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The N1 launch vehicle, developed by Russia in the 1960's, was to be the Soviet Union's counterpart to the Saturn V. The largest of a family of launch vehicles that were to replace the ICBM-derived launchers then in use, the N series was to launch Soviet cosmonauts to the moon, Mars, and huge space stations into orbit. In comparison to Saturn, the project was started late, starved of funds and priority, and dogged by political and technical struggles between the chief designers Korolev, Glushko, and Chelomei. The end result was four launch failures and cancellation of the project five years after Apollo landed on the moon. Not only did a Soviet cosmonaut never land on the moon, but the Soviet Union even denied that the huge project ever existed. Data is for the N1 launch vehicle as flown. These test vehicles did not exceed 2735 tonnes liftoff mass and 70 tonne earth orbit payload capability. Four flight tests, all failures. Manufacturer: Korolev. Launches: 4. Failures: 4. Success Rate: 0.00%. First Launch Date: 1969-02-21. Last Launch Date: 1972-11-23. Launch data is: complete. LEO Payload: 70,000 kg (154,000 lb). to: 225 km Orbit. at: 51.60 degrees. Apogee: 200 km (120 mi). Associated Spacecraft: Soyuz 7K-L1A, Soyuz 7K-LOK, LK, DLB Module, Mavr, OS-1 (1969), DLB Lunokhod 2, DLB Lunokhod 3, DLB Lunokhod 1, Global Communications Satellite Using Nuclear Power, MPK, OS-1 Lunar, OS-1 (1965). Other Associated Spacecraft: OS-1962, L3-1963, KK, TMK-1, TKS Heavy Space Station, OS, MEK, OP, L4-1963, L5-1963, L4-1960. Liftoff Thrust: 43,000.000 kN (9,666,000 lbf). Total Mass: 2,735,000 kg (6,029,000 lb). Core Diameter: 17.00 m (55.00 ft). Total Length: 105.00 m (344.00 ft). Flyaway Unit Cost $: 604.000 million. in: 1985 unit dollars.
Superraket.
The ancestor of the N1 lunar launch vehicle, this was the first heavy lift launch vehicle actively considered in the USSR. The 2,000 tonne liftoff mass was similar to the later N1 design, but the first stage would use a staggering cluster of around 66 Kuznetsov NK-9 engines (as opposed to the modest 24 NK-15's of the first N1 configuration). The real difference was in the second stage, which used the nuclear YaRD engine, giving the launch vehicle nearly double the later N1's payload capacity.
LEO Payload: 150,000 kg (330,000 lb). to: 185 km Orbit. Liftoff Thrust: 29,313.600 kN (6,589,959 lbf). Total Mass: 2,030,000 kg (4,470,000 lb). Core Diameter: 9.00 m (29.50 ft). Total Length: 64.00 m (209.00 ft).
N1 1962.
Final configuration of the N1 at the time of development go-ahead in 1962. The 75 tonne payload was to consist of the Raskat dispenser, which would have delivered 17 multi-megaton nuclear warheads, essentially destroying the United States in a single launch. The design also supported the OS-1 heavy space station and TMK manned Mars flyby requirements - as opposed to any manned lunar landing project. In the early projects a 'super ICBM' payload was proposed for the N1. The Raskat dispenser would have delivered 17 multi-megaton nuclear warheads, essentially destroying the United States in a single launch. Liftoff Thrust: 33,927.500 kN (7,627,205 lbf). Total Mass: 2,110,000 kg (4,650,000 lb). Core Diameter: 10.00 m (32.00 ft). Total Length: 74.00 m (242.00 ft).
N11.
It was originally planned the N1 would form the basis of a family of launch vehicles that could replace existing ICBM-derived boosters. The N11 would use the second, third, and fourth stages of the N1. This would give it a lift-off mass of 700 tonnes and a 20 tonne payload into low earth orbit. It could replace Chelomei's Proton launch vehicle in the medium-lift role.
LEO Payload: 20,000 kg (44,000 lb). to: 300 km Orbit. at: 51.60 degrees. Liftoff Thrust: 10,610.000 kN (2,385,220 lbf). Total Mass: 700,000 kg (1,540,000 lb). Core Diameter: 9.80 m (32.10 ft). Total Length: 40.00 m (131.00 ft).
N111.
It was originally planned the N1 would form the basis of a family of launch vehicles that could replace existing ICBM-derived boosters. The N111 would use the third and fourth stages of the N1, and the second stage of Korolev’s R-9 ICBM. This would result in a lift-off mass of 200 tonnes and a five tonne payload. It could replace the R-7 derived boosters (Vostok and Soyuz) in this payload category.
LEO Payload: 5,000 kg (11,000 lb). to: 300 km Orbit. at: 51.60 degrees. Liftoff Thrust: 2,325.500 kN (522,793 lbf). Total Mass: 215,900 kg (475,900 lb). Core Diameter: 4.80 m (15.70 ft). Total Length: 33.00 m (108.00 ft).
N11 1963. Status: Study 1963. Article Number: 11A53. A military variant of the N-11 which would use a powerful third stage, probably derived from the first stage of the 8K713 GR-1, to put up to 24 tonnes in low earth orbit. This was a competitor with Chelomei's UR-500K, which was selected instead for the heavy military payload mission.
LEO Payload: 24,000 kg (52,000 lb). to: 300 km Orbit. at: 51.60 degrees. Liftoff Thrust: 10,610.000 kN (2,385,220 lbf). Total Mass: 770,000 kg (1,690,000 lb). Core Diameter: 9.80 m (32.10 ft). Total Length: 60.00 m (196.00 ft).
N1 1964.
The N1 launch vehicle for the N1-L3 lunar landing mission as described in the draft project of 1964. Design requirement for the single-launch lunar-orbit-rendezvous lunar landing was 2750 tonnes liftoff mass and 95 tonnes low earth orbit payload. The actual N1 that flew in 1969 to 1972 had lighter first and third stages, but never demonstrated a full fuel load using superchilled propellants as planned in the draft project..
LEO Payload: 95,000 kg (209,000 lb). to: 225 km Orbit. at: 51.60 degrees. Liftoff Thrust: 44,000.000 kN (9,891,000 lbf). Total Mass: 2,750,000 kg (6,060,000 lb). Core Diameter: 17.00 m (55.00 ft). Total Length: 105.00 m (344.00 ft). Flyaway Unit Cost $: 604.000 million. in: 1985 unit dollars.
N11GR.
This 1962 project was designed by Korolev's OKB as a competitor to Chelomei's UR-500 against the military GR-2 (Global Rocket 2) requirement. The N-11GR was an adaptation of the basic N-11, derived from the second and third stages of the N1 heavy booster. The GR-2 was to be a kind of enormous multiple-warhead FOBS (fractional orbit bombing system). Surrounding the top of the second stage of the rocket, like bullets in an enormous revolver, were six final stages derived from the 8K713 GR-1 last stage. Each stage had a 1,500 kg nuclear warhead. The stages would separate from the main vehicle, and make violent maneuvers using independent guidance systems to put each warhead in a different low 160 km altitude orbit. At the end of 10,000 to 12,000 km journey along their separate orbital paths, the warheads would appear on US radar screens at the last moment with minimal warning. The total spread of the warheads would be 1800 km from left to right; two such missiles could devastate America's major cities from coast to coast. Chelomei's UR-500 instead was selected for the mission (and in turn never put into operation as a weapon). Payload: 9,000 kg (19,800 lb). to a: 6 x 1500 kg warheads, 160 km orbits, 1800 km apart trajectory. Liftoff Thrust: 10,610.000 kN (2,385,220 lbf). Total Mass: 753,000 kg (1,660,000 lb). Core Diameter: 9.80 m (32.10 ft). Total Length: 40.00 m (131.00 ft).
N1 Nuclear A. Nuclear orbital launch vehicle. Status: Study 1963. A version of the N1 with a nuclear upper stage was studied by Korolev in 1963. It was concluded that the optimum design would allow a single N1 to launch a direct manned lunar landing and return. However for manned Mars missions, a nuclear electric engine was found to be much more efficient. This essentially killed further consideration of thermal nuclear upper stages within the bureau. Following abandonment of the nuclear-ammonia ICBM projects, the engine bureaus of Bondaryuk (OKB-670) and Glushko (OKB-456) continued study of nuclear propulsion, but using liquid hydrogen for upper stage applications. Engines of 200 metric tons and 40 metric tons thrust with a specific impulse of 900 to 950 seconds were being considered. At the end of 1961 both bureaus completed their draft projects and it was decided to continue work on development of an engine in the 30 to 40 metric ton thrust range. In the following year Korolev was asked to study application of such engines, followed by a specific demand in May 1963 from the Scientific-Technical Soviet for specific recommendations. Korolev considered three variants based on the N1:
The study concluded that the two stage vehicle was the most promising. Compared to an equivalent vehicle using liquid oxygen/liquid hydrogen, mass in low earth orbit would be more than doubled. Optimal stage size was 700 to 800 metric tons for the Type A engines and 1,500 to 2,000 metric tons for the type V engines (this resulted in a halaciously large number of nuclear engines by Western standards). Use of the nuclear stage would result in a single N1 launch being able to launch a round-trip lunar landing (mass landed on lunar surface over 24 metric tons with return of a 5 metric ton capsule to earth). For a Mars expedition, it was calculated that the AF engine would deliver 40% more payload than a chemical stage, and the V would deliver 50% more. But Korolev’s study also effectively killed the program by noting that his favored solution, a nuclear electric ion engine, would deliver 70% more payload than the Lox/LH2 stage. Further investigation of nuclear thermal stages for the N1 does not seem to be pursued. Bondaryuk and Glushko turned to Chelomei and his competing UR-700 rocket for future application of such stages. LEO Payload: 270,000 kg (590,000 lb). to: 220 km Orbit. at: 51.60 degrees. Payload: 24,600 kg (54,200 lb). to a: lunar surface trajectory. Liftoff Thrust: 35,000.000 kN (7,868,000 lbf). Total Mass: 2,400,000 kg (5,200,000 lb). Core Diameter: 17.00 m (55.00 ft). Total Length: 180.00 m (590.00 ft).
N1 Nuclear AF. Nuclear orbital launch vehicle. Status: Study 1963. A variant of the first alternative considered in the 1963 nuclear N1 study. This was a 'high thrust' version of the Type A engine - apparently with higher propellant rate, lower specific impulse, and lower engine weight. Due to the very low density of the enormous liquid hydrogen upper stages, these immense vehicles would have been very ungainly (and had interesting stress problems during ascent!)
LEO Payload: 300,000 kg (660,000 lb). to: 220 km Orbit. at: 51.60 degrees. Payload: 27,100 kg (59,700 lb). to a: lunar surface trajectory. Liftoff Thrust: 35,000.000 kN (7,868,000 lbf). Total Mass: 2,500,000 kg (5,500,000 lb). Core Diameter: 17.00 m (55.00 ft). Total Length: 200.00 m (650.00 ft).
N1 Nuclear V. Nuclear orbital launch vehicle. Status: Study 1963. Second primary alternative considered for the 1963 nuclear N1 study. The immense liquid hydrogen tank of the second nuclear stage would have dwarfed the N1 first stage mounted below it in the shadows. The extremely poor thrust to weight ratio of the Type V engine design compared to that of the Type A remains unexplained.
LEO Payload: 420,000 kg (920,000 lb). to: 220 km Orbit. at: 51.60 degrees. Payload: 38,500 kg (84,800 lb). to a: lunar surface trajectory. Liftoff Thrust: 35,000.000 kN (7,868,000 lbf). Total Mass: 2,600,000 kg (5,700,000 lb). Core Diameter: 17.00 m (55.00 ft). Total Length: 190.00 m (620.00 ft).
N1 Nuclear V-B. Nuclear orbital launch vehicle. Status: Study 1963. N1 with nuclear upper stage. This variant of the Type V nuclear engine used a very heavy radiation shield to protect the crew of any manned spacecraft payload.
LEO Payload: 360,000 kg (790,000 lb). to: 220 km Orbit. at: 51.60 degrees. Payload: 33,000 kg (72,000 lb). to a: lunar surface trajectory. Liftoff Thrust: 35,000.000 kN (7,868,000 lbf). Total Mass: 3,060,000 kg (6,740,000 lb). Core Diameter: 17.00 m (55.00 ft). Total Length: 210.00 m (680.00 ft).
N-IF 1965.
The N-IF would be the first follow-on version with increased performance. The first stage engines would be increased in thrust from an average of 150 tonnes to 175 tonnes, and those in the second stage from 150 tonnes to 200 tonnes. The second and third stages would be substantially enlarged.
LEO Payload: 100,000 kg (220,000 lb). to: 220 km Orbit. at: 51.60 degrees. Liftoff Thrust: 51,500.000 kN (11,577,600 lbf). Total Mass: 2,950,000 kg (6,500,000 lb). Core Diameter: 17.00 m (55.00 ft). Total Length: 110.00 m (360.00 ft).
N-IM 1965.
The N-IM would mark an tremendous increase in vehicle size and was the ultimate pure liquid oxygen/kerosene version considered. The first stage engines would be increased to 250 tonnes thrust, without reducing reliability, through use of higher engine chamber pressure. Propellant load in the first stage would be almost doubled. Second stage engine thrust would increase to 280 tonnes each and the second and third stages again enlarged.
LEO Payload: 155,000 kg (341,000 lb). to: 220 km Orbit. at: 51.60 degrees. Liftoff Thrust: 74,000.000 kN (16,635,000 lbf). Total Mass: 4,950,000 kg (10,910,000 lb). Core Diameter: 17.00 m (55.00 ft). Total Length: 135.00 m (442.00 ft).
N-IFV-III.
Then N-IFV-III would add the Block V-III cryogenic third stage to the first and second stages of the N-IF.
LEO Payload: 125,000 kg (275,000 lb). to: 220 km Orbit. at: 51.60 degrees. Liftoff Thrust: 51,500.000 kN (11,577,600 lbf). Total Mass: 3,000,000 kg (6,600,000 lb). Core Diameter: 17.00 m (55.00 ft). Total Length: 125.00 m (410.00 ft).
N-IFV-II-III.
N-IFV-II, III would use only the first stage from the N-1F, and use new cryogenic second and third stages. This cryogenic second stage seems not to have been pursued beyond the study phase.
LEO Payload: 150,000 kg (330,000 lb). to: 220 km Orbit. at: 51.60 degrees. Liftoff Thrust: 51,500.000 kN (11,577,600 lbf). Total Mass: 3,250,000 kg (7,160,000 lb). Core Diameter: 17.00 m (55.00 ft). Total Length: 145.00 m (475.00 ft).
N-IMV-III.
Then N-IMV-III would add the Block V-III cryogenic third stage to the first and second stages of the N-IM. This provided the second-highest performance of the variations considered and would certainly have been cheaper than the N-IFV-II, III.
LEO Payload: 185,000 kg (407,000 lb). to: 220 km Orbit. at: 51.60 degrees. Liftoff Thrust: 74,000.000 kN (16,635,000 lbf). Total Mass: 4,950,000 kg (10,910,000 lb). Core Diameter: 17.00 m (55.00 ft). Total Length: 145.00 m (475.00 ft).
N-IMV-II-III.
N-IMV-II, III was the ultimate conventionally-powered N1 ever considered. It paired the monster N-1M first stage with new cryogenic second and third stages. Both liftoff thrust and payload of this vehicle would have been double that of the American Saturn V.
LEO Payload: 230,000 kg (500,000 lb). to: 220 km Orbit. at: 51.60 degrees. Liftoff Thrust: 74,000.000 kN (16,635,000 lbf). Total Mass: 5,200,000 kg (11,400,000 lb). Core Diameter: 17.00 m (55.00 ft). Total Length: 165.00 m (541.00 ft).
N-IU. Status: Study 1965. The N-IU would be the initial production version of the N1 following the mad rush to make the lunar landings. It would have essentially the same payload but would be substantially re-engineered for sharply improved reliability, most notably with autonomously operating engines. It is interesting to note that four years before the disastorous first flight Korolev already foresaw the potential engine problems that would be the downfall of the project.
LEO Payload: 95,000 kg (209,000 lb). to: 220 km Orbit. at: 51.60 degrees. Liftoff Thrust: 44,000.000 kN (9,891,000 lbf). Total Mass: 2,750,000 kg (6,060,000 lb). Core Diameter: 17.00 m (55.00 ft). Total Length: 105.00 m (344.00 ft).
N-IUV-III.
The N-IUV-III would replace the N-IU's conventional third stage with a LOX/LH2 cryogenic third stage. This was seen at the time as the first step in exploitation of cryogenic technology in Russia. Although pursued for some time, this large stage never went into development. The more modestly-sized Block R, Block S, and Block SR instead were put into development in the early 1970's.
LEO Payload: 115,000 kg (253,000 lb). to: 220 km Orbit. at: 51.60 degrees. Liftoff Thrust: 44,000.000 kN (9,891,000 lbf). Total Mass: 2,900,000 kg (6,300,000 lb). Core Diameter: 17.00 m (55.00 ft). Total Length: 120.00 m (390.00 ft).
N1M.
The N1M was to be the first Soviet launch vehicle to use liquid oxygen/liquid hydrogen high energy cyrogenic propellants. It was designed to launch payloads in support of the LEK lunar expeditions (two cosmonauts on the surface), the DLB (long-duration lunar base), and heavy unmanned satellites into geosynchronous and interplanetary trajectories. As originally conceived, the advanced propellants would be used in all upper stages. However due to delays in Kuznetsov development of a 200 tonne thrust Lox/LH2 engine, the final version used an N1 first stage, with a Block V-III second stage, and Blocks S and R third and fourth stages.
Associated Spacecraft: L3M-1970. Liftoff Thrust: 43,295.500 kN (9,733,216 lbf). Total Mass: 2,348,000 kg (5,176,000 lb). Core Diameter: 10.00 m (32.00 ft). Total Length: 96.00 m (314.00 ft).
N1F-L3M.
The N1M was found to be too ambitious. The N1F of 1968 was instead pencilled in to be the first Soviet launch vehicle to use liquid oxygen/liquid hydrogen high energy cyrogenic propellants. The N1F would have only used the Block S and Block R fourth and fifth stages in place of the N1's Block G and Block D.
Liftoff Thrust: 43,295.500 kN (9,733,216 lbf). Total Mass: 2,773,000 kg (6,113,000 lb). Core Diameter: 10.00 m (32.00 ft). Total Length: 104.00 m (341.00 ft).
N1F Sr.
The final more modest version of the N1F replaced the fourth and fifth stages of the N1 with the single liquid oxygen/liquid hydrogen Block Sr stage. Development of the Sr stage was from May 1971 until cancellation of the N1 project in May 1974.
Liftoff Thrust: 38,990.000 kN (8,765,300 lbf). Total Mass: 2,677,900 kg (5,903,700 lb). Core Diameter: 10.00 m (32.00 ft). Total Length: 94.00 m (308.00 ft).
N1F.
The N1F would have been the definitive flight version of the N1, incorporating all changes resulting from the four flight tests of the vehicle, including the new Kuznetsov engines and 10% greater liftoff mass by using superchilled propellants in all stages. N1 8L would have been the first N1F configuration flight, with launch planned in the third quarter of 1975 at the time the project was cancelled.
LEO Payload: 105,000 kg (231,000 lb). to: 220 km Orbit. at: 51.60 degrees. Associated Spacecraft: L3M-1972. Liftoff Thrust: 44,400.000 kN (9,981,500 lbf). Total Mass: 3,025,000 kg (6,668,000 lb). Core Diameter: 17.00 m (55.00 ft). Total Length: 105.00 m (344.00 ft).
N1-MOK.
Ultimate derivative of N1. Single-stage-to-orbit vehicle based on N1 Block A. Propellants changed to LH2/LOX, 16 x modified NK-33 engines + 4 Liquid Air Cycle Engine Liquid Air/LH2 boosters. All figures estimated based on tank volume of Block A and delivery of 90,000 kg payload to 450 km / 97.5 degree MKBS orbit. Briefly described in RKK Energia official history and in some detail in Peter James'
Liftoff Thrust: 31,928.600 kN (7,177,835 lbf). Total Mass: 1,200,000 kg (2,600,000 lb). Core Diameter: 10.00 m (32.00 ft). Total Length: 36.00 m (118.00 ft).
N1 Chronology 1956 September 30 - First official plan for future Soviet spaceflight Spacecraft: Sputnik 3, Vostok, Zenit-2. This set forth the following objectives: orbiting of satellites of 1.8 to 2.5 tonnes mass by 1958; one week flight of a manned spacecraft by 1964; unmanned reconnaissance satellite by 1970; rocket capable of 12 tonne escape velocity payload by 1970; rocket with 100 tonne low earth orbit payload to be developed, capable of placing 2 to 3 men on the moon (no date set). 1957 During the Year - USSR starts ion engine development Spacecraft: TMK-E. At the urging of S P Korolev, OKB-1 Section 12, led by M V Melnikov, started development of an ion engine. By 1959 it would be proposed that clusters of the 7.5 kgf thrust ion engine could take the TMK-E manned Mars spacecraft on a low acceleration spiralling trajectory away from the Earth until it finally reached escape velocity and headed toward Mars. But to power even such a limited engine solar panels with a total area of 36,000 square meters would be required - clearly beyond 1959 technology. Feoktistov's solution was to turn to the use of a nuclear reactor to power the ion engine. 1958 June 30 - Development of Soviet nuclear-powered rockets authorised. Central Committee of the Communist Party and Council of Soviet Ministers Decree 'On the Creation of pockets With Engines on the Basis of Nuclear Energy Applications--work on a draft project for rockets with nuclear engines' was issued. Competing engine designs were in development by Glushko’s OKB-456 and Bondaryuk’s OKB-670. Both designs used existing available reactors in cyldindrical housings, with the reactors operating at 3000 degrees K. The propellant was heated in the reactor and exhausted through four expansion nozzles. The Glushko engine operated with ammonia, while the Bondaryuk engine used a mixture of ammonia and alcohol. With such propellants a specific impulse of 430 seconds was achieved. 1959 During the Year - TMK Heavy Piloted Interplanetary Spacecraft Spacecraft: TMK-1. In 1959 a group of enthusiasts in OKB-1 Section 3 under the management of G U Maksimov started engineering design of this first fantastic project for manned interplanetary travel. The requirements for executing this project would shape the specifications for the N1 launch vehicle. The TMK-1 would then be put on a free flight trajectory towards Mars. After 10.5 months it would fly by Mars, dropping remote controlled landers, and then be flung by the gravity of Mars into an earth-return trajectory. Only minor midcourse manoeuvres would be required. The first flight to Mars of the TMK-1 was planned to begin on June 8, 1971, with the crew returning in a re-entry capsule to the earth on July 10, 1974, after a voyage of three years, one month, and two days. A variation of this scenario involved flybys of Venus on the return voyage, and may have been the project given the code name 'Mavr' ('Moor' or MArs - VeneRa). 1959 December 31 - Nuclear propulsion work abandoned. Korolev abandons work on nuclear-powered rockets. Future launch vehicles to be based on conventional lox/keroesene propellants. 1960 June 23 - Soviet plan for mastery of space issued. Spacecraft: TMK-E. Decree 715-296 'On the Production of Various Launch Vehicles, Satellites, Spacecraft for the Military Space Forces in 1960-1967' authorised design of a range of spacecraft and launch vehicles by Korolev, Yangel, and Chelomei. The decree included the N1 (development of launch vehicles of up to 2,000 tonnes liftoff mass and 80 tonne payload, using conventional chemical propellants) and nuclear reactors for space power and propulsion. 1960 June 23 - Korolev tries to obtain support for a military orbital station Spacecraft: OS. Korolev wrote to the Ministry of Defence, trying to obtain support for a military orbital station (OS). The station would have a crew of 3 to 5, orbited at 350 to 400 km altitude. The station would conduct military reconnaissance, control other spacecraft in orbit, and undertake basic space research. The N-I version of the station would have a mass of 25 to 30 tonnes and the N-II version 60 to 70 tonnes. Korolev pointed out that his design bureau had already completed a draft project, in which 14 work brigades had participated. 1961 February 12 - Space plans Spacecraft: Vostok. Flight: Vostok 1. Kamanin describes Korolev. He is unable to make a decision about the man's true nature. Everyone is excited about the new seven-year plan, approved on 23 January 1960 in decree 711-296, which authorises design work to start on the N1 superbooster. In the immediate future, Vostok 3KA flights are planned every 8 to 10 days beginning 22 February until the first manned flight is achieved. The first flights will use mannequins to test the cosmonaut ejection seat. A manned flight will be attempted after two consecutive successful mannequin flights. In the West, the failed Venera 4 launch is being analysed as an attempted manned flight. Some Italians claim to have picked up voices on radio from the satellite. Kamanin describes all of this as unfounded speculation -- the Soviet Union will not risk a man's life until two fully successful mannequin flights demonstrate safe recovery. 1961 May 3 - The draft project of the TKS Heavy Space Station was completed Spacecraft: TKS Heavy Space Station. Also known as TOSZ - Heavy Orbital Station of the Earth, this was Korolev’s first 1961 project for a large N1-launched military space station. 1961 May 13 - Soviet response to Apollo program Spacecraft: Kosmoplan, Raketoplan, Elektron-A, Elektron-B, LK-1. Soviet Decree 'On the Revision of Plans for Space Objects for Accomplishing Goals of Defence Designations--heavy boosters, course of work on Elektron, and suspension of work of work on the Kosmoplan and Raketoplan with continuation of new Raketoplan work' was issued. The decree set the end of 1965 as the date for the first launch of the N1. It also authorised Chelomei to stop work on Kosmoplan interplanetary probes and instead concentrate on a specific Raketoplan design - the LK-1 manned lunar flyby spacecraft. 1961 June 1 - Moon program go-ahead in response to U.S. start Spacecraft: Soyuz A, Soyuz B, Soyuz V, LK-1. Chelomei is informally asked by Khruschev to begin design of a booster and spacecraft for a manned circumlunar mission (UR-500 Proton and LK-1). There is no authorization for a lunar landing program, although Korolev, Yangel, and Chelomei all begin booster designs. 1961 October 12 - TMK-1 draft project was completed. Spacecraft: TMK-1. Design of the manned Mars flyby spacecraft had involved nearly all sections of Korolev's OKB-1. Those who worked on the TMK included A I Dylnev, A K Algypov, A A Kochkin, A A Dashkov, V N Kubasov, V E Bugrov, and N N Protacov. Kubasov would be selected as a cosmonaut in 1966. 1962 During the Year - GR-2 (Global Rocket 2) requirement. The GR-2 was to be a kind of enormous multiple-warhead FOBS (fractional orbit bombing system). Competitors included Korolev's N-11GR; Chelomei's UR-500; and Yangel's R-56 During February 1962 - Pitsunda Conference - Decision to start design of UR-500 and N1 lunar boosters The Soviet leadership attends a secret exhibition of Soviet rocket technology in a sporting hall at Pitsunda, on the Black Sea. The Chief Designers offer competing designs. It is decided that the R-16, R-9, UR-200, UR-500, and N1 will go forward. Yangel's R-56 is rejected. Additional Details: Pitsunda Conference - Decision to start design of UR-500 and N1 lunar boosters. 1962 April 12 - First Soviet announcement of manned lunar goals Spacecraft: Soyuz A, Soyuz B, Soyuz V. First Soviet public announcement of manned lunar goals. 1962 April 13 - N1 development slowed. Decree 'On restriction of work on the N1' was issued. 1962 April 16 - N1, R-36, R-36-O, and R-56 rockets authorised. Decree 'On Important Development of Intercontinental Ballistic and Global Missiles and Carriers-Rockets for Space Objects--work on the N1, R-36, R-36-O, and R-56' was issued. 1962 April 20 - OP -Orbital Belt Spacecraft: OP. Korolev’s fantastic ‘Orbitalniy Poyas’ (OP -Orbital Belt) scheme anticipated Ronald Reagan’s Strategic Defence Initiative by 25 years. Two to three large N-I launched military manned stations would control a constellation of strategic assets. Geosynchronous nuclear-powered satellites would provide secure communications. Piloted reconnaissance spacecraft would surprise the enemy, observing military preparations without warning. The orbital stations would provide continuous observations of the territory of the imperialist block. 1962 September 24 - N1 and GR-1 authorised. Central Committee of the Communist Party and Council of Soviet Ministers Decree 1021-436 'On start of work on the N1 and GR-1' was issued. Following a review of the N1 project by an Academy of Sciences expert commission headed by Keldysh in July, this decree provided a detailed plan leading to a first launch by the end of 1965. Planning and drawing release for the GR-1 were completed by this date and the decree ordered test flights to begin in the third quarter of 1963. However development problems with the NK-9 engine resulted in continual delays. Finally in 1964 Korolev's GR-1 was cancelled and Yangel’s R-36 was selected for the mission. This would deprive Korolev of a vital test-bed for flight test of the N1 engines. 1962 September 25 - N1 launch vehicle upgraded to accomodate OS-1 75 tonne manned platform with nuclear weapons. Spacecraft: OS-1 (1965). Work on the OS-1 began following a meeting between Khrushchev and chief designers at Pitsunda. Korolev was authorized to proceed immediately to upgrade the three stage N vehicle to a maximum 75 tonne payload in order to launch the station. By 1965 the mockup of the huge station had been completed. 1962 November 1 - Chelomei takes over Lavochkin and Myasishchev OKBs Spacecraft: Soyuz 7K-L1. At Khrushchev's decision Chelomei takes over Lavochkin's OKB-301 and Myasishchev's OKB-23. Lavochkin had built objects 205, 207, 400 (SA-1,2,5); Chelomei UR-96 ABM-1. 1963 March 21 - Baikonur LC110L. Design work starts on N1 launch complex. 1963 March 21 - Presidium of Inter-institution Soviet Spacecraft: Soyuz A, Soyuz B, Soyuz V, Soyuz 7K-OK. The expert commission report on Soyuz is reviewed by the Chief Designers from 10:00 to 14:00. The primary objective of the Soyuz project is to develop the technology for docking in orbit. This will allow the spacecraft to make flights of many months duration and allow manned flyby of the moon. Using docking of 70 tonne components launched by the N1 booster will allow manned flight to the Moon, Venus, and Mars. Keldysh, Chelomei and Glushko all support the main objective of Soyuz, to obtain and perfect docking technology. But Chelomei and Glushko warn of the unknowns of the project. Korolev agrees with the assessment that not all the components of the system - the 7K, 9K, and 11K spacecraft - will fly by the end of 1964. But he does argue that the first 7K will fly in 1964, and the first manned 7K flight will come in 1965. 1963 April 28 - N1 Plans Spacecraft: TMK-1, L3-1963, OS-1 (1965). An Inter-Institution Soviet considers Korolev's N1 plans. He believes the first booster will be launched in 1965. The N1 is to have a payload capability of 75 tonnes to a 250 km altitude orbit, 50 tonnes to a 3000 km altitude orbit, and 16 tonnes in geostationary orbit. It could launch spacecraft capable of landing men on the moon and returning them to earth, or manned flybys of Mars or Venus. Three to ten launches would be needed for such missions, with the components being docked together in low earth orbit. The N1 can also be used to launch a large space station for military research. After the N1 discussion a decision is made that cosmonauts will not have to spend more than three to four days in a spacecraft mock-up on the ground to prove their readiness for flight. A simulation of the entire flight duration is not necessary. 1963 May - Nuclear N1 designs At the end of 1961 the Glushko and Bondaryuk bureaux completed their draft projects on nuclear thermal engines for space vehicle upper stages. It was decided to continue work on development of an engine in the 30 to 40 tonne thrust range. In the following year Korolev was asked to study application of such engines, followed by a specific demand in May 1963 from the Scientific-Technical Soviet for specific recommendations. For a Mars expedition, it was calculated that the AF engine would deliver 40% more payload than a chemical stage, and the V would deliver 50% more. But Korolev’s study also effectively killed the program by noting that his favoured solution, a nuclear electric ion engine, would deliver 70% more payload than the Lox/LH2 stage. Further investigation of nuclear thermal stages for the N1 does not seem to be pursued. Bondaryuk and Glushko turned to Chelomei and his competing UR-700 rocket for future application of such stages. 1963 September 1 - Baikonur LC110L. Construction begins of N1 launch complex 1963 October 4 - Gagarin identified as head of lunar cosmonauts Tereshkova announces in Havana that Gagarin head of lunar cosmonaut team. 1963 November 13 - N1 launch site facility construction approved. Central Committee of the Communist Party and Council of Soviet Ministers Decree 'On approval of the schedule of work for the N1 launch complexes' was issued. 1963 December 24 - N1 ground equipment construction authorised. Decree 'On ensuring the manufacture of ground equipment for the N1' was issued. 1964 February 12 - Kremlin meeting on lunar landing plans Spacecraft: L3-1963. VVS officers meet with O G Ivanovskiy for two hours. The Communist Party plans a lunar expedition in the 1968-1970 period. For this the N1 booster will be used, which has a low earth orbit payload of 72 tonnes. The minimum spacecraft to take a crew to the lunar surface and back will have a minimum payload of 200 tonnes; therefore three N1 launches will be required to launch components, which will have to be assembled in orbit. However all of these plans are only on paper, and Kamanin does not see any way the Soviet Union can beat the Americans to the moon, who are already flying Apollo hardware for that mission. 1964 May 12 - Korolev's plans Spacecraft: Voskhod, Soyuz A, Soyuz B, Soyuz V. Flight: Voskhod 1, Voskhod 2, Voskhod 3, Voskhod 4, Voskhod 5, Voskhod 6, Soyuz A-1, Soyuz A-2, Soyuz A-3, Soyuz A-4. While Kamanin is away arranging screening of Voskhod candidates, Korolev meets with the VVS General Staff. He tells them he wants to have four Voskhods completed by the anniversary of the October Resolution for the first spacewalk. He dreams of a manned lunar flyby by either docking Soyuz A-B-V modules in orbit, or in a single N1 launch (no metal has even yet been cut for the N1 at Kuibyshev). In order to further develop EVA techniques he wants to convert a further five Vostoks into the Voskhod configuration. Meanwhile Kamanin agrees to a compression of the medical screening schedule from 20-25 days to 15-17 days. The physicians will reduce it no further than this. 1964 June 19 - R-56 super booster canceled. Decree 'On termination of work on the R-56 launch vehicle and on schedule of the testing for the N1' was issued. 1964 July 19 - Korolev obtains preliminary approval for a single-launch, lunar orbit rendezvous, manned landing. Spacecraft: Soyuz 7K-LOK, LK, L3-1963, LK-1. Work on the original N1-L3 had begun in 1963. This had been preceded by two years of working on a draft project for the LK lunar lander and its propulsion system. But there was no money for full scale development -- no code name from Gosplan against which to charge such work. It was annoying that Chelomei, Glushko, and Yangel were wasting resources on alternate designs at the same time. Additional Details: Korolev obtains preliminary approval for a single-launch, lunar orbit rendezvous, manned landing.. 1964 July 21 - Korolev's single-launch lunar scheme reviewed by the Chief Designers Spacecraft: Soyuz 7K-LOK, LK. How to achieve the additional N1 payload was a key point of discussion. Additional Details: Korolev's single-launch lunar scheme reviewed by the Chief Designers. 1964 August 1 - Full scale development of Soviet manned lunar flyby and landing projects authorised. Spacecraft: LK-1, Soyuz 7K-LOK, LK, Luna Ye-8, Soyuz A. Flight: Soyuz A-1, Soyuz A-2, Soyuz A-3, Soyuz A-4. Central Committee of the Communist Party and Council of Soviet Ministers Decree 655-268 'On Work on the Exploration of the Moon and Mastery of Space--piloted LK-1 circumlunar and L3 lunar landing projects and the Ye-6M lunar lander' was issued. Chelomei was to develop the three-stage UR-500K booster and LK-1 spacecraft for the manned lunar flyby. Korolev was to develop the totally different N1 booster and L3 spacecraft complex for the manned lunar landing. First launch of the N1 was to be by the first quarter 1966, with manned lunar landings in 1967 to 1968. Reprioritization led to work being stopped on Korolev's Zvezda 6-man orbiting weapons platform by mid-1965, after a huge mockup had been built. Korolev felt that if he had the full support of the Communist Party, the military, and industry he could achieve this goal, and this decree ordered such support. The USSR would be first on the moon. But in truth the draft project behind the decree had not solved all of the technical problems, or provided a solution on how to achieve the required payload on either the booster or spacecraft side. New technology features required for success of the scheme included an advanced guidance system in the N1 third stage equipment bay, the enormous fuel tanks in the N1 first stage, and the Lox/LH2 fuel cells needed for the LOK lunar orbiter. But the real technical problem with the N1-L3 design was the total lack of any weight growth reserve. Even thought the systems had not even been developed yet, engineers were fighting over tens of grams in their weight allocations, let alone the kilograms normally at issue. Development of Korolev's Soyuz A-B-V, a competing circumlunar project, was evidently still authorised, although it duplicated Chelomei's LK-1. 1964 September 1 - Baikonur LC110L. Construction start of N1 launch complex 110 east 1964 September 14 - Voskhod abort system Spacecraft: Voskhod, LK-1. Flight: Voskhod 1. Kamanin reviews the Voskhod abort system with Korolev. Up to T+27 seconds, there is no possibility of saving the crew in the event of a booster failure; from T+27 seconds to T+44 seconds, escape would be difficult, but is possible; and from T+44 seconds to T+501 seconds abort should be possible, with the capsule landing on Soviet territory. Afterwards, Korolev speaks with Kamanin secretly and privately. Korolev reveals that he has discussed a greater VVS role in space with Marshal Krylov, but that Krylov is adamantly opposed to the VVS assuming such a mission. Korolev is seeking a resolution from the Communist Party that will authorise him to develop a manned lunar flyby and landing system using his N1 booster. He believes that Chelomei's UR-500 booster will not have sufficient payload to mount a manned flyby - a docking in low earth orbit will be required. But Chelomei has rejected the use of docking, and is even designing his UR-700 to allow a lunar landing without the use of docking. Finally Korolev gets to the purpose of the secret meeting. He wants Feoktistov to be aboard Voskhod 1, despite the opinion of Kamanin and the physicians. Kamanin reiterates that the most qualified crew would be Komarov, Volynov, and Lazarev; and if he gives in on Feoktistov, then Komarov, Feoktistov, Lazarev. But Korolev is opposed to Lazarev, and insists that the crew should be Komarov, Feoktistov, and Yegorov. From Kamanin's point of view this is flying a space mission with two invalids aboard. Lazarev is a qualified and fit flight surgeon, a qualified pilot as well as a physician with 15 years of research experience in aviation medicine. Korolev is adamant that the two passengers should be civilian, not military. No agreement is possible. 1964 September 24 - Khrushchev visits Baikonur Spacecraft: Voskhod, Berkut, LK-700. Flight: Voskhod 2. This was his last visit, just weeks before his overthrow. The Soviet leadership were shown the UR-100 and observed launches of the competing UR-200 and R-36. Khrushchev agreed with the decision to put the R-36 into production instead of Chelomei’s UR-200. He felt he couldn’t turn down Yangel a third time after approving Korolev’s N1 instead of Yangel’s R-56 and Chelomei’s UR-100 instead of Yangel’s R-26. Khrushchev decided to cancel Korolev’s badly behind schedule R-9A, even though Smirnov and Ustinov insisted they wanted it in their arsenal (in May 1965, after Khrushchev’s overthrow, this decision was reversed and the R-9A went into production). Khrushchev also visited a secret space fair, with Korolev, Chelomei, Yangel, and Glushko presenting their rockets and spacecraft. Chelomei presented his UR-700 heavy lift design as an alternative to Korolev’s N1. This presentation was a surprise to Ustinov and Dementiev. Khrushchev ordered Chelomei to prepare a draft proposal for the design. Chelomei hoped that 12 to 18 months later, when the UR-700 draft project would be completed, the fallacy of Korolev’s N1 design would be apparent to all. Korolev’s N1 plans were also reviewed and approved at the meeting. Over the two days, Khruschev witnessed five launches of rockets by Korolev, Yangel, and Chelomei, all of them successful. Gagarin and Belyayev explained the Vykhod spacecraft to him, and Leonov donned a spacesuit and demonstrated how he would exit into open space form the inflatable airlock and return thereafter. All went very well. This was the last time Khrushchev saw the chief designers of the Soviet rocket industry. Despite his support for them not one of them visited him in his retirement. 1964 October 28 - Lunar project orders issued to industry. Spacecraft: LK-1, Soyuz 7K-LOK, LK, Luna Ye-8. Military-Industrial Commission (VPK) Decree 'On assignment of lunar programs to OKB-52 and OKB-1' was issued. November 1964 - Korolev's admits that N1 cannot attain payload needed for single-launch mission Spacecraft: LK, Soyuz 7K-LOK, LK-700. Korolev speaks privately to Chertok. Kozlov has told him it will be impossible to build an N1 with the 93 tonne payload capability until the fourth flight article. The L3 concept was still the same as in the August decree - 2 cosmonauts aboard the LOK orbiter, one aboard the LK lander. Korolev asks Chertok to take 800 kg out of the weight budget for the L3. Chertok informs him that they are already 500 kg over the August budget. This is still without all the unknowns of the automated lunar landing being solved. Additional Details: Korolev's admits that N1 cannot attain payload needed for single-launch mission. During 1965 - N1 development issues Spacecraft: Luna E-6, LK, Soyuz 7K-LOK. There were two camps on the N1-L3 control systems. One group was within OKB-1, and had developed the systems for the Vostok and Zenit spacecraft, under the personal oversight of Korolev. They stressed the maximum quality and reliability in their systems. The second group had worked with Pilyugin, and had designed the systems for the Mars, Venus, Luna E-6 probes, the R-9, RT-1, RT-2, and GR-1 missiles; and piloted spacecraft. Their design emphasis was on maximum usability and output. Pilyugin had been named chief designer of the control system for the N1-L3. Additional Details: N1 development issues. 1965 February 10 - L3 single-launch spacecraft draft project approved. Spacecraft: LK, Soyuz 7K-LOK. Interdepartmental Scientific-Technical Council on Space Research (MNTS-KI) Decree 'On approval of the L3 draft project' was issued. The decree followed a review by a Keldysh-led Academy of Sciences state commission the previous December. The decree moved the first flight of the N1 to the end of 1966. Additional Details: L3 single-launch spacecraft draft project approved.. Spring 1965 - Guidance system for N1 cannot support planned schedule Spacecraft: LK, Soyuz 7K-LOK. By the second quarter of 1965 Pilyugin was already notifying OKB-1 that he could never have the booster guidance system ready for the planned first launch in 1968 - not to even mention the systems for the LOK and LK. 1965 September 1 - Voskhod/Soyuz crewing plans Spacecraft: LK-1, LK, Soyuz 7K-LOK, Soyuz 7K-L1, Voskhod. Flight: Voskhod 3, Voskhod 5, Soyuz 1, Soyuz 2A, Soyuz 3A, Soyuz 4A. Kamanin meets with Korolev at 15:00 to discuss crew plans. As Soyuz pilot candidates, Kamanin proposes Gagarin, Nikolayev, Bykovsky, Komarov, Kolodin, Artyukhin, and Matinchenko. Korolev counters by proposing supplemental training of a supplemental group of engineer-cosmonauts from the ranks of OKB-1. He calls Anokhin, his lead test pilot, informs Korolev that there are 100 engineers working at the bureau that are potential cosmonauts candidates, of which perhaps 25 would complete the selection process. Kamanin agrees to assist OKB-1 in flight training of these engineer-cosmonauts. Kamanin again proposes Volynov and Katys as prime crew for the Voskhod 3 12-15 day flight. Korolev reveals that, even though Kamanin will have the crew ready by October, the spacecraft for the flight may not yet even be ready by November - Kamanin thinks January 1966 is more realistic. The discussion turns to the female EVA flight - Ponomaryova as pilot, Solovyova as spacewalker. It is decided that a group of 6 to 8 cosmonauts will begin dedicated training in September for lunar flyby and landing missions. Korolev advises Kamanin that metal fabrication of the N1 superbooster first article will be completed by the end of 1965. The booster will have a payload to low earth orbit of 90 tonnes, and later versions with uprated engines will reach 130 tonnes payload. Korolev foresees the payload for the first N1 tests being a handful of Soyuz spacecraft. 1965 September 6 - Problems in lunar projects addressed. Spacecraft: Soyuz 7K-L1, Soyuz 7K-LOK, LK. Ministry of General Machine Building (MOM) Decree 'On delays in work on piloted lunar programs' was issued. 1965 December 20 - Decision to use analogue guidance in early N1 launches Spacecraft: LK, Soyuz 7K-LOK. Pilyugin called Keldysh to tell him he had heard that Keldysh again wanted to form an expert commission to study guidance system development problems with the N1, with Bushuyev as the head. Additional Details: Decision to use analogue guidance in early N1 launches. 1965 December 31 - Daunting year ahead Spacecraft: Soyuz 7K-OK, Soyuz 7K-L1, Soyuz 7K-LOK, LK. Flight: Soyuz 1, Soyuz 2A, Soyuz 7K-L1 mission 1, Soviet Lunar Landing. Kamanin looks ahead to the very difficult tasks scheduled for 1966. There are to be 5 to 6 Soyuz flights, the first tests of the N1 heavy booster, the first docking in space. Preparations will have to intensify for the first manned flyby of the moon in 1967, following by the planned first Soviet moon landing in 1967-1969. Kamanin does not see how it can all be done on schedule, especially without a reorganization of the management of the Soviet space program. 1966 January 14 - Korolev's death Spacecraft: Voskhod, Soyuz 7K-OK. Korolev dies at age 59 during what was expected to be routine colon surgery in Moscow. The day began for Kamanin with firm plans finally in place for the next three Voskhod and first three Soyuz flights. Volynov and Shonin will be the crew for the first Voskhod flight, with Beregovoi and Shatalov as their back-ups. That will be followed by a female flight of 15-20 days, with the crew begin Ponomaryova and Solovyova, with their back-ups Sergeychik (nee Yerkina) and Pitskhelaura (nee Kuznetsova). Tereshkova will command the female training group. Training is to be completed by March 15. After this Kamanin goes to his dacha, only to be called by General Kuznetsov around 19:00, informing him that Korolev has died during surgery. Kamanin does not minimise Korolev's key role in creating the Soviet space program, but believes the collectives can continue the program without him. In truth, Kamanin feels Korolev has made many errors of judgment in the last three years that have hurt the program. Mishin, Korolev's first deputy, will take over management of Korolev's projects. Kamanin feels that Mishin is a clever and cultured engineer, but he is no Korolev. Over the next three days the cosmonauts console Korolev's widow. Korolev's surgery was done personally by Petrovskiy, the Minister of Health. Korolev was told the surgery would take only a few minutes, but after five hours on the operating table, his body could no longer endure the insult, and he passed away. 1966 February 1 - Baikonur LC110L. Construction starts on N1 launch pad 110 west. 1966 February 14 - N1 redesign to increase payload to 95 tonnes Following Korolev's death, Mishin discovered that growth of the mass of the L3 payload had taken the low earth orbit payload requirement to 95 tonnes, beyond the 75 tonne lifting capability of the N1. To achieve the 95 tonne payload, changes in plans and redesign of the N1 would be necessary. The measures taken were: reduction of the orbital inclination for the initial earth orbit from 65 degrees to 52 degrees; reduce the altitude of the lunar orbit from 300 km to 220 km; increase the propellant mass by supercooling the propellants prior to loading in the lunach vehicle (the kerosene to be at -15 to -20 degrees Centigrade, the liquid oxygen to -191 degrees centigrade); add six engines to the first stage; increase thrust of all the engines on the first, second, and third stages by 2%; add a fourth stabilizer. The result of all of these measures would increase the launch mass to 2800 tonnes and the payload to the required 95 tonnes. 1966 March 6 - Soviet design bureaux reorganised and renamed. Spacecraft: LK, Soyuz 7K-LOK, Soyuz 7K-OK, Soyuz 7K-L1. Decree 'On renaming OKB-1 as TsKBEM and OKB-52 as TsKBM' was issued. In 1966 Afanasyev reorganised the military industrial complex. OKB-1 was redesignated TsKBEM. Sergei Osipovich Opakhin was made First Deputy within the new organization. However within TsKBEM there were no relative priorities for the projects competing for resources. The R-9 and RT-2 ICBM's, the orbital, circumlunar, and lunar orbiter versions of Soyuz, the LK lunar lander, the N1 booster -- all were 'equal'. It seemed folly to be pursuing the orbital ferry version of the Soyuz when no space station had to be funded. But it was felt flying the spacecraft would solve reliability questions about the design, so it was pursued in parallel with the L1 and L3 versions. 1966 May 11 - Mishin selected as Korolev's replacement after four-month delay Spacecraft: LK, Soyuz 7K-LOK. Flight: Soyuz 1, Soyuz 2A. From 1963-1965 Ustinov was both head of the Soviet for the National Economy and the First Secretary of the Presidium of Soviet Ministers. He supported civilian space projects and instructed the military to co-operate in them. But after Khrushchev was ousted, Ustinov had less influence with the Ministry of Defence. After the death of Korolev in January, a letter was sent to the Central Committee requesting that Mishin be appointed director of OKB-1. Ustinov tried to line up support for Mishin, but by the time of the first first Saturn IB orbital flight on 26 February 1966, no decision had been made. America was progressing on the path to the moon, but Russia was stalled. An alternate that had been considered was Sergei Okhapkin, another Deputy Chief Designer at TsKBEM. But Okhapkin knew only spacecraft, he had never developed complete launch-booster-spacecraft systems. By the time Mishin was appointed, it was clear that the race was lost. The American's planned their first Saturn V launch in September 1967 and their first manned flight in 1968. Mishin could not expect trials of the LK lunar lander until 1969 at the earliest. There were insufficient funds allocated, and the schedule had no allowance for test flight failures. Ustinov, Morozhin, and Keldysh pointed fingers as to who had presented such unrealistic schedules to the Politburo. Keldysh now supported unmanned robot lunar landers in development by Babakin. Even these would not land until 1970, allowing three years of flight trials to achieve reliability. Khrushchev, it seemed, was to blame for such enormous unaffordable projects. This in turn put Ustinov in danger, as Khrushchev's point man for space. 1966 September 1 - N1-L3 manned landing profile approved. Spacecraft: LK, Soyuz 7K-LOK. Central Committee of the Communist Party and Council of Soviet Ministers Decree 'On approval of the N1-L3 mission profile' was issued. September 1966 - N1 two-launch moon scenario proposed Spacecraft: LK, Soyuz 7K-LOK, Soyuz 7K-OK, Soyuz 7K-L1, Soyuz 7K-LOK, Molniya-1. Bushuyev proposed a two launch variation on Korolev's single-launch scheme. The increased-payload version of the N1 with six additional engines was not planned to fly until vehicle 3L. 1L and 2L were to be technology articles for ground test with only the original 24 engine configuration. At that time the first Apollo test flight was planned by the end of 1966, and the US moon landing no later than 1969. The Soviets expected the first test of their LK lander in 1969, and concluded they could not expect to land a Soviet man on the moon until 1972. Additional Details: N1 two-launch moon scenario proposed. 1966 September 14 - N1 plans approved. Spacecraft: LK, Soyuz 7K-LOK. Academy of Sciences Decree 'On course of work on the N1-L3' was issued. 1966 September 16 - Communist Party delegates visit Baikonur Communist Party delegates from Interkosmos states visited Baikonur for two days. They were shown the N1 launch complex and viewed a Molniya-1 launch. They were the first non-Russians to see the N1 complex. 1966 September 17 - Competing lunar landing designs to be evaluated. Spacecraft: LK-700, LK, Soyuz 7K-LOK. Military-Industrial Commission (VPK) Decree 'On creation of a commission to compare the UR-700-LK-700 and the N1-L3' was issued. 1966 November 1 - Delays in Soviet manned lunar programs addressed. Spacecraft: Soyuz 7K-L1, Soyuz 7K-LOK, LK. Decree 'On lag of work on the N1-L3 and UR-500K-L1 programs' was issued. 1966 November 10 - Lunar coordination problems Spacecraft: Soyuz 7K-LOK. Kamanin diary complains of lunar coordination problems. 1966 November 15 - Baikonur -. First N1 hardware arrives at Baikonur. 1966 November 16 - Government go-ahead for N-1 use in lunar program Spacecraft: Soyuz 7K-LOK, LK-700. Mishin's draft plan for the Soviet lunar landing was approved by an expert commission headed by Keldysh. The first N-1 launch was set for March 1968. At same meeting, Chelomei made a last ditch attempt to get his revised UR-700/LK-700 direct landing approach approved in its place. Although Chelomei had lined up the support of Glushko, and Mishin was in a weak position after Korolev's death, Keldysh managed to ensure that the N1-L3 continued. However continued design work on the LK-700, the UR-700 booster, and development of the RD-270 engine were authorised. 1966 November 18 - N1 facilities tour Spacecraft: Soyuz 7K-OK. Flight: Soyuz 1, Soyuz 2A. Rudenko and Kamanin meet with Mishin at Area 31 (18-20 kilometers east of Area 2). Launch preparations are reviewed, and Mishin satisfies them that the two Soyuz will be launched on 26-27 November. The State Commission will meet officially tomorrow at 16:00. For today, they tour the N1 horizontal assembly building at Area 13. Korolev planned the N1 as early as 1960-1961. It will have a takeoff mass of 2700-3000 tonnes and will be able to orbit 90-110 tonnes. The first stage of rocket has 30 engines, and the booster's overall height is114 m. The construction of the assembly plant, considered a branch of the Kuibyshev factory, began in 1963 but is still not finished. Two factory shops are in use, and the adjacent main assembly hall is truly impressive - more than 100 m in length, 60 m high, and 200 wide. Work on assembly of the ground test version of the rocket is underway. Assembly will be completed in 1967, and it will be used to test the systems for transport to the pad, erection of the booster, servicing, and launch preparations. The booster is to be ready for manned lunar launches in 1968. The construction site of the N1 launch pads occupies more than one square kilometre. Two pads are located 500 meter from each other. Between and around them is a mutli-storied underground city with hundreds of rooms and special equipment installations. Only late in the night Rudenko and Mishin finally agree that the crews for the first manned Soyuz flights will be: Basic crews: Komarov, Bykovsky, Khrunov, Yeliseyev; Back-up crews: Gagarin, Nikolayev, Gorbatko, Kubasov. Meanwhile poor weather in Moscow is delaying zero-G training for the flight. In the last week only one weightless flight on the Tu-104 was possible - and a minimum of 24 flights need to be flown before the launch. It was therefore decided to ferry one Tu-104 to Tyuratam and train the cosmonauts here - it made its first flight today. 1966 December 31 - 18 cosmonauts in lunar training Spacecraft: Soyuz 7K-LOK. Gagarin, Komarov, Nikolayev, Bykovsky, Khrunov, Gorbatko, Voronov, Kolodin, Popovich, Gubarev, Artyukhin, Gylyayev, Belousov, Kolesnikov, Volynov, Doborvolsky, Zhobolov. During 1967 - N1 development progress The KORD system detected and controlled the parameters of 42 engines (30 first stage + 8 second stage + 4 third stage) This involved processing 1600 data elements. Additional Details: N1 development progress. 1967 February 1 - Government approves landing on moon by end 1968 Spacecraft: Soyuz 7K-LOK. Soviet government approves plan to land cosmonaut on moon by end 1968. N-1 test plan approved, envisioning third quarter 1967 as beginning of flight hardware construction. Fall-back project would be manned circumlunar mission. First manned L1 mission imagined as early as June 1967. First N1 launch by March 1968. 1967 February 4 - L1/L3 launch schedules set Spacecraft: Soyuz 7K-L1, Soyuz 7K-LOK. The following is the schedule set be decree for the L1 and L3 projects:
Serial # Mission Date
2P Develop Block D stage Feb or Mar 67
3P same Mar 67
4L Unmanned lunar flyby May 67
5L Unmanned lunar flyby Jun 67
6L Manned lunar flyby Jun or Jul 67
7L&8L Manned lunar flybys Aug 67
9L&10L Manned lunar flybys Sep 67
11L&12L Manned lunar flybys Oct 67
13L Reserve spacecraft
N1-3L
Serial # Mission Date
3L Develop LV & Blocks G&D Sep 67
4L Reserve
5L LOK/LK unmanned Dec 67
6L LOK/LK unmanned Feb 68
7L Manned LOK/unmanned LK Apr 68
8L Manned LOK/unmanned LK Jun 68
9L Piloted LOK/unmanned LK
with LK landing on moon Aug 68
10L First men land on moon Sep 68
11L Reserve
12L Reserve
Kamanin's personal opinion of this schedule - manned L1 flights may occur before the end of 1967, but there will be no lunar landing until 1969.
1967 February 14 - Fairing for OS space station authorised. Spacecraft: OS-1 (1969). Ministry of General Machine Building (MOM) Decree 'On construction of the N1 payload fairing by the Khrunichev Plant' was issued. 1967 March 5 - Three Soviet subjects begin full year in closed-loop NEK Mars spacecraft simulator. Spacecraft: TMK-1. The Institute of Medical-Biological Problems (IMBP) and the Zvezda design bureau (designer of the ejection seat, space suits, and environmental control system for the Vostok spacecraft) became partners with OKB-1 in developing the SOZh closed-loop environemental control system. An earth-based simulator - the Earth Experimental Complex (NEK) was built. V Ulibishev, G Manovtsev, and A Bozhko spent an entire year in this closed-environment test unit beginning on 5 March 1967. An analogous US experiment was conducted for only 90 days in July-September 1970. 1967 March 14 - Lunar flyby/landing program plan reviewed Spacecraft: Soyuz 7K-L1, Soyuz 7K-LOK, Soyuz 7K-L1A, LK. UR-500K/L1 project will consist of three phases. Phase I will be dedicated to development of the Block D translunar stage, using prototype, incomplete L1 spacecraft. Phase II will conduct lunar flybys with complete but unmanned L1 spacecraft. Phase III will fly Soviet cosmonauts around the moon. The N1/L3 project will consist of five phases. Phase I will use the N1 and the 7K-L1A spacecraft. This will be used primarily to test out the Block G translunar and Block D lunar orbit insertion stages, but will also conduct lunar flybys, returning photographs of the lunar surface to the earth. Phase II will use N1's to fly L3 spacecraft with an unpiloted LOK lunar orbiter and an unpiloted LK lunar lander. Phase III, the first manned missions, will use N1's to fly L3 spacecraft with a piloted LOK lunar orbiter and an unpiloted LK lunar lander. Phase IV will fly a piloted LOK lunar orbiter and an unpiloted LK lunar lander, that will be landed on the lunar surface. In Phase V N1-L3 number 10L is to launch the first manned landing on the moon in September 1968. N1-L3 numbers 11L and 12L were back-ups, in the event any of the planned earlier missions failed. Additional Details: Lunar flyby/landing program plan reviewed. 1967 March 15 - CIA reports on Soviet space developments Spacecraft: Soyuz 7K-LOK. CIA reports accurately development of N-1, Almaz, Proton, etc.... even states 100,000 kg large space station in development for launch by N-1 by 1969. CIA does not expect lunar landing until early 1970's. 1967 June 15 - First test of liquid hydrogen/LOX engine for N1M First test of the 11D56 in an iron stand version. First test of an engine with these propellants in USSR for use in a space launch vehicle. 1967 August 31 - Baikonur LC110R. N1 launch pad 110 east completed 1967 September 20 - Review of N1 progress. Spacecraft: Spiral OS, LK-700. The booster was supposed to be launched by 1966, but there is no way it will be finished this year, and it is highly questionable it will even get off the ground in 1968. The N1 tanks are pressurised to 2 atmospheres, and can go up to three atmospheres in an emergency. In the enormous MIK assembly hall are three N1's - one 'iron bird' ground test model and two flight vehicles. The first roll out of the mock-up will take place in 1967, and the first launch attempt is still expected in 1968 (the first launch will not be attempted until the second and third stages complete stand tests. There is no test stand for the first stage, it will be fired for the first time in flight). An explosion would destroy the pad, requiring several years of repairs. There are two pads, but even that would not be a guarantee of the availability of the rocket due to the poor expected initial reliability. The N1 project is costing 10 billion roubles, not including considerable investment required by the military. To Kamanin the whole thing is a boondoggle, showing the necessity for development of lighter air-launched boosters. He believes there are many mistakes in design and construction, but Mishin, Pashkov, Smirnov, and Ustinov support these doubtful projects of Korolev and Mishin, instead of technically sound projects such as Chelomei's UR-700 or MiG's air-launched spacecraft. If Mishin thinks the current Proton/L1 reliability is only 0.6, then that of the completely unproved N1/L3 must be even less... 1967 October 10 - Lunar Soviet Spacecraft: L5-1967. The meeting is headed by Afanasyev. The first N1 will have a payload of only 76 tonnes, versus the 95 tonnes required for the L3 lunar landing complex. In order to land two cosmonauts on the moon, as the Americans are planning, a 105 tonne low earth orbit payload would be needed. This would require new engines in the first and second stages. Kuznetsov says that his 153 tonne engine could be uprated to 170 tonnes without any basic changes. Lox/LH2 engines would be needed for the upper stages. Keldysh questions the safety of the current plan of landing only one cosmonaut on the moon. Mishin replies that putting two cosmonauts on the moon simply is not possible with the N1. Chelomei raises a question - How is it possible that the Americans have built he Saturn V, which can put 130 tonnes in low earth orbit, in order to land two men on the moon, and Mishin says he can do the same mission with 105 tonnes? Mishin claims that this is due to the lighter design and construction of the L3. The following decisions are made:
1967 October 29 - Cosmos 188 launch scrubbed. Spacecraft: Soyuz 7K-OK. The Soyuz-B ('Baikal') launch was delayed to 30 October due to problems with the celestial navigation system aboard Cosmos 186. Later that day an N1-L3 review is held. The first launch vehicle will be completed in two to three weeks, but the launch complex will not be ready until next January. The first trials of the booster on the pad will begin in February-March 1968, with the first launch in the second half of the year. 1967 November 13 - Kamanin's thoughts on first Saturn V launch. The first Saturn V and Surveyor 6 have been launched by the Americans. Kamanin catalogues why the Americans are beating them: bad organisation, on the parts of Ustinov, Smirnov, Pashkov, Malinovskiy, and Grechko; technical errors and an undisciplined approach to the fulfilment of government decrees concerning the Soyuz and N1 on the parts of Chief Designers Korolev and Mishin; lack of coordination between the institutes and design bureaux compared to the United States; and finally, the Americans are spending several times more money than has been dedicated to the Soviet space program. 1967 November 14 - N1-L3 moon landing schedule revised. Spacecraft: Soyuz 7K-LOK, LK. Decree 'On revision of the timetable for the N1-L3' was issued. 1967 November 25 - Baikonur LC110L. N-1 mockup 1M1 rolled out to launch pad Stays on pad until 12 December for facilities checks. Photographed by US reconnsat on 11 December. 1M1 mockup scrapped in 1975. 1967 December 2 - Lunar Soviet. A panel headed by Afanasyev and Mishin reviews the readiness of the N1. The mock-up booster is to complete pad compatibility tests by 30 March 1968. The first launch is still supposed to take place in the second half of 1968. The launch of the American Saturn V in November has reenergized the workers at Tyuratam. Kamanin is impressed - he was less sure of success, knowing all the problems of a project that requires the labour of thousands of persons. Afanasyev then turns to crew selection issues. The original resolution said that a cosmonaut was to be launched by an N1-L3 by April 1968. Mishin says he will be able to make two launches in the second half of 1968. It will take 18 to 24 months to train crews. But to date, Mishin still won't agree to crew selections, despite dozens of contacts and letters from Kamanin to Ustinov and Smirnov. There are still no simulators for the L3. Mishin wants to launch to the moon only engineers from TsKBEM. He is given an ultimatum: either the VVS will leave the space program, requiring Mishin to take over all training and crew responsibilities, or reach an agreement on crew composition in the next few days. Afansyev orders the commission to convene again in two to three days. 1967 December 27 - Mishin to remain in charge until first L3 launches. Afanasyev holds meetings on the L3 lunar expedition program. Kamanin recites Mishin's failings. Afanasyev replies that he has talked to Ustinov about it, but Ustinov will leave the current management in charge until N1 flight tests begin. If they are unsuccessful, then Mishin alone will have to answer for it. Afansyev also assures Kamanin that although Feoktistov should be allowed to train for a space flight, he and Ustinov will make sure he never flies. 1968 January 23 - Three-launch Soviet lunar expedition pitched Spacecraft: LK, Soyuz 7K-LOK, Soyuz 7K-L1, L3M-1970. The 'big' Soviet of Chief Designers meets and the three-launch landing concept developed a month earlier is presented in detail. Pilyugin pointed out that this was a typical contradiction. Mishin had just made a presentation to the expert commission justifying that the one-launch scheme was safe and reliable. Now they wanted to put forward a new scheme because the one-launch scheme was unsafe and unfeasible. Additional Details: Three-launch Soviet lunar expedition pitched. 1968 January 28 - Sergei Osipovich Okhapkin put in charge of the N1 at TsKBEM This decision led to one of Mishin's famous 'illnesses', putting him out of action for a period. 1968 March 1 - Originally planned N-1 first launch Spacecraft: Soyuz 7K-LOK. Slipped to May. 1968 March 13 - Lunar cosmonaut training program approved. Spacecraft: Soyuz 7K-LOK, LK. Decree 'On approval of the training program for lunar cosmonauts' was issued. This incuded the final moon landing plan. 1968 March 13 - L3 project plan. Spacecraft: Soyuz 7K-LOK, LK. Titov is going to Italy, Feoktistov to Hungary. The 30 month program for the L3 lunar landing is settled. The cosmonauts already began training in January. The first LK lunar lander will be tested in low earth orbit in the second half of 1969. The first Soviet manned lunar landing cannot take place any earlier than 1970-1971. The resolution had set the date as 1967-1968, but the N1 and L3 will not be ready in time. The L3 is still conceptual, a purely paper spacecraft. The first N1 was to have been moved to the pad by March of this year, but it won't even make that milestone by May. 1968 April 4 - Soviet view on Saturn V The second successful launch of the Saturn V stunned the Soviet engineers. They could not believe the variety and volume of data telemetered back in real-time to the launch centre. They viewed with jealousy the launch room set-up at Cape Canaveral - where each engineering speciality could sit in their own comfortable chair, viewing data as the booster ascended on a computer screen. 1968 May 7 - Baikonur LC110R. N1 booster 4L erected at launch complex 110 east A September 1968 flight test was planned. However the first stage LOX tank developed hairline cracks during ground tests. 4L was removed from the pad in June 1968. The first stage was cannibalized; the upper stages were incorporated into the 1M1 mockup for further training of the launch crews. 1968 June 23 - First test of N1 stages Construction of the test facilities at Zagorsk for the N1 were directed by Tabakov's NII-229. First static test of the EU-15 test article of the N1's 1200 tonne thrust Block B second stage began on 23 June 1968. Test of the EU-16 Block V third stage began in early 1969, with three trials tests completed. But for the Block A first stage, only single engine tests were undertaken at Kuznetsov's OKB-236. Additional Details: First test of N1 stages. 1968 June 30 - N1 ground vehicle 1M1 moved to launch pad 110 east While the next N1, 3L was being built, the 1M1 was moved back to the pad for further ground tests and launch crew training. It remained there until the end of September. 1968 September 19 - Bulldozer delays N1 launch by two months Spacecraft: Soyuz 7K-L1. The Zond 5 situation remains the same. The star trackers quit working, and the use of the back-up systems has not been completely successful. However the spacecraft is on course for a ballistic re-entry. At Area 112 Afanasyev heads the State Commission for the N1-L3 first launch. There are problems with the launch complex. The main electrical cable to the launch complex was accidentally bulldozed. The back-up cables were buried only 30 cm from the main line and both were destroyed. The cables were poorly marked. It will take 50 days to repair the damage. This will delay first launch until the second half of November 1968, and the second launch to February 1969. Most likely the first launch cannot take place until next year. 1968 October 24 - N1 - lost opportunity in 1961 Spacecraft: LK, Soyuz 7K-LOK. Flight: Soyuz 3. Glushko has a private conversation with Isayev at the N1 MIK during the Soyuz 3 launch preparations. Glushko revealed to Isayev that in 1961 he had offered Korolev a compromise - if Korolev would use the same 'packet' scheme for the N1 that he had used on the R-7, so that the individual engine modules could be individually tested on the ground before flight, Glushko would give up his insistence on the use of storable propellants. However, after checking with Mishin, Korolev would not compromise. Additional Details: N1 - lost opportunity in 1961. 1968 November 15 - Baikonur LC110R. N1 1M1 mockup erected on pad with L1S payload Spacecraft: Soyuz 7K-L1. The N1 mockup was again erected on the pad, in order to conduct tests of the L1S payload in advance of the availability of the 3L launch vehicle. 1968 November 21 - The N1-L3 state commission meets. Spacecraft: Soyuz 7K-LOK, LK. The previous launch date of 25 November has been pushed back to January 1969. The N1 has completed a good cycle of ground tests, but work on the L3 has not even begun. There is no news when it will be ready. The L3 plan called for the first article to be ready in March 1968. 20 cosmonauts from the L1 and Soyuz groups were to have trained on the spacecraft. But MOM never issued the implementation plan to the industrial enterprises to begin work on the spacecraft. 1968 December 12 - Kamanin catalogues the reasons the Soviet Union is losing the moon race Spacecraft: Soyuz 7K-LOK, LK, Soyuz 7K-L1.
1968 December 22 - Soviet reaction to Apollo 8 Flight: Apollo 8, Voskhod 3. Apollo 8 has been launched. Kamanin recalls that he first saw a model of the Saturn V during his visit to Washington DC with Titov in 1962. At that time the Soviet Union planned to fly the N1 in four years, but the only manned spacecraft on the drawing boards after Voskhod was the Sever. Khrushchev didn't give a go-ahead for the lunar program until 1964. In the gap between Voskhod and Soyuz flights, when the American Gemini program seized the lead, the USSR could have achieved a record by flying Volynov for 18 days in Voskhod 3. But this was cancelled at the last minute by the leadership because the Voskhod had 'no development potential'. Ustinov, Smirnov, Pashkov were responsible for this decision, which put the USSR permanently behind in the space race. 1968 December 23 - Soviet crisis meeting mulls response to Apollo 8 Spacecraft: LK, Soyuz 7K-LOK. Flight: Apollo 8. Following the success of Apollo 8, Ustinov calls a crisis meeting at the Ministry of Defence. His question - how to reply to the American's success? Additional Details: Soviet crisis meeting mulls response to Apollo 8. 1968 December 25 - Soviets consider lunar landing alternatives Spacecraft: |
