local or regional level. As a result of
the 1991 border, the northeastern part of Estonia, with its
derelict industrial complexes and its 90 percent Russian
population, faces the same economic collapse as the
agrarian, Estonian-populated southeastern. So far,
initiatives for improving cross-border infrastructure,
trade, and administrative regulations have come from
regional authorities and the business community. Among those
initiatives are the introduction of a ferry line between
Mustvee and Pskov, Estonian participation at trade fairs in
Pskov, and the 1997 cooperation between three Latvian and
three Estonian provinces as well as three border raions of
Pskov Oblast.
	Third, the unsolved border issue has practical
consequences in the immediate frontier area. Inhabitants of
Narva-Ivangorod regularly demonstrate against the visa
payment still needed to visit family members or one's dacha
across the border. Social and cultural cross-border contacts
in the south have also been seriously hampered by the border
issue, in particular for the small Setu minority living on
both sides of the frontier. It appears that setting up a
special border regime for locals of the immediate border
region depends on the signing of the border treaty.
	In sum, the border treaty is a football in Russian-
Estonian relations at the state level. For Moscow, it is an
effective instrument to destabilize Estonian national
politics and hamper the EU integration process. Tallinn
seems to be more troubled by the possible consequences in
foreign policy (EU accession) and in party politics (the
symbol of Tartu) than by the practical implications at a
regional and local level. Indeed, problems at the future EU
border not solved on a bilateral or regional level might
become European problems.
	Thus, the "direct neighborhood" between the future EU
member state and Russia also ought to include regional and
local cross-border cooperation, which might help sustainable
socio-economic development on both sides and reduce existing
asymmetries and enmities. The drive for such cooperation
exists at a regional level, in Tartu and Pskov. But what is
missing is a signed border treaty between Tallinn and
Moscow. After all, there can be no progress on cross-border
cooperation without a fixed border.

The authors are senior analysts at the Direct Neighborhood
program at the Center for Applied Policy Research, Munich.

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